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This synthesis review of key lessons in the management of small-scale fisheries is part 
of a collaboration between the Rockefeller Foundation and the Foundation Center, 
aimed at helping organizations and individuals build more effectively on each other's 
experience. With financial support from the Rockefeller Foundation, the Foundation 
Center is engaging in synthesis reviews such as this one, as well as the development 
of related practices and supportive technologies that facilitate the collection, synthesis 
and sharing of the sector's collective knowledge.
Our goal and hope is that such efforts can support the development of programmatic 
and funding strategies that start with a more inclusive and comprehensive under-
standing of what has worked, what hasn't, and why. We encourage you to make use of 
this report, to explore its online components at fisheries.issuelab.org, and to share it 
widely with colleagues across sectors.
This synthesis review was produced by a team from IMM led by Jock Campbell. 
IMM is a leading research, development and consultancy group providing innovative 
solutions to global development problems. Jock Campbell is a policy, institutions and 
planning specialist with many years of development experience. He holds a BSc in 
Zoology with Marine Zoology from University College of North Wales and an MSc in 
Sea-Use Law, Economics and Policy-Making from the London School of Economics 
and Political Science. Team members included Philip Townsley, Emma Whittingham 
and Jessica Marsh.
Nancy MacPherson
ManaGinG DiReCtoR, evaluation
tHe RoCKefelleR founDation
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This synthesis review of key factors supporting small-scale coastal fisheries manage-
ment was commissioned by the Rockefeller Foundation through a contract with Itad 
Ltd. The work was carried out by a team based at IMM Ltd, in Exeter, UK, from July 
to September 2013. 
It was designed to provide an evidence base on the success factors in small-scale 
coastal fisheries management in developing countries and, in turn, to assist the Rock-
efeller Foundation in developing its strategy for its Oceans and Fisheries Initiative. In 
doing so, it identifies and describes some 20 key factors believed to influence success 
in small-scale coastal fisheries management.
The synthesis first presents an outline of the methods used in the study followed by 
a background of coastal fisheries, an introduction to fisheries management themes, 
and a review and discussion of some of the critical factors that influence success. It 
then offers some conclusions and possible ways forward. 
The review process
This report was completed via a rapid review of key sources of knowledge from formal 
published literature, institutional literature, key informants and Internet searches. 
The focus was on key success factors in achieving a balance of social, economic and 
ecological benefits from the management of small-scale coastal fisheries. 
Background to coastal fisheries 
Small-scale coastal fisheries is an important sector. It contributes very significantly 
to food and nutrition security, employment, income and providing livelihoods for 
many very poor people. The diversity of coastal resources creates opportunities for 
these people, and the ease of becoming a fisher means that many people depend on 
fisheries for all or part of their household livelihood strategies. 
However, as people are often able to enter the fishery with ease, many fisheries are 
over-capitalized with too much investment in fishing capacity, some are over-exploited 
and their contribution to wider economic development is being poorly used. Today, 
87.3 percent of fisheries are either over-exploited or fully exploited (FAO, 2012a). 
These issues are compounded by a number of other human activities that result in 
coastal pollution and habitat destruction, further depleting resources. Subsidies to 
the fisheries sector in the past have increased the excessive pressure on resources, 
and destructive fishing methods are threatening wider ecosystem functions in many 
coastal areas. Growing global demand for fish by a variety of users and the penetra-
tion of global marketing chains to almost all corners of the world are also creating 
incentives to over-exploit fisheries. 
Climate change is also beginning to affect coastal habitats, such as coral reefs which 
are under severe threat. These are some of the richest habitats and provide a wide 
diversity of opportunities for coastal people. 
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Climate change is likely to have other effects on both the ecology and the liveli-
hoods of people who live near the coast, including increasing their exposure to 
natural hazards. The climate is only one of a number of factors that are changing. 
Today’s fishers are faced with fuel and food price rises, changes in demand for fish 
and changes in market structures which are forcing fisheries and fisheries manage-
ment to confront issues in the much broader contexts of the wider ecology and local 
and national economies.
Fisheries management
Much of the current situation of poorly managed fisheries results from past policies 
and practices. On the back of historic views that fisheries could not be depleted, 
national governments and intergovernmental organizations promoted the expansion 
of fisheries and subsidized expansion in capital, technology and skills. The momentum 
of this growth meant that fishing capacity has now expanded beyond that required 
for full and efficient utilization of the fisheries. 
Many different forms of fisheries management have evolved, depending on the 
perceived aims of the management process. Early forms of customary marine tenure 
focused on the locally controlled management of resource access and benefits. As 
fisheries developed, yield maximization approaches were adopted which, in turn, 
gave rise to concerns for the environment and for maximizing sustainable economic 
returns from fisheries management. Thus, approaches have been added that confer 
rights – individual, community and human – on the people in the sector to achieve 
both efficiency and equity gains. This recognition of the wider ecological and 
economic implications of poor fisheries management also has stimulated an interest 
in more holistic approaches that go beyond fisheries and include ecosystem-based 
approaches and integrated coastal management. Such approaches are increasingly 
looking closely again at community involvement in fisheries management through 
co-management arrangements, under which the community and government share 
roles and responsibilities. 
Impacts
The social, economic and ecological impacts of fisheries management are hard to 
measure. However, in the big picture, it can be said that a balance of sustainability, 
efficiency and equity goals have not been achieved. In fact, with the current state 
of the world’s fisheries, most people would conclude that, overall, the management 
process has largely failed. 
Key success factors
In spite of this rather negative picture of the management process, there are indica-
tions that some elements of fisheries management – in some locations and under 
some circumstances – have contributed to success. While there is no single approach 
or management system that addresses all the problems facing fisheries management 
globally, there is a growing belief that if enough of the factors affecting success are 
brought together, they have the potential to reverse fisheries’ downward spiral. 
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This report identifies 20 of these key success factors, grouping them under three 
broad headings: i) factors affecting policy and planning, ii) factors affecting technical 
implementation and iii) factors affecting community engagement. This division is 
more for ease of presentation, as there are considerable overlaps between levels. 
In many cases, these overlaps are as important as the factors themselves. The key 
factors are summarized below. 
Factors affecting policy and planning 
These factors tend to operate at the policy and planning levels, but also can influence 
what happens at the policy implementation and community engagement levels.
1. Embracing complexity and integration. 
 Fisheries encompass interactions among people, the environment, political and 
social institutions, and markets, making for a complex system. In the past, t he 
focus tended to be on simplifying fisheries in order to understand them, e.g. using 
single species models of management from temperate fisheries on multi-species 
small-scale fisheries. However, this did not fully address the complexity of these 
fisheries and the biodiversity upon which they tend to depend. These small-scale 
fisheries are also very closely linked to local economies, which greatly influences 
the movement of people in and out of the fishery. At the same time, this com-
plexity is rapidly changing as climate change and other global pressures affect 
the way fisheries operate – all of which indicates that engaging with complexity 
is becoming more urgent. If the management of small-scale coastal fisheries is 
to be successful, then a greater emphasis needs to be placed on understanding 
and responding to this complexity rather than externalizing it. Fisheries man-
agement must embrace that complexity and integrate with the wider local and 
national economies and development process. 
2. Addressing conflicting aims. 
 The inherent complexity of fisheries has been compounded by confusion over 
the aims of fisheries management. The aims of fisheries, and therefore fisheries 
management, are often diverse and mixed. Different stakeholders have different 
objectives, as is often reflected in contradictory policies and management plans. 
Effective means of linking the aims of the sector to the wider development aims 
of resolving conflicts between different objectives and prioritizing those objec-
tives are usually lacking. This leads to confusion as to what the management 
process is trying to achieve, and contributes to the lack of success of fisheries 
management approaches. It is important to recognize and address these con-
flicting and contradictory aims if fisheries management is to be successful and 
contribute to national development aims. 
3. Recognizing the importance of context. 
 Part of the complexity of fisheries is that each fishery has developed within, 
and responds to, the local ecology, culture, economy, social patterns and political 
forces that operate around it. Efforts to seek a common solution are bound to 
be frustrated by this local diversity. This does not mean that solutions cannot 
be found, but they must take the local context into account. A key part of this 
xprocess will be the full and meaningful engagement of local communities in the 
management process. 
4. Operating at multiple scales. 
 Although the local context is important, there is also a need to understand the in-
terconnectedness of different local situations. This interconnectedness operates 
through ecological, economic, social, cultural and political structures and 
processes at local, national, regional and global scales. Increasingly, it is recog-
nized that working at multiple scales is needed to understand the wider context 
and to accommodate it in the fisheries management process. A variety of ap-
proaches to this are being piloted and used, including large marine ecosystems 
(LMEs), Seascapes, Marine Ecoregions, Regional Seas and Integrated Coastal 
Management (ICM). ICM has been used most extensively in the context of 
linking coastal fisheries to wider development processes, but all these approach-
es have wider and more holistic elements that attempt to integrate fisheries more 
realistically with other ecological and economic development areas. 
5. Ensuring institutional coherence. 
 Recognizing the complexity of fisheries management and the need to link 
fisheries much more closely to other economic, social, ecological and political 
processes at different scales indicates the importance of ensuring institutional 
coherence across these processes and at different levels. This is particularly so 
in terms of policy coherence, legislative coherence and the incentives provided 
by policy instruments. For example, where the establishment of well-defined 
rights to access fisheries resources is seen as an important part of fisheries man-
agement, it also needs to be recognized in policy and legislation at all levels. 
6. Ensuring the viability and sustainability of ecosystem function. 
 Fisheries cannot survive if there are no fish to catch. Ensuring the viability and 
sustainability of ecosystem function underpins the long-term survival of fisheries 
and the benefits that flow from them. Management measures such as marine 
protected areas have an important role to play in this process. However, it is 
important to understand this role in terms of the local ecological as well as socio-
economic context.  In particular, environmental management measures will have 
different effects on different groups of stakeholders in the fishery. In many situ-
ations, fishing opportunities will decline in the short to medium term for at least 
some people, and the fishers’ abilities to react will also differ. Thus, management 
interventions should pay particular attention to sequencing interventions and 
measures to support fishers during transition to better management. 
7. Adapting to external pressure and change. 
 Even under the best fisheries management system, change is inevitable. This is 
becoming more pronounced as climate change takes effect and the forces that 
drive markets for labor, capital and fish become more globalized. In addition, 
in the face of outside opportunities, local economies are rapidly changing 
and coastal populations are increasing. With global media reaching even the 
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most remote parts of the world, people’s perceived needs and aspirations are 
changing. Adapting to all of these external pressures and changes must become 
an important part of the fisheries management process. Efforts to address 
change by incorporating more adaptive planning and processes into fisheries 
management are increasing. This can be facilitated through greater recognition 
of the inherent adaptive capacities of fishing communities and using these ca-
pacities to support greater community resilience in the face of change. 
Factors affecting technical implementation
These are factors that address more of the practical implementation aspects of 
fisheries management.
8. Establishing legal group rights and responsibilities. 
 There seems to be widespread agreement that the allocation of clearly defined 
and limited rights in fisheries is essential if we are to stop further over-capitaliza-
tion of the fishery and provide a basis for rebuilding many fisheries into viable, 
sustainable and equitable entities. Although there is less agreement about the 
form of those rights, there is increasing recognition of the value of group-held 
rights in developing countries where peer pressure can be a valuable force 
for improved management. Establishing group rights and responsibilities in 
fisheries can create clear incentives and a sense of commitment to making man-
agement work and stimulate a sense of responsibility for the sustainable use of 
those resources. However, a group’s right to harvest can also become the group’s 
right to over-exploit if adequate checks and balances are not in place. This would 
suggest the importance of users and the state sharing roles and responsibilities 
through some form of co-management structure. These rights should not just be 
rights to harvest resources but should also include the right to a livelihood, good 
health care and education, and other human rights so often unavailable to the 
poor. 
9. Incrementally changing to allow for capacity, reflection and negotiated 
response. 
 Changes in both policy and policy implementation will require substantial 
changes: in the way fisheries are managed; in the skills, attitudes and knowledge 
for management; and in new institutional structures, processes and linkages that 
can facilitate that change. This will require both the courage to make significant 
changes in what is often a knowledge vacuum, and the humility to accept that 
other groups of people may have something important to say about fisheries 
management – including the young, the old, women, processors, traders and 
shopkeepers. Such massive changes cannot occur quickly, they need time for 
reflection, experimentation, negotiation and acceptance. It is important to adopt 
change incrementally to assist this process and provide space for change. 
10. Institutional fit and subsidiarity. 
 This change process also requires allocating institutional roles and responsibili-
ties at different levels, although decisions should ideally be made as close to the 
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fishery as is possible while remaining effective. This will often link closely with 
the administrative devolution processes increasingly being adopted in develop-
ing countries. Getting the right institutional fit and the right level of subsidiarity 
for different roles and responsibilities is important, as is recognizing that it is an 
iterative and adaptive process that evolves over time.
11. Incorporating politics and political choices. 
 In the past, many of the political influences on fisheries were externalized and 
left unresolved. Even today, fisheries management remains a contested area, 
with access and benefits often decided for political reasons, some for the public 
good, others for the private benefit of politicians or other powerful elites. In-
corporating politics and political choices into the planning and implementation 
of fisheries management is important for achieving a balance between social, 
economic and environmental objectives. It is also important for gaining access 
to government funding and support for implementing change, and for achieving 
coherence between national development policies and sector policies. 
12. Sustainably and equitably addressing costs and benefits. 
 Even when there is a budget and political commitment for reform, it is still 
important to implement management efficiently and to share the costs and 
benefits of fisheries management in ways that are fair – and seen to be fair. Ad-
dressing costs and benefits sustainably and equitably is vital if fisheries man-
agement is to gain support from the community and wider society. However, at 
present, the understanding of costs and benefits is poorly documented. More 
needs to be done to improve understanding in order to allow informed decisions 
at all levels, such as by investigating the role of fishers in the funding of the 
management process based on the improved gains and how that links into local 
economic growth. 
13. Getting market measures right. 
 There is potential for the markets to improve the livelihoods of fishers through 
better returns for fish caught sustainably and equitably. With the public’s in-
creasing awareness of the damage poorly managed fisheries can inflict on coastal 
ecosystems, their willingness to pay for such damage is being tested through 
certification schemes and eco-labeling. However, changes in the way fish har-
vesting is carried out generally has costs, particularly for producers, making 
it important to introduce these market-driven measures in support of better 
fisheries management in the correct sequence and in ways that avoid having 
adverse effects on poor and vulnerable producers. Given women’s important 
role in fish processing and trade, it is important that they are fully engaged in all 
decision-making around this and other fisheries management decisions. 
Factors affecting community engagement 
These factors are concerned with engagement at the community and household 
levels. They will influence, and be influenced by, technical implementation factors 
and those concerned with policy and planning. 
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14. Understanding dependency.
 A key factor that affects the way people behave in response to management 
decisions is their level of dependency on the resource. Some people are full-time 
fishers and have no other income source. Others are part-time or seasonal 
fishers, or use the resource as a safety net. For many poor people, fisheries will 
be part of a portfolio of household livelihood activities which may involve more 
than one household member. Understanding how different stakeholder groups 
depend on the fishery is essential to ensuring fair and sustainable management 
decisions. 
15. Balancing exclusion, livelihoods alternatives and the local economy. 
 Ultimately, fisheries management decisions will involve some people being 
included in the right to fish and some being excluded. Those excluded may be 
current fishers or future generations that may wish to join the fishery. There 
need to be alternative livelihood options for those who are excluded because, 
otherwise, they are likely to become impoverished or will try to circumvent entry 
regulations. Fisheries are generally closely linked to the local economy in which 
they operate, making it essential that they become a well-integrated part of the 
local economic development process. Getting the right balance among exclusion, 
alternative livelihoods and local economic growth is important to the sustainable 
and equitable development of small-scale fisheries. It is also important to get the 
sequencing of decisions around controls over entry requirements and livelihood 
alternatives right. 
16. Building capacity. 
 If fishing communities are to play a greater role in both decision-making and 
management implementation, then many will also need support in building their 
capacity to take on these new roles. Good leadership skills are essential, especial-
ly those which encourage inclusiveness and negotiation. Bringing communities 
together to work in collaboration is important, as is clearly defining what their 
roles and responsibilities are under the law and how far they extend geographi-
cally. Ensuring that the poor are fully included in this process is important. 
17. Engaging with fishers’ motives and preferences. 
 While many assumptions have to be made about the social, economic and ecolog-
ical development factors surrounding fisheries management, perhaps one of the 
most important areas of knowledge to get right is understanding and engaging 
with fishers’ motives and preferences. Many fisheries management efforts have 
gotten into trouble because managers have made assumptions about the way 
fishers will behave that have proved to be wrong. For example, considerable 
conflict arises over time preference – fishers, managers, politicians and funders 
all have different time horizons and meshing them is particularly difficult. 
18. Addressing commitment, compliance, conflict and enforcement. 
 Addressing many of the factors above will encourage a greater commitment 
of fishers to the management process. However, there also will be a need to 
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address compliance, conflict and enforcement in order, for example, to enforce 
regulations quickly and effectively, and to develop conflict resolution processes. 
A greater emphasis on co-management of small-scale coastal fishers is likely to 
increase group pressure to comply, but enforcement is likely to remain with gov-
ernment and must be recognized as effective. 
19. Ensuring participation and inclusion. 
 Implicit in all of these factors is a greater level of participation and inclusion of 
fishers and their wider communities in decision-making around fisheries man-
agement. This should include fish traders and processors, money lenders, gear 
suppliers and those responsible for wider community and local economic devel-
opment. Men and women, the poor and the well-off, the old and the young, ethnic 
and religious groups, all have different perspectives and need to be involved. 
This will make for more representative decision-making while also supporting a 
more empowering process. 
20. Linking different knowledge management systems. 
 An important part of inclusion is recognizing the value of both traditional eco-
logical knowledge and experience-based knowledge in the management process. 
A sharing of roles and responsibilities across formal and informal systems of 
knowledge generation, sharing and use is likely to reduce costs and, at the same 
time, increase the relevance of knowledge used. The linking of knowledge man-
agement systems will provide a very important reflection of mutual trust and 
cooperation. 
Discussion, conclusions and ways forward
As this research has shown, there is no simple universal cure for the problems that 
small-scale coastal fisheries face in many developing countries. It is likely that this 
is also true for fisheries more generally. However, this does not mean that fisheries 
cannot achieve a much more balanced equitable and sustainable trajectory into the 
future. The 20 factors identified in this report could help to achieve this, and there 
are doubtless others that would emerge from a more comprehensive study. Already, a 
number of these factors are starting to combine and to have a positive effect in some 
fisheries. There is also increasing recognition that a greater emphasis on getting the 
process right for specific contexts, rather than adopting a uniform approach for all 
fisheries, is likely to lead to better outcomes.
Efforts to distill some of these factors into principles for management began with the 
Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries. The specific needs of small-scale fisheries 
that go beyond the Code have been progressively recognized and the United Nations 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) is currently producing the International 
Guidelines for Securing Sustainable Small-Scale Fisheries which address many of 
the emerging issues associated with fisheries management. These Guidelines are 
intended to enhance the contribution of small-scale fisheries to poverty alleviation, 
food security and economic growth. 
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It is important to recognize that achieving success in fisheries management will take 
a long time, a substantial financial commitment, enhanced sharing of knowledge and 
experience, political support and a commitment to building capacity at all levels. 
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1. Background to the synthesis
As part of its new model of operation, the Rockefeller Foundation is undertaking 
synthesis reviews to strengthen its knowledge and evidence base of what works and 
what does not work in its key areas of interest. The primary purpose of synthesis 
reviews is to enable Foundation initiative teams and their grantees to build on what is 
known, avoid the pitfalls of others and add value to the area of endeavor by not dupli-
cating efforts. 
The Foundation’s Oceans and Fisheries Initiative aims to determine effective ways to 
integrate natural ecosystems into their economic and social systems. Research under-
taken by the Foundation shows that oceans are in a state of crisis due, in large part, 
to rampant overfishing that has occurred for several decades. Millions of people, par-
ticularly the poor and vulnerable who depend on the productivity of marine resources 
for their food security and livelihoods, are seeing these eroded because of declining 
ocean health. Efforts to emphasize resource conservation and sustainable manage-
ment while addressing the social and economic vulnerabilities of fishing communities 
will have high potential to deliver joint benefits for ecosystems and for people. The 
Foundation’s body of work aims to shift paradigms in the environmental community 
in order to incorporate powerful new approaches including innovative financing, ap-
proaches and diffusion, and more purposeful planning for scale. 
Oceans and Fisheries is a new Initiative in Development for the Rockefeller Founda-
tion. Consistent with the Foundation’s operating model, the dual objectives of Initia-
tives in Development are to quickly synthesize a wide variety of knowledge to inform 
internal decision-making for larger-scale investment while contributing significant 
public goods to the field, regardless of the Foundation’s potential future investment 
in this space. In its Search process (the stage prior to Development), the Foundation 
explored the potential for grant making in the areas of fisheries, aquaculture, poverty 
and food security as a means of improving the lives of poor and vulnerable populations. 
In addition to generating significant knowledge, the results of the Search concluded 
that this area of work had significant potential. As a result, the Foundation approved a 
15-month Initiative in Development spanning late March 2013 until April, 2014.
To learn quickly from existing knowledge in the field, the Initiative team wished to 
learn from “a synthesis of knowledge and evidence of critical success factors for in-
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2
terventions aimed at improving natural resource management and their potential scal-
ability, with a particular emphasis on the field of coastal/near shore fisheries manage-
ment and the links to poor, vulnerable, or marginalized populations” (the Rockefeller 
Foundation, internal document). The objectives for this synthesis are built upon the 
Foundation team’s latest understanding of the field and, to the extent of its knowledge, 
reflect insufficiently studied areas of inquiry. Its focus is on integrating the socio-
ecological factors in the management of coastal small-scale fisheries in developing 
countries and their effects and impacts. 
Thus, in order to undertake a rapid review1 of key formal and informal knowledge 
sources and identify factors influencing the success, failure and potential scalability 
of fisheries management that combine ecological and socio-economic objectives, this 
report: 
•	 synthesizes	 key	 lessons	 from	 past	 and	 on-going	 ecosystem-based	 community	
management efforts and programs, with a focus on fisheries and, where possible, 
other sectors
•	 identifies	key	insights	in	terms	of	factors	contributing	to	the	success	and	failure	of	
ecosystem-based community management (ECM) and their implications for the 
Foundation’s work
•	 provides	a	preliminary	assessment	of	critical	success	factors	for	their	potential	to	
be catalytic in achieving (or inhibiting) impact at scale
•	 identifies	outliers	of	interest	to	the	Foundation
•	 identifies	key	players	and	their	areas	of	expertise	in	relation	to	key	lessons.
It focuses on the lessons learned regarding key success factors from past and ongoing 
work on managing small-scale fisheries in developing countries to achieve a balance 
between social, economic and environmental benefits in sustainable and equitable 
ways, and presents a synthesis of the lessons emerging from the key documents 
reviewed and interviews held around this area of work. 
The report starts with an outline of the methods used in the synthesis work. This 
is followed by a background section on coastal fisheries, an outline of key fisheries 
management approaches and the impacts that fisheries management has had. It then 
identifies 20 critical factors that influence success in coastal small-scale fisheries 
management. These factors are reviewed at three levels: i) factors affecting policy 
and planning, ii) factors affecting technical implementation and iii) factors affecting 
community engagement. These factors are then discussed, conclusions drawn and 
ways forward briefly outlined. 
1  The study took place over a 10-week period from July to September 2013.
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2
2. Research process and methods
The research process was organized into four stages: study design, 
formal knowledge search and screening, informal knowledge 
search, and analysis and report writing. The elements of each 
stage are outlined in the sections below.
2.1 Stage 1: Study design
The study design was developed from Terms of Reference (TORs) drafted by the 
Rockefeller Foundation and based on an analysis of knowledge gaps around fisheries 
management that needed to be addressed to inform its development strategy for en-
gagement with the sector. On the basis of the TORs, IMM’s research team prepared 
a research protocol. The study design outlined in the research protocol proposed a 
search strategy focusing on both formal and informal knowledge sources. 
Formal knowledge search 
This search focused on documented knowledge from two key areas: academic peer 
review literature and institutional grey literature. 
The academic literature search was based on five electronic reference databases:
•	 Web	of	Knowledge:	Web	of	Science
•	 Aquatic	Sciences	and	Fisheries	Abstracts	(ASFA)
•	 Applied	Social	Sciences	Index	and	Abstracts	(ASSIA)
•	 Directory	of	Open	Access	Journals	(DOAJ)
•	 Scirus.
The institutional grey literature search was carried out using institutional website 
search engines and online library databases. To guide the search, an institutional 
map was developed of key institutions likely to be involved in the areas covered by 
the synthesis. These included academic institutions, donors and funding agencies 
(including foundations), intergovernmental agencies, regional fisheries management 
organizations and NGOs. 
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4
Informal knowledge search. 
This search focused on the experiential knowledge of key informants working in the 
field of fisheries management. Key informants were also asked to identify important 
formal knowledge resources, which were obtained through online searches or sent 
directly to us by the informant. 
2.2 Stage 2: Formal knowledge search and screening
Keyword search strategy
The search of formal knowledge sources applied a keyword search strategy based on 
the principal topics of relevance to this synthesis (see Table 1).
taBle 1: Principal topics and keywords search strategy
tOPIC 1
anD
tOPIC 2
anD
tOPIC 3
fish*
ecosystem
natural Resource
*Manage*
Community-based
adaptive neaR *manage
Coast*
* / anD / neaR represent Boolean search operators 
Initially searches combined Topic 1 and 2 keywords and applied this strategy to the 
whole document. To further narrow the search (for searches yielding over 6,000 
results), Topic 3 was applied. Then if necessary, the search was applied to fewer 
document fields (e.g. title or abstract). Once a search yielded less than 6,000 results, 
it was exported to EndNote, a library software package. 
The keyword search strategy was applied consistently to all five electronic reference 
databases. Where possible this strategy was also adopted for the institutional grey 
literature search. However, if a searchable library database was not available, a 
manual search of publication lists for relevant topics (e.g. fishery management and 
governance, co-management, ecosystem approach to fisheries) was undertaken. In 
total, 26 institutional websites were searched. In addition, the IMM office library and 
reference libraries of team members were searched to identify additional grey litera-
ture that, from experience, was considered useful.
All searches were recorded in a search log which indicated the number of results for 
each search and which searches were downloaded into EndNote (see Annex 1).
Inclusion criteria
An initial set of inclusion criteria, developed to ensure the documents compiled for the 
review were accessible and relevant, included: 
•	 yeaR oF publICatIon: the study must be published in or after 1990
•	 language: the study must be published in English
•	 geogRaphIC RelevanCe: the study must be based on evidence from developed 
countries
•	 topIC RelevanCe: the study must pertain to management initiatives and factors of 
their success/failure in relation to coastal marine fisheries, including articles that 
examined relevant management concepts or theories.
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5
For the institutional grey literature searches, documents were screened for inclusion 
criteria based on their title, and only those meeting the criteria were exported to 
EndNote. In total, 141 accessible and relevant documents were identified from the 
institutional grey literature search. Further grey literature documents were identified 
from the IMM and team libraries.
For the academic literature searches, the year of publication criteria was combined 
with the initial keyword search. In total, 16,923 academic references were compiled 
from the five electronic databases. Of these, 7,304 were identified as duplicates and 
removed, leaving a library of 9,619 documents to be screened for language and 
relevance inclusion criteria.2 
Inclusion screening was applied to the title and abstract of each document. A coding 
system was used during screening to identify the reason for exclusion. This provided 
an outlier library resource, containing documents which may have potential insights 
for the synthesis but may be outside the geographical relevance (e.g. developed 
country) or topic relevance (e.g. inland fishery or forestry management). Following 
inclusion screening, a total of 1,166 documents were identified as accessible and 
relevant for the synthesis.
Included academic literature documents were further screened to identify documents 
of particular relevance to the synthesis. These included overviews or reviews of 
fisheries management initiatives at multiple sites. In total, 195 documents were identi-
fied as key documents, with snowball sampling from citation lists of key documents 
also yielding further documents. 
The overall formal knowledge search and screening yielded 1,379 relevant documents 
for review, as summarized in Table 2.
taBle 2: Summary of formal knowledge search results
ACADEMIC LItERAtuRE SEARCh RESuLtS
Keyword search 
results
Included 
documents
Key documents excluded: 
Developed country
excluded: 
Relevant off topic
9,613 1,166 195 2,940 1,045
GREy LItERAtuRE SEARCh RESuLtS
Website search results IMM library search & snowball sampling
150 63
2.3 Stage 3: Informal knowledge search 
From the institutional grey literature search and from the research team’s experience 
of the sector, a number of key informants were contacted to take part in semi-struc-
2  Due to the export functionality of the Directory of Open access Journals (DOaJ) and applied Social Sciences 
Index and abstracts (aSSIa) databases, inclusion screening for language and relevance criteria was carried 
out as documents were exported to EndNote. This yielded 45 documents.
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tured interviews. Interviews were conducted in person, by telephone or email, and 
were guided by a checklist of topics and questions (see Annex 2).
In total, the team contacted 55 individuals, of whom 20 were interviewed and 4 replied 
to an email checklist, as summarized in Table 3 below. Approximately half of those 
contacted were unavailable, or failed to respond, which may be explained by the fact 
that the synthesis was conducted during a holiday season. 
taBle 3: Summary of the informal knowledge search
INStItutIONS CONtACtS 
MADE
INtERvIEwS CONDuCtED
In person telephone email
intergovernmental/multi-lateral organizations 7 2 - 1
international development banks 3 - 3 -
Government organizations 2 - 1 1
Regional fisheries management organizations 3 - - 1
Research institutions 18 - 5 -
non-governmental organizations 15 - 6
fisher organizations 7 - 3 1
2.4 Stage 4: Analysis and report writing
Analysis of documents initially focused on the full text of key documents identified 
from the academic literature search. As the review progressed, documents identi-
fied through snowball sampling of citation lists and from the institutional grey litera-
ture search were also analyzed. This analysis revealed a number of preliminary key 
success factors, which were reviewed and revised to fit more closely to the available 
evidence as the analysis developed. These factors were finally grouped into three 
areas: i) factors affecting policy and planning, ii) factors affecting technical implemen-
tation and iii) factors affecting community engagement. This analysis was cross refer-
enced against the results of the informal knowledge search in order to triangulate the 
results. This provided the basis for the report’s results and discussion. 
Given that the study had only two months to complete the search and analysis, only 
a limited number of documents could be reviewed in the time available. Ultimately, 
the scope of knowledge included in the report reflects the limitations imposed by 
this time schedule. In total, approximately 170 documents were reviewed. As such, it 
is recognized that a continued review of the formal knowledge search results would 
reveal additional information that may be of benefit. However, the level of repetition in 
the results suggests that the synthesis represents an acceptable level of convergence 
of thought. 
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3
3. Background to coastal fisheries 
This section provides a brief summary of the global fisheries 
sector: its importance, its current state, the effectiveness of 
fisheries management measures and the potential of the sector. 
The coastal environment is one of the most diverse parts of the planet with many 
ecosystems and species. This diversity, combined with the dynamic and changing 
nature of coasts, creates conditions for the provision of a wide range of ecosystem 
services which benefit humans as individuals and societies including: food from fish, 
building materials from reefs and mangroves, storm protection for coastal communi-
ties, medicines and cultural traditions, as well as wider regulatory support services. 
Fish are harvested from all coastal countries throughout the world. In developing 
countries, fisheries are particularly important for providing food and nutrition security, 
income and employment. The diversity of species and habitats in coastal areas provides 
a range of opportunities for the livelihoods of men, women and children, and the open 
access nature of many resources provides opportunities for the poor. 
However, the vital role of coastal ecosystem services is being undermined by over-fish-
ing, habitat destruction and pollution. As a consequence, many of the world’s fisheries 
are at, or beyond, their sustainable limits of harvesting. Fisheries management has been 
used to try to halt or reverse this adverse situation, but overall it has failed to improve 
matters significantly. If fisheries can be successfully managed, then their potential con-
tribution to food, employment, foreign exchange generation and poverty reduction can 
be both large and sustainable. This is discussed in more detail below. 
3.1 The importance of coastal fisheries
The coast is one of the most ecologically diverse ecosystems – a diversity that creates 
many livelihood opportunities for different groups of people. Because of the relatively 
open access nature of coastal fisheries and the low cost of entering, these opportuni-
ties attract many poor people into the fishery and, in turn, the fishing supports many 
different forms of livelihoods for different groups of people. The main attraction of the 
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coastal waters is the ability to harvest fish for food and to sell, but this is only part of 
the engagement of the community with the coastal system. 
Fisheries ecology 
The sea covers 71 percent of the surface of the earth and constitutes 96.5 percent 
of all water by volume. It is one of the most biologically diverse parts of the planet 
in terms of both ecosystem diversity and species diversity. Much of that diversity is 
concentrated in coast fringes where small-scale fisheries often operate (Campbell and 
Beardmore, 2001). Key habitats include:
•	 open	sea	
•	 deep	ocean	floor
•	 continental	slopes
•	 sea	mounts
•	 mud/sand	banks
•	 inshore	coastal	areas
•	 coral	reefs
•	 mudflats
•	 sandy	beaches
•	 kelp	forests
•	 estuaries
•	 mangroves
•	 deltas
•	 lagoons
These different habitats are often mutually supporting with, for example, reefs 
providing shelter for sea grass areas and sand for beaches. The habitats also link 
the different lifecycles of fish, some as nursery areas and others as adult feeding 
and breeding areas. Connectivity between these is important in the wider ecological 
balance. 
Although coral reefs cover less than 0.1 percent of the ocean (250,000 km2), they are 
the most productive and biologically rich ecosystems on earth with around 25 percent 
of all known marine species (Burke et al., 2011). They occur mainly in coastal areas 
where fisheries are particularly important. 
Fish production 
The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) monitors the 
world’s fisheries on a regular basis. Capture fisheries and aquaculture supplied 
the world with an estimated 154 million tonnes of fish in 2011 (with a total value of 
$217.5 billion), of which about 131 million tonnes was utilized as food for people 
(FAO, 2012a) (See Table 4). Fish production maintained a growth rate of 3.2 percent 
per year in the period 1961–2009, outstripping population growth. 
taBle 4: Global fish production by year and source in millon tonnes
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
CaptuRe
inland 9.8 10 10.2 10.4 11.2 11.5
Marine 80.2 80.4 79.5 79.2 77.4 78.9
total 90.0 90.3 89.7 89.6 88.6 90.4
CultuRe
inland 31.2 33.4 36 38.1 41.7 44.3
Marine 16.0 16.6 16.9 17.6 18.1 19.3
total 46.3 49.9 52.9 55.7 59.9 63.6
total WoRlD pRoDuCtIon 137.3 140.2 142.6 145.3 148.5 154.0
Source: faO, 2012a 
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Table 1 shows that while wild capture fisheries have remained relatively static in recent 
years, aquaculture has grown considerably. Aquaculture now makes up 41 percent of 
total fish availability compared with 51 percent from marine capture fisheries (FAO, 
2012a). 
The global fishing fleet is comprised of 4.36 million vessels, of which 74 percent work 
in marine fisheries. Asia has the largest fleet with 73 percent, Africa has 11 percent 
and Latin America and the Caribbean has 8 percent (FAO, 2012a). 
Food and nutrition security
World per capita food fish supply increased from an average of 9.9 kg (live weight 
equivalent) in the 1960s to 18.4 kg in 2009 and is set to increase further (FAO, 2012a). 
In 2010, fish production provided a global fish consumption rate of 18.7 kg/person/
year with consumption rates varying across the globe from 9.1 kg/person/year in 
Africa to 24.6 kg/person/year in Oceania. Fish makes up 16.6 percent of all animal 
protein consumed and 6.5 percent of all protein consumed by people. Globally, fish 
provides about 3.0 billion people with almost 20  percent of their intake of animal 
protein, and 4.3 billion people with about 15 percent (FAO, 2012a). Fish also provide 
other benefits such as micro-nutrients (MRAG et al., 2013) that are particularly 
important in the diets of the poor. 
In most developing countries, fish is sold mainly in live or fresh form (representing 
56  percent of fish destined for human consumption in 2010). Cured forms of fish 
(dried, salted, smoked or fermented) still remain important in developing country 
markets, although the share of fish that is processed is declining (FAO, 2012a).
Fish and fishery products are among the world’s most traded food commodities. 
In 2010, fishery trade represented about 10  percent of total agricultural exports 
(excluding forest products) and 1 percent of world merchandise trade in value terms 
(FAO, 2012a).
Fisheries livelihoods and poverty reduction
There are some 54.8 million people involved in the production of fish. An estimated 
660–820 million people, or 10–12  percent of the global population, depend upon 
fisheries and aquaculture for their livelihoods: 87 percent of them in Asia, 7 percent in 
Africa and 3.6 percent in Latin America and the Caribbean (FAO, 2012a). Of the people 
directly employed in capture fisheries (production and processing), 97 percent live in 
developing countries and 90 percent work in small-scale fisheries (Hall and Andrew, 
2011). It is thought that, on average, 30 percent of people employed in fisheries overall 
are women mainly in fish processing and trade (FAO, 2012a). 
Many of the people involved in small-scale fisheries in developing countries are poor, 
marginalized or vulnerable to adverse change. According to Pomeroy (1994, 3), 
“[i]n many parts of the world, rights to common property are all that separate the 
poor from destitution.” While many of these people are poor, vulnerable and margin-
alized, an important question is “are they poor because they are fishers, or are they 
fishers because they are poor?” (Béné, 2003). The answer is complex and is probably 
a mixture of both. 
10
Coastal fishers live in one of the most dynamic and contested parts of the world where 
risk is a part of their livelihood strategies (Campbell et al., 2006). This creates oppor-
tunities for poor people that others may consider too costly or unpredictable, but it 
also creates threats to life, assets, income and savings, which means there is consider-
able movement into and out of poverty in fishing communities. 
Fishers often live adjacent to areas of high biological diversity which creates a 
diversity of opportunities to employ different combinations of labor, skill, experience-
based knowledge, capital, technical knowledge, risk-avoidance strategies, market 
knowledge and access, and seasonal time allocation (Campbell and Townsley, 2013). 
This diversity often, at least initially, reduces competition from other fishers that 
require the economies of scale afforded by less ecologically diverse environments. 
Increasingly, however, such biological diversity is attracting tourism which offers both 
threats (land acquisition, pollution, habitat destruction) and opportunities (markets 
for seafood, alternative employment opportunities). Where barriers to entry are low, 
such as open access fisheries, where there is low competition or where entry requires 
little investment in, e.g. skills or equipment, poor people can often find niches as in-
dividual fishers or as hired crew. While there is high gender differentiation in most 
fisheries (generally with men catching fish and women processing and trading), 
some habitats, such as coral reefs, provide opportunities for women to glean food for 
domestic consumption or trade, an activity which often provides an important social 
and cultural function (Whittingham et al., 2003). In addition, women in many parts of 
the world play an important role in owning and financing fishing operations. 
However, while open access coastal fisheries attract poor people, they often remain 
poor, because:
•	 they	have	inherent	risks	working	in	such	difficult	environments,	where	catch	pre-
dictability is low
•	 they	have	few	enforceable	rights	over	land	and	fish	resources	
•	 they	have	competition	in	harvesting	combined	with	pollution,	habitat	destruction,	
increasing climate change and decreasing catches 
•	 they	may	be	marginalized	to	poorer	parts	of	 the	fishery	or	excluded	at	certain	
times
•	 they	are	dealing	with	highly	perishable	products,	where	market	access	is	difficult	
and market knowledge poor
•	 their	investment	in	boats,	gear,	fuel	and	labor	is	often	dependent	on	loans	from	
middle men and women who are able to charge high costs for their services 
•	 their	lack	of	rights	over	land	and	access	to	fisheries	resources	(especially	for	the	
very poor, migrant workers, certain classes and castes of people, and ethnic mi-
norities) often means that their activities fall outside of the law and the decision-
making processes (Béné, 2003; Campbell et al., 2006). 
For small-scale processors and traders, increasing competition for supply, changing 
market and quality-control demands, concentration of landings in fewer landing sites, 
and changes in investment levels in processing and trade are often leading to signifi-
cant shifts in the structure of the post-harvest fisheries sector – changes that often 
marginalize small-scale operators. In some areas where women previously played key 
roles in post-harvest fisheries, more men may be found entering processing and trade, 
which is leading to reduced opportunities and increased competition for small-scale 
female traders and processors (IMM and ICM, 2003). 
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3.2 The state of coastal fisheries 
There can be little doubt that the world’s fisheries are in suboptimal condition (see 
Box 1). In 2009, 29.9 percent of global fish stocks were overexploited, 57.4 percent 
were fully exploited and 12.7 percent were not-fully exploited (FAO, 2012a). Most of 
the fully exploited stocks are at their maximum sustainable yield (MSY) and therefore 
not achieving their full economic potential. FAO (2012a, 200), in its analysis of global 
fisheries in 2012, stated that the results “are troubling from a resource exploitation 
perspective and suggest a global system that is overstressed, reducing in biodiversity 
and in imminent danger of collapse.” 
In addition, many key ecosystems on which the health of marine fisheries depend are 
being degraded. Mangrove forests have been widely depleted and, over the past 50 
years, approximately one-third of the world’s 
mangrove forests have been lost (Alonghi, 
2002), 29  percent of sea grasses have been 
lost (Waycott et al., 2008) and more than 
75 percent of coral reefs are under immediate 
threat from local and global forces (Burke 
et al., 2011). In addition, 60 percent of coral 
reefs are threatened by local pressures such 
as over-fishing, destructive fishing, coastal 
development, watershed-based pollution, or 
marine-based pollution and damage (Burke 
et al., 2011).
In addition to pressures on species and eco-
systems, there are also significant economic 
losses from the sector. World Bank-FAO 
(2009) estimated global losses of net economic 
benefit at some US$50 billion, due to excess 
harvesting capacity and effort, linked with 
capital and operating-cost subsidies. In 2003, 
subsidies primarily to support overfishing 
were estimated at $16.2 billion out of a total of 
$27 billion globally (Sumaila et al., 2010). In 
addition, illegal, unreported and unregulated 
(IUU) fishing is now a major concern for 
many fisheries, with global losses estimated at 
between $9 billion and $24 billion annually, representing between 11 and 26 million tons 
of fish or between 10 percent and 22 percent of total fisheries production (MRAG, 2009). 
These losses impact directly on the availability of fish for small-scale fishers.
Marine and, in particular, coastal habitats and resources are under increasing threat 
from a variety of sources (Campbell, 1996; Bryant et al., 1998; Whittingham et al., 
2003) (see Box 2) including: 
•	 habitat	loss,	destruction	and	fragmentation	as	a	result	of	agriculture,	aquaculture,	
fishing, urban growth, port developments and tourism
•	 pollution	from	industry,	mining,	farming,	aquaculture	and	urban	development
•	 changes	in	water	sediment	loads	from	agriculture,	forestry	and	mining
BoX 1:   
Overfishing in asia
an asian Development Bank (aDB)-funded, 
Worldfish-implemented regional fisheries project 
in Bangladesh, india, indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines and Sri lanka identified the central 
issue of fisheries as drastically depleted resources 
– resulting from overfishing and compounded 
by environmental degradation. all fisheries had 
harvesting rates that were greater than those 
required to achieve maximum sustainable yields or 
maximum economic yields. 
overfishing was found to be intimately linked to 
poverty among fishing communities, where fishing 
was seen to be the income of last resort. the de 
facto open access regime of the fishery allowed 
more and more people to join the fishery. 
Source: Stobutzki et al., 2006
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•	 changes	in	water	flows	as	a	result	of	deforestation,	abstraction	for	irrigation	and	
human consumption, and hydroelectric dams
•	 excessive	or	inappropriate	exploitation	of	resources
•	 inappropriate	genetic	manipulation	and	selection	in	aquaculture	
•	 introduction	of	exotic	species	from	aquaculture,	the	aquarium	trade,	ships	ballast	
tanks
•	 climate	variability	resulting	in	periodic	coastal	shocks
•	 climate-related	changes	such	as	changes	in	sea	level,	sea	temperatures	and	pred-
ator-prey relations. 
The reasons for the poor state of global fisheries are complicated (Rudd et al., 2003). 
They are complex systems that combine social, economic, ecological and political forces 
which are difficult to reconcile. Fisheries management has been a major component 
of the wider sector development process that has been used to address some of these 
issues. However, fisheries management has not been very successful across global 
fisheries. According to Bromley (2009), “the 
imperiled status of global fish stocks offers 
clear evidence of the comprehensive failure of 
national governments to provide coherent man-
agement to protect those stocks.” This reflects 
the complex nature of fisheries management 
as will be discussed later. As Hilborn noted, 
“fisheries management isn’t rocket science, it 
is actually quite a bit harder” (Western Star, 
2009). 
3.3 The potential of  
           coastal fisheries
In spite of these management issues, the 
potential of fisheries, if managed well, is con-
siderable. What form that potential will take 
will depend on how and why fisheries are 
managed.
The ability of depleted fisheries to recover and achieve their maximum potential will 
depend, to an extent, on how that potential is measured, i.e. in terms of production max-
imization, economic return maximization, environmental protection or employment 
maximization. The length of time required to return fisheries to their desired state 
will also vary, depending on the current state of the stocks and the species concerned. 
Even with management, multiple-species stocks are likely to evolve gradually towards 
an equilibrium which may or may not be the same as before exploitation. 
There is, however, broad recognition of the potential of fisheries to bounce back 
from the current state of mismanagement and to continue to provide benefits into 
the future. What those benefits are and who benefits from them are largely political 
decisions that countries will have to decide. The following section reviews a variety of 
management themes that have been used in the quest to achieve that potential. 
BoX 2:  
Reef destruction
Coral reefs are seen as an important source of food 
and income through the sale of fish in many coastal 
communities. However, there are also examples 
where the sustainability of this ecosystem service is 
being threatened by coral mining. 
in tanzania, live and dead coral was extracted for 
lime production in the 1990s. on Mafia island, 
coral mining was ranked third among income-
earning activities, in terms of the number of people 
involved. after commercial lime production was 
made illegal this fell rapidly. 
Source: Tobey and Torell, 2006
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4
4. Fisheries management 
 approaches and themes
This section discusses the concept of fisheries management, its 
evolution and how it manifests itself in modern fisheries. It looks 
at the broad management themes that have been adopted and 
briefly discusses each of these.
Fisheries management has been defined as: “The integrated process of information 
gathering, analysis, planning, consultation, decision-making, allocation of resources 
and formulation and implementation, with enforcement as necessary, of regulations 
or rules which govern fisheries activities in order to ensure the continued productiv-
ity of the resources and the accomplishment of other fisheries objectives”(Cochrane, 
2002, 3). 
In the past, there was widespread discussion of the different merits of economic, social 
and biological objectives and management strategies for fisheries. Much of the focus 
was on the maximization of productivity and production targets, which remains the 
key indicator of success used by many governments around the world. However, as 
the realization has grown that fish stock harvesting cannot be continuously increased, 
the focus has increasingly shifted towards environmental management. The social 
aspects also have taken a more prominent role in strategies, due to a greater focus on 
reduction of global poverty and recognition that fish and fisheries play an important 
role in the livelihoods of many poor people. 
The conflicts among the different management schools of thought continue. However, 
efforts are being made to bring these disparate threads together into a management 
process that harmonizes different aims and strategies to achieve a balance across 
social, economic and environmental sector objectives. 
In reality, a fishery is a complex system which links individual human endeavor, en-
terprise, risk, culture, the physical world, technology, the natural world, the political 
economy and wider society’s beliefs, aspirations and values (Campbell and Catter-
moul, 2009). According to Ostrom (2009a), all human-used resources are embedded 
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in complex, social-ecological systems composed of multiple subsystems and the 
internal variables within these subsystems at multiple levels. 
Scientists have often responded by developing simple theoretical models to analyze 
aspects of the resource problems and to prescribe universal solutions (Ostrom, 
2009a). In their attempts to understand and interact with fisheries, scientists have 
often tried to simplify or break down the complexity. Thus they can work with its 
separate parts by, for example, focusing on specific components of fisheries, such 
as gear/vessel classification, or over-simplifying relationships implicit in bio-econom-
ic models. As the crisis in world fisheries deepens, the pressure to find workable 
solutions increases. The combination of complexity and urgency has created a market 
for quick and technical solutions to management problems (Degnbol et al., 2006). But 
these rarely do more than explain a part of what is happening in localized situations 
at a given time. As Dengbol et al. explained, these “fixes” often lead to tunnel vision. 
The responsibility for the management of fisheries has been disputed for many years. 
In many traditional communities, management has been a function of the community 
itself. In the Pacific, for instance, the rights to resources are often part of a complex 
web of social and cultural relations between and within communities and kinship 
groups. More recently, and particularly as fisheries have come under increasing 
pressure, the state has taken on a greater role in their management. 
However, governments are no longer the only source of decision-making in fisheries 
or other environmental fields (Armitage et al., 2012) where collaborative approaches 
involving a number of stakeholders are becoming accepted. This is important because 
different groups of people want different things from the resource, at different times 
and collected in different ways. Armitage et al. (2012) argued that while “command 
and control” management systems have yielded success in terms of flows of ecosystem 
services, they have done so at social and environmental cost – social cost related 
to compliance, enforcement and conflict, and environmental cost due to declines in 
regulating and providing ecosystem services. They noted that management and gov-
ernance systems are not mutually exclusive and suggested that cooperative models of 
governance are more likely to work effectively within an enabling system of govern-
ment regulation. 
However, the very concept of management is sometimes questioned and the broader 
approach of governance, which considers the wider processes and institutions through 
which society makes decisions, is often seen as more appropriate (Armitage et al., 
2012). Governance of resources raises questions that go far beyond narrow manage-
ment concerns and start to address more philosophical issues about wider benefit 
flows to society and to future generations. The form and function of governance often 
reflect the wider changes in society’s approaches, concerns and priorities, the market 
realities, and the cost-cutting motives of government to hand over responsibility for 
that management. 
While there are no clear-cut or separate models of fisheries management, there are broad 
approaches or themes that reflect the emphasis of a particular management process 
in a particular situation. Some are suited to some circumstances, others to other cir-
cumstances. Management methods developed for single species fisheries in temperate 
waters, for example, may be unsuited to tropical multi-species inshore fisheries (Rudd 
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et al., 2003) where ecological and fish landing data are poor, where there are few formal 
property rights, where many operators compete for resources with different gear from 
many sites, and where people regularly move in and out of the fishery. Often these 
approaches or themes are combined, as in the use of marine protected areas with co-
management, to address different aspects of the management process. 
These management themes can be grouped in numerous ways. We have identified 
seven broad themes reflecting different aims: i) customary marine tenure, ii) yield 
maximization, iii) conservation of resources, iv) economic maximization, v) rights-
based approaches, vi) ecosystem-based management and vii) co-management. There 
is much overlap between them, and which ones are used depends very much on the 
local context. These are reviewed in the following sections.
4.1 Customary marine tenure (CMT)
Traditional community-based resources management systems have been document-
ed across the world by, e.g. Ruddle et al. (1992) and Kuemlangan (2004). Berkes et 
al. (2000) noted that resource monitoring has been a regular feature of traditional 
systems that note and act upon the abundance of different species. Sacred sites may 
have provided some protection to species much as a marine protected area does. For 
example, Berkes et al. (2000) recalled how some indigenous people “rested” their 
fisheries on a periodic basis, and that traditional fisheries sometimes used methods 
that are only beginning to be adopted by more formal systems. Some traditional com-
munities have tended to conceptualize their fisheries as multi-species, rather than 
single species, and also to view the interconnectedness of land and water systems. In 
their review of the similarities among some 30 traditional fishing societies throughout 
the world, Acheson et al. (1998 cited in Berkes et al., 2000) suggested that the similari-
ties indicate some geographic transfer of knowledge. 
Many customary marine tenure (CMT) arrangements may have resulted in the sus-
tainable and equitable use of fisheries resources, in part because there was limited 
fishing pressure. Many continued to operate when resources declined and effort sub-
stantially increased, but with varying degrees of success. However, it needs to be 
remembered that these CMT systems are often primarily mechanisms that govern 
exchange and social relations within and between traditional communities and groups, 
rather than explicitly protecting resources.
While customary marine tenure may have been associated largely with traditional 
systems, there is increasing recognition that it also has a role to play, albeit in modified 
form, in modern management systems. For example, Kuemlangan (2004) noted that 
a “[a] cursory examination of PIC (Pacific Island Countries) Constitutions, fisheries 
legislation and general natural resource management practice indicate that the PICs 
have the necessary minimum legal basis for application of CMT, and are receptive to 
or already practise participatory approaches to fisheries management including those 
based on CMT.” 
Today, there is renewed interest in learning from these approaches and applying them 
to rights-based approaches at the community level. But, it is also recognized that com-
munity-based approaches more generally are not a panacea for resource management 
(Pomeroy, 1994). 
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4.2 Yield maximizing approaches
As mentioned above, in the past, the focus of fisheries management and development 
tended to focus on ways of maximizing production. Speaking at the opening of the 1883 
International Fisheries Exhibition in London, the biologist Thomas Huxley famously 
stated that “The world’s fish and fisheries are inexhaustible” (Link, 2010). It was only 
in the 1900s that people began to fully realize that the world’s fish were exhaustible. 
More recently, there have been concerns about maintaining stock size, retaining bio-
diversity and ensuring ecosystem function – with significant tension between those 
approaches adopted to maximize productivity and those for achieving biological con-
servation. For example, the Plan of Implementation of the 2002 World Summit on Sus-
tainable Development targeted the restoration of fish stocks to maximum sustainable 
yield (MSY) levels by 2015. While MSY is a useful concept in a single species stock, it 
becomes less useful in a multi-species stock with inter-species interaction (Leal, 2010). 
In addition, limited governmental capacity may limit the ability to assess what MSY 
actually is. The World Bank-FAO report, The Sunken Billions: The Economic Justifica-
tion for Fisheries Reform, suggested that MSY should be considered a minimum target 
(World Bank-FAO, 2009). 
The drive to maximize production from fisheries has been, in large part, behind the 
massive over-capitalization of fisheries and the perverse incentives that now are the 
norm. As a result, there have been many attempts to control fishing efforts at MSY. 
These have often involved a series of technical measures including direct gear and 
fishing effort restrictions, including limits on vessel numbers (e.g. by license), vessel 
types, engine power, vessel length and gear used. Gear restriction may include mesh 
size restrictions, hook size, net length and the use of excluder devices. Restrictions 
may also be on species, fish length or age, total weight taken, weights landed (and 
thus discards) and breeding state. Fishing activities may be limited by physical areas 
which may range from zones where no fishing occurs at any time of the year to lesser 
restrictions that allow certain gears by certain people at certain times. These might 
include inshore fishing areas for small-scale fishers. Such spatial restrictions, often 
called marine management areas (MMAs), are discussed in more detail below. In 
some fisheries, total allowable catches (TACs) of different species are designated and, 
in some cases, quotas are allocated within that. They may be allocated directly (free of 
cost or for a fee) or through an auction system. 
These different measures have come into favor and gone out of favor in different 
fisheries at different times. In Scott’s (2010) useful chronology of such changes, he 
identified a general movement from gear restrictions, through licenses, to quotas 
and to property rights with a move towards stronger qualities of rights including: 
greater exclusivity, greater permanence, greater transferability, greater divisibility 
and greater security.
4.3 Conservation of resources
Approaches to conserve resources have adopted a number of measures to limit the 
ability of fishers to harvest resources. While technical measures (as outlined above) 
K
e
y
 f
a
c
t
o
r
s
 s
u
p
p
o
r
t
in
g
 s
m
a
l
l
-s
c
a
l
e
 c
o
a
s
t
a
l
 f
is
h
e
r
ie
s
 m
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t
 - s
y
n
t
h
e
s
is
 r
e
v
ie
w
17
have been adopted, marine conservation areas, habitat and stock restoration, and pre-
cautionary principles have been a key part of this approach (Hilborn, 2007). 
The precautionary approach uses foresight to avoid unacceptable or undesirable situ-
ations, taking into account that changes in fisheries systems are only slowly revers-
ible, difficult to control, not well understood, and subject to change in the environment 
and human values (FAO, 1996). As Hilborn (2003, 387) noted “[t]he precautionary 
approach is built around the concept that managers should not wait until they have 
unequivocal evidence that fishing effort needs to be reduced before acting, and it is 
intended to protect fisheries from overexploitation in the face of uncertainty.” 
Even where fisheries are being managed effectively, there is likely to be a need to 
ensure that forces from outside of the sector do not degrade habitats and stocks. 
These include land-based pollution, marine pollution, coastal development and climate 
change. Restoring habitats and stocks to 
their original condition and limiting external 
pressure are important components.
Marine conservation areas are often referred 
to as Marine Protected Area (MPAs), 
including those which are no-take zones 
and thus have the benefit of protecting the 
species and individual fish that remain inside 
the protected area (see Box 3). 
FAO (2007) listed eight common reasons for 
establishing MPAs:  i) to protect a specific 
life history stage, ii) to control fishing 
mortality, iii) to handle the spillover effect 
of fish migrating across the boundaries of an 
MPA so they can be fished, iv) to serve as a 
source and/or sink for fish eggs and larvae to 
improve recruitment, v) to protect habitat, food web integrity and biodiversity, vi) to 
reduce by-catch, discarding and other negative impacts on harvested species, other 
species, endangered species and other species society wants to protect, vii) to reduce 
competition between user groups or to enhance opportunities for certain groups of 
users (by establishing rights), and viii) to serve as a potential hedge against uncer-
tainty. However, MPAs take many forms around the world and the language used to 
describe them differs from place to place, which can lead to considerable confusion 
(Christie and White, 2006). 
The effectiveness of MPAs depends in part upon the size and ecological sufficiency 
of the enclosed area, its level of exclusion and its connectivity to other MPAs. While 
very large MPAs which are enforced no-take zones effectively eliminate fishing 
pressure, there still may be other pressures from climatic conditions, non-fisheries 
pollution or habitat destruction. A review of the experience of inter-coastal manage-
ment (ICM) in the Philippines by White et al. (2006) determined that MPAs, as part 
of wider ICM processes, protect and enhance near-shore habitats and fisheries for 
BoX 3:  
Soufrière marine management 
area in St Lucia 
the Soufrière Marine Management area in St 
lucia, created in 1995, had a rapid impact on the 
combined biomass of five commercially important 
fish families in the adjacent fishing area. Mean total 
catch per trip per fisher increased by between 46% 
and 90% over a five-year period with stable fishing 
effort. 
Source: Roberts et al., 2001
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the benefit of coastal communities, and they 
attract marine tourism which contributes to 
the local economy. Key benefits include i) 
enhanced local biophysical quality of coastal 
habitats and improved fish catches inside and 
outside of MPAs, ii) enhanced revenues to 
communities and local governments derived 
from tourism within and outside of MPAs, iii) 
revenues from marine-based or eco-tourism 
enterprises to local communities, and iv) 
improved planning and implementation of 
ICM through 100 municipal and city govern-
ments.  However, benefits can be mixed, as 
shown in Box 4.
In addition to conserving existing resources, 
there has been considerable interest in 
enhancing fish stocks. Bell et al. (2006) stated 
that the key challenges for capture fisheries 
are i) reducing fishing effort, ii) removing 
excess fishing capacity, and iii) building 
the institutional arrangements needed to 
restore spawning biomass to more produc-
tive levels and reverse degradation of sup-
porting habitats. They suggested two options 
from the cultured production of juveniles to 
enhance this process – restocking and stock enhancement – although they also recog-
nized the difficulties of doing so. Examples of success include scallop stock enhance-
ment in Hokkaido, Japan, and giant clam restocking in the Philippines. 
4.4 Economic maximization
The over-exploitation of fisheries resources is often associated with significant 
economic losses. When the World Bank and FAO (2009) calculated the current state 
of fisheries from an economic perspective, FAO reported that “economic losses in 
marine fisheries resulting from poor management, inefficiencies, and overfishing add 
up to a staggering US$50 billion per year ... Taken over the last three decades, these 
losses total over $US2 trillion, a figure roughly equivalent to the GDP of Italy.” 
The focus of economic approaches calls for the maximization of economic yield (MEY) 
and the reduction of these losses. MEY – the value of the largest positive difference 
between total revenues and total costs of fishing – generally requires less fishing 
effort than what is required to achieve maximum sustainable yield (MSY). Many 
fisheries managers hope that some of this economic return may be captured by wider 
society as a resource rent that will provide a return from giving fishers the opportu-
nity to profit from the nation’s fishery. Economic approaches often include some of the 
technical measures discussed above and the use of rights which are outlined below. 
BoX 4:  
Impact of marine protected areas 
(mPas) in Tanzania 
the impact on abundance of harvested fish around 
MPas in tanga and Mafia, tanzania, was perceived 
to be positive, but impacts were perceived as 
negligible or negative in other MPa sites. fishers’ 
focus group meetings in tanga and Mafia sites 
corroborated that MPa efforts have improved the 
fisheries. the changes in Mafia were further verified 
by key informant marine experts who knew the 
condition of the fisheries in the early 1990s and at 
the time of the study. finfish, octopus, endangered 
species such as marine turtles, and even whales and 
dolphins were returning.
However, social and economic changes were less 
obvious, with only a small impact on household 
involvement in decision-making, negligible or 
negative effects on employment, and negligible 
impact on incomes.
Source: Tobey and Torell, 2006
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Resource rents can be captured, for example, 
through charging for the right to fish, either 
directly on landed catch or by selling licenses 
for access or selling quota access. 
One approach to fisheries management which 
emphasizes the potential economic returns is 
referred to as wealth-based fisheries manage-
ment (WBFM). WBFM calls for using the al-
location of fishing rights to capture the wealth 
that is currently being dissipated through 
poor management practices (Cunningham 
et al., 2009). While this has occurred in, for 
example, Norway, Iceland and New Zealand, there are few examples in developing 
countries where small-scale, labor-intensive fisheries operate (see Box 5). A key 
problem is that this approach depends on the capacity of resource managers to assess 
how much fish catch is sustainable in a particular fishery and establish quotas based 
on that amount, which can be challenging in developing country fisheries that may 
lack such information and the capacity to collect it.  
4.5 Rights-based approaches
In recognition of the adverse effects of the often open-access nature of fisheries, 
fisheries authorities have been developing a series of approaches to fisheries manage-
ment that confer specific rights to some groups of fishers but exclude others. This is 
an increasing trend in fisheries and other natural resources (Pearse, 1992). 
Rights-based management of fisheries, in its most basic form, refers to bundles of 
entitlements that confer both privileges and responsibilities. For example, since the 
1980s, countries have established Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) through which 
they claim exclusive rights up to 200 nautical miles from baselines. Such rights-based 
approaches are evolving to address more complex issues, and discussions referring 
to “rights-based management” or “rights-based approaches” are now expanded to 
include human rights (Charles, 2008; FAO, 2010; Charles, 2011) to reach, for example, 
adequate livelihood and poverty-reduction criteria (Willmann, 2010). 
Rights are an emotive issue that is much misunderstood. A “right” can be thought of 
as an entitlement assured by custom, law or property, and defined by legal, social or 
ethical principles. Some rights have been described as universal, natural, permanent 
and inalienable while others are thought to be more culturally specific or limited to 
specific groups. Rights may be defined by international or national law or custom, and 
may be changed or removed by society. Rights generally involve two parties: those 
that hold the right and those that have responsibility to uphold the right. The effective-
ness of the right is in large part dependent on each party fulfilling its role (Donnelly, 
2003). Rights in fisheries have tended to refer to a legally defined ability to do or to 
own something, e.g. to catch a quota of fish, to access an area of water or to harvest 
a certain species. 
BoX 5:  
an economic approach in practice
the Partnership for african fisheries (Paf), 
operated under the auspices of the african union, 
is currently piloting an approach to the economic 
rationalization of the fisheries of africa through 
wealth-based fisheries management (WBfM). this 
will inform fisheries policy across the continent.
Source: DfID, 2012
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Pomeroy (1994) noted that rights and rules, or incentives and sanctions are essential for 
the effective operation of any fisheries management system. Rights to harvest resources 
have taken a number of forms that include licenses, individual transferrable quotas 
(ITQs), and territorial use rights in fisheries (TURFs). In most cases, fisheries rights 
also have associated responsibilities that need to be adhered to, as reflected in the Code 
of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (Charles, 2011). Informal rights are being recognized 
more and more, and are being converted into formal rights in developing fisheries es-
pecially in co-management systems. These informal property or use rights, which have 
tended to be based around community ownership of resources, are becoming more 
formally recognized. The draft International Guidelines for Securing Sustainable Small-
Scale Fisheries (GSSF) currently being prepared by FAO (FAO, 2012b, 7) recognizes 
that “[r]ights and responsibilities should be bestowed on small-scale fishing communi-
ties to restore, protect and manage local aquatic and coastal ecosystems on which they 
depend for their wellbeing and that they have used traditionally for their livelihoods.” 
For example, individual transferrable quotas (ITQs), used in a number of developed 
fisheries across the globe, receive much attention in the literature. They can be seen 
as part of a rights-based approach where the right to a certain part of a total allowable 
catch (TAC) is transferrable and tradable. They are based on a TAC being established 
for a fishery and the quotas within the TAC limits being allocated to individuals, 
vessels or groups. Key questions around the specific design of ITQs include i) method 
of allocation and charges for a accessing a quota, ii) length of time of ownership of the 
quota, iii) its transferability between users, iv) divisibility of quotas, v) the ability to 
assess the TAC and vi) enforcement.
4.6 Ecosystem-based management
Ecosystem approaches to fisheries (EAFs) represent a move away from management 
systems that focus only on the sustainable harvest of target species or the manage-
ment of fishers’ behaviors, to a system that also considers the major components of 
the ecosystem and the social and economic benefits that can be derived from them 
(FAO, 2012a). EAFs also follow the direction established by the 1993 Convention on 
Biological Diversity and can be seen as an attempt to reverse the divergence of two 
management goals that call for i) conserving the structure, diversity and function 
of ecosystems and ii) satisfying societal and human needs for food and economic 
benefits (Zhou et al., 2010). But it also recognizes the wider importance of ecosystems 
services and the long-term benefits of their continuation. 
FAO’s EAF, adopted by FAO’s Committee on Fisheries (COFI) in 2003 as the most ap-
propriate management framework, was explicitly indicated as the target framework by 
the World Summit of Sustainable Development (WSSD, 2002). FAO (2008) suggested 
that ecosystem approaches to fisheries management should be implemented with the 
following features: 
•	 adopting	participatory	approaches	at	all	levels	of	the	planning	and	implementation	
steps
•	 ensuring	that	all	key	components	of	the	fishery	system	are	considered	(including	
those related to the ecological, social, economic and governance dimensions) and 
also take account of external drivers such as climate change
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•	 encouraging	the	use	of	the	best	available	knowledge	–	both	scientific	and	tradi-
tional – in decision-making 
•	 promoting	the	adoption	of	adaptive	management	systems	
•	 building	on	existing	institutions	and	practices.	
FAO promotes EAF as the most recent stage in a process of fisheries management 
which includes the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries and guidelines for EAF’s 
implementation developed in 2003. EAF is recognized as an important guiding 
principle in FAO’s Guidelines for Small-Scale Fisheries (FAO, 2012b). To date, the most 
extensive applications of the EAF have been in developed countries such as Norway, 
Australia and the EU. 
Although the concept of the EAF may seem relatively straightforward, its implementation 
may require the involvement of a large number of stakeholder groups, particularly if the 
implementation is across sectors. This implies a need to find improved ways of defining 
and sharing responsibilities. The importance of stakeholder participation in EAF has im-
plications for the type of governance arrangements required to implement that approach 
(FAO, 2008). As regards existing fisheries management procedures, FAO recommends 
supporting current management systems, enabling them to evolve and adapt in order to 
become EAF compliant. In many ways, the ecosystem approach is designed to address 
the complexity of fisheries management, es-
pecially with respect to small-scale fisheries 
(Mahon et al., 2008). In order to understand 
this complexity, Hall and Mainprize (2004) 
suggest the need for ecosystem performance 
measures and reference points for a diversity 
of metrics to provide an overall picture of the 
ecosystem. 
Integrated coastal management (ICM), which 
aims to bring together a wide diversity of 
sectors, interests and groups in a large area, 
is one management approach that comple-
ments the wider approach of EAF. Likewise, 
marine protected areas (MPAs) can play an 
important role in EAF. 
The concept of ecosystem-based approaches 
is now being extended to address a much 
wider set of issues where fisheries man-
agement concerns are embedded in the 
local economic, social and environmental 
situations and designed not only to improve 
existing resource use but to address future 
issues such as climate change. Conservation 
International (2011) describes its approach 
as ecosystem-based adaptation (EbA), “which 
capitalizes on the ability of natural systems to 
BoX 6:  
Ecosystem-based adaptation 
(Eba) in the Philippines
in the Philippines, Conservation international (Ci) is 
targeting the verde island Passage marine corridor, 
specifically its coastal ecosystem where 830,000 
people live and depend on its marine resources 
for livelihoods including fishing, aquaculture and 
tourism. 
With increasing population, pressures such as 
overfishing, clearing of mangroves for aquaculture, 
development and logging will result in erosion and 
degradation of the natural coast. the vulnerability 
assessment for this region, completed in 2009, 
resulted in a series of recommendations. Based 
on this, Ci is working with partners to implement 
two initiatives: to enhance coastal protection and 
strengthen fisheries resilience. Key actions include 
mangrove reforestation, training local communities 
and government in eba coastal management 
techniques, application of best fishing practices and 
technologies, and income diversification strategies.
Source: Conservation International, 2011 
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assist in human adaptation to climate change.” CI defines EbA as “the use of biodiver-
sity and ecosystem services as part of an overall adaptation strategy to help people to 
adapt to the adverse effects of climate change” (see Box 6). 
The interpretation of ecosystem approaches is also becoming increasingly sophisticat-
ed – with more attention given to the interlinkages among different ecosystems, with 
more recognition of marine and coastal management in terms of “from the deep-sea to 
the ridgeline”, and with more recognition of the ways ecosystems interact with each 
other (Silvestri and Kershaw, eds., 2010). The added complexities of these “expanded” 
ecosystem approaches clearly has important implications for the decision-making 
processes, policies and institutional structures required to support them.
4.7 Co-management 
Co-management systems are becoming popular in many parts of the world and are 
demonstrating considerable levels of success (see Box 7). 
The greater involvement of fishers in the management decisions of fisheries not only 
builds on traditional systems of resource management in many parts of the world, it 
reflects both an increased awareness of the need to empower and engage fishers in 
the management process, and a recognition that it is potentially less expensive than 
trying to manage from the center (Alpízar, 2006). Berkes (2008) discussed the oppor-
tunities and challenges of using indigenous and community conserved areas (ICCAs) 
for conservation practice, noting that they have a role to play in ensuring that conven-
tional conservation approaches become more inclusive and pluralistic.
In its simplest form, co-management can be described as fisheries management 
where roles and responsibilities are shared between the government and the users 
(Pomeroy, 1994; Sen and Raakjaer Nielsen, 
1996). Sen and Raakjaer Nielsen (1996) dif-
ferentiated this from community-based 
resource management (CBRM) because with 
co-management, government is also involved 
in the decision-making process concerning 
the management of the fishery. Abdullah et 
al. (1998, 106) found that “co-management is 
a middle course between pure state property 
and pure communal property regimes,” 
while Guttiérrez et al. (2011) referred to co-
management as community-based co-man-
agement where fishers and managers work 
together to improve the regulatory process. 
In many respects, co-management and com-
munity-based management are separated 
by the degree of government involvement 
and community centricity (Alpízar, 2006). 
However, in the wider context of Exclusive 
Economic Zones (EEZ), markets, infrastruc-
BoX 7:  
Co-management in inland water 
bodies in Bangladesh
During a ten-year period, the Bangladesh 
Department of fisheries, in partnership with 
the Worldfish Center and 11 nGos, established 
community control over 116 water bodies. over 130 
poverty-based community-based organizations 
(CBos) were involved in the management of these 
water bodies. 
in return for the right to operate these fisheries, the 
CBos had to embrace the principles of sustainable 
fisheries management. 
Source: Dickson, 
www.worldfishcenter.org
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ture, safety and rescue, and the associated policy and legislative environment in which 
fisheries exists, it is difficult to conceive of any fishery which is not co-managed. 
Abdullah et al (1998, 106) noted that “[s]trictly speaking, pure communal property 
systems and community-based coastal resource management (CBCRM) are always 
embedded in state property systems and derive their strength from them.” 
Sen and Raakjaer Nielsen (1996) provide a useful classification within the broader 
scope of co-management as follows:3
•	 InStRuCtIve: where there is only minimal exchange of information between gov-
ernment and users (e.g. co-management arrangements in inland fisheries in Ban-
gladesh) 
•	 ConSultatIve: where mechanisms exist for government to consult with users 
but all decisions are made by the government (e.g. the fisheries committees es-
tablished on Lake Malombe in Malawi and the bay management council in San 
Miguel Bay in the Philippines)
•	 CoopeRatIve: where government and users cooperate as equal partners in deci-
sion-making (e.g. customary rights areas in Fiji)
•	 aDvISoRy: where users advise government of decisions to be taken and govern-
ment endorses these decisions
•	 InFoRMatIve: where government has delegated authority to make decisions to 
user groups who are responsible for informing government of these decisions 
(e.g. the mechanized seine fishery in Inhassoro, Mozambique). 
While co-management covers a broad spectrum of relationships between government 
and users, others such as environmental advocacy groups and scientists may also feel 
they have a role to play in the process. The level of participation by non-state actors 
can often reflect the cultural or political preferences of the country concerned (Sen 
and Raakjaer Nielsen, 1996). 
Co-management, in addition to being regarded as a management approach on its own, 
is also key to other approaches, such as integrated area management, ecosystem-
based management, protected area management and adaptive management (Evans 
et al., 2011a). 
The developing focus on co-management in fisheries is, in part, a response to the 
failure of other, more top-down forms of management. But, as Wamukota et al. (2012) 
noted, there has also been considerable debate about whether co-management has 
provided the expected benefits. There seems to be widespread agreement that co-
management has a growing role to play in fisheries management globally, especially 
in small-scale tropical coastal fisheries. However, the evidence to support this still 
remains elusive, largely because of the complexity of the processes involved and the 
long-time frames often required to see clearly distinguishable impacts. Evans et al. 
(2011a, 1938), carried out a meta-analysis of 29 case studies in 90 sites, noting that 
“overall fisheries co-management delivers benefits to end-users through improve-
ments in key process and outcome indicators. However, the dataset as a whole is con-
stituted primarily of data from the Philippines. When we exclude this body of work, 
few generalizations can be made about the impact of fisheries co-management.” 
3 The examples given were from a sample of 22 case studies on fisheries co-management.
24
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5
5. Impacts
The success of different fisheries management systems can be 
measured in terms of their impact. This section discusses impacts, 
how they might be measured and what has been achieved through 
fisheries management. 
Impact has two sides. One concerns the achievement of the objectives established 
in the management regime, the second defines the actual, objectively measurable 
impacts of the management regime on the resource, environment and people’s lives, 
i.e. the intended versus the actual. The impacts identified in the literature are often 
selective and may be biased towards social, ecological or economic perspectives 
(Bennett, 2005b) or even biased to demonstrate effectiveness selectively (Wamukota 
et al., 2012). Even when one of these biases is adopted, it may have bias within it, e.g. 
the type of sociological indicators selected may be those of the researcher rather than 
those of the people who are impacted. This needs to be kept in mind when assessing 
impact. In the Philippines, for instance, community-based coastal resource manage-
BoX 8:  
assessing community perceptions of impact in Cambodia
in Cambodia, the decision to introduce 
community-based fisheries management was a 
political one. the government had its perceptions 
of what it wanted to achieve in terms of improving 
people’s livelihoods but it also wanted to see what 
perceptions the communities had. 
it adopted a process of participatory impact 
assessment to evaluate policy effectiveness. 
Different stakeholders were asked to identify 
the impact on their livelihoods and to score 
them. initially, the policy reforms generated 
improvements in poverty reduction, reduced 
fishing costs, improved income and improved food 
security, but these started to decline over time as 
they encouraged more people to join the fishery. 
they also created opportunities for small-scale 
processors and for small-scale farmers who were 
better able to access flooded land.
Source: CfDO and Imm, 2004
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ment (CBCRM) programs are effective in engaging local communities but resource 
users are skeptical about the impact on their livelihoods (Maliao et al., 2009). Evans 
et al. (2011a) also noted that different studies tend to measure different indicators 
and include biases towards favorable places, or they focus on successful projects or 
projects that are currently being supported, which is likely to produce more favorable 
results.
There can often be confusion around impact because of who decides the criteria used 
to assess it. Researchers or managers views of what should, could or has occurred 
may be very different from those of the community, and different stakeholder groups 
in the community may also have quite different perceptions from each other. Par-
ticipatory approaches to policy reform impact assessment can often reveal interesting 
aspects of impact (see Box 8).
According to Hanna (1996), there are three main means of assessing the effectiveness 
of co-management:
•	 SuStaInabIlIty: in the form of stewardship (the maintenance of productivity and 
ecological characteristics) and resilience (the ability to withstand changes and 
shocks) 
•	 eFFICIenCy: the cost effectiveness of the arrangement (transaction costs or net 
returns)
•	 equIty: this is divided into representation (of users), process clarity (transpar-
ency and accountability), homogenous expectations (similarity of user expecta-
tions) and distributive effects (equitable distribution of benefit flows). 
Wamukota et al. (2012) complemented this by indicating that co-management 
success can be measured through social dimensions, the condition of the resources 
and aspects of wider ecology. In regard to community-based fisheries management 
(CBFM), Kuemlangan (2004) noted the importance of balancing the livelihoods of 
fisheries with improving fish resource conservation or management. Weeratunge et 
al. (2013) pointed out that human wellbeing can be measured in a number of different 
ways but, in relation to fisheries, this is not a well-developed area of research. They 
also noted that fishers’ perceptions of wellbeing changes over time, which needs to be 
accommodated in any wellbeing analysis. 
Assessing the delivery of impact is often confused by a lack of clarity around the aims 
of the intervention. Many programs have confused policy objectives that interact, 
are internally inconsistent (Bellamy et al., 2001), are unrealistic or are incapable of 
objective measurement. Few seem to recognize trade-offs or a need to prioritize. In 
part, the ability to measure impact is time dependent, with some impacts taking many 
years to become apparent. In other situations, the theory of change itself may be 
changed over time to reflect changing political aims, and the focus of implementation 
may shift while the impacts being evaluated may remain unchanged (Bellamy et al., 
2001). 
Co-management impacts seem to have been studied more than most. Sen and Nielsen 
(1996) noted that in most of the co-management cases they studied, the rationale 
for introducing co-management was that the fishery was reaching a point of over-
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exploitation or was already over-exploited, making it a form of crisis management. 
Although it was mostly not possible to assess the outcomes in terms of sustainability, 
equity and efficiency, in most cases representation was increased and process clarity 
was improved. Guttiérrez et al. (2011) noted that the advantages of co-management 
include an enhanced sense of ownership which encourages responsible fishing, 
greater sensitivity to local socio-economic and ecological restraints, improved man-
agement through use of local knowledge, collective ownership by users in decision-
making, increased compliance with regulations through peer pressure, and better 
monitoring, control and surveillance by fishers. 
However, what is rather disappointing is the general lack of strong evidence about 
the impact of fisheries on people’s livelihoods and sense of inclusion. Evans et al. 
(2011a) noted the scarcity of impact assessment data on fisheries co-management 
in developing countries. Hilborn (2007a, 272) also found that there has been “very 
little systematic attempt to evaluate the success and failures of individual fisheries.” 
Roe et al (2009, x) found that a “major deficiency of formal CBNRM projects is the 
absence or paucity of quantitative and/or qualitative data on the social, economic and 
environmental impacts,” and Hilborn (2007) also noted that there are no systematic 
evaluations of the ecological impact of fisheries. 
In reviewing the evidence for the success of fisheries management, Sutinen (2010, 
97) concluded that: “Although there are several bright spots for some marine fishery 
resources (marginal improvements in stock status, growing use of rights-based man-
agement, capacity reduction programs, to name a few), the evidence overall leads me 
to conclude that our marine resource management institutions have failed to conserve 
resources and improve the economic health of coastal communities.” 
Although there are few examples of really successful management in developing 
country coastal fisheries, much still can be learned from the existing operations of 
fisheries management that may inform a better way of doing things. These critical 
success factors are outlined in the next section. 
28
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6
6. Critical factors that influence    
 success 
This section of the report presents evidence from the literature, 
cross-referenced with key informants, as to factors that have 
been key in making fisheries management work. 
In spite of the paucity of evidence on the impact of fisheries management systems and 
approaches, there is some evidence about which factors influence success in particu-
lar fisheries in particular locations at a particular time. 
This section starts with a brief introduction of some of the efforts undertaken by 
specialists in the fields of fisheries and natural resources management to encapsulate 
frameworks of success factors. It then looks at these factors in more detail under three 
headings: i) factors affecting policy and planning, ii) factors affecting technical imple-
mentation and iii) factors affecting community engagement. The critical factors are 
those which fisheries experts and practitioners perceive to have influenced the extent 
to which a fisheries management approach has had direct influence over planned or 
perceived impact. As our concern here is to achieve an understanding of the balance 
between social and ecological impacts, the critical success factors are reviewed in 
terms of both social and ecological impacts. 
This analysis does not give a concrete solution to management problems but indicates 
the trends in thinking and practice towards more successful ways of implement-
ing management. As Hilborn (2007, 300) noted, “there is no single prescription for 
moving currently unsustainable fisheries towards sustainability. The appropriate 
method will depend greatly on local circumstances.” Arthur (2005, 4) concluded in 
an 11-year study of fisheries management, funded by the UK government’s Depart-
ment for International Development (DFID), “[w]hile a diversity of circumstances and 
needs suggests there is no single or ‘optimum’ co-management arrangement for any 
region, nation or local situation there are some features common to all and common 
lessons that can be drawn from the study of different arrangements.” 
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In spite of these concerns for the specificity of success, some researchers have 
developed design principles or generalized criteria. Some are outlined below with the 
components discussed in more detail in later sections. 
6.1 Some frameworks of success factors
Ostrom (2009b) identified the following design principles for the management of com-
mon-pool resources management that were sustained over a long period of time and 
absent from fsystems: 
•	 uSeR bounDaRIeS: clear and locally understood boundaries between legitimate 
users and nonusers are present
•	 ReSouRCe bounDaRIeS: clear boundaries that separate a specific common-pool 
resource from a larger socio-ecological system are present
•	 CongRuenCe WIth loCal ConDItIonS: appropriation and provision rules are 
congruent with local social and environmental conditions
•	 appRopRIatIon anD pRovISIon: appropriation rules are congruent with provision 
rules: the distribution of costs is proportional to the distribution of benefits 
•	 ColleCtIve-ChoICe aRRangeMentS: most individuals affected by a resource 
regime are authorized to participate in making and modifying its rules
•	 MonItoRIng uSeRS: individuals who are accountable to or are the users monitor 
the appropriation and provision levels of the users
•	 MonItoRIng the ReSouRCe: individuals who are accountable to or are the users 
monitor the condition of the resource
•	 gRaDuateD SanCtIonS: sanctions for rule violations start very low but become 
stronger if a user repeatedly violates a rule
•	 ConFlICt-ReSolutIon MeChanISMS: rapid, low-cost, local arenas exist for 
resolving conflicts among users or with officials
•	 MInIMal ReCognItIon oF RIghtS: the rights of local users to make their own rules 
are recognized by the government 
•	 neSteD enteRpRISeS: when a common-pool resource is closely connected to a 
larger social-ecological system, governance activities are organized in multiple 
nested layers.
BoX 9:  
Design principes for the Peruvian anchovy fishery
a study of the Peruvian anchovy fisheries assessed 
the applicability of ostrom’s eight “design principles” 
of long-lasting common pool resources management 
regimes. ostrom (1990) confirmed these could serve as 
a valuable tool for analysis and understanding of large-
scale common pool resource systems: 
1.  early defined boundaries defining who has rights 
to withdraw resources and the boundaries of the 
common resource
2. congruence between appropriation (restricting time, 
place, technology, etc.) and provision rules (requiring 
labor, material, and money) and local conditions
3. collective-choice arrangements 
4. monitoring of conditions and behavior
5. graduated sanctions depending on the seriousness of 
an offense
6. conflict-resolution mechanisms
7. minimal recognition by government authorities of 
rights of appropriators to organize
8. nested enterprises with monitoring, enforcement 
and governance activities organized in multiple levels 
for CPRs that are part of larger systems.
Source: arias Schreiber and Halliday, 2013
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Refined versions of these have been tested in the field and demonstrated their value, 
as shown in Box 9. 
Similar sorts of criteria that support positive management experiences have been 
identified by other researchers. The following highlights the findings of Leal (2010), 
Berkes et al. (2001), Francis and Bryceson (2001) and Bennett (2005b). 
Community management of quotas
Leal (2010) suggested that, to be effective, the communities require:
•	 legally	backed	quota	rights
•	 sufficient	common	interest	to	make	negotiations	feasible
•	 clear	awareness	among	fishers	that	collective	management	will	generate	benefits	
for both fishers and non-fishers
•	 an	 acceptable	 system	 for	 disposal	 of	 rights	 should	 the	 collective	 arrangement	
close 
•	 an	effective	system	for	deterring	violations	with	sanctions	
•	 clear	signals	that	such	arrangements	will	not	be	overturned	by	higher	levels	of	
government. 
Fisheries management in San Salvador
Berkes et al. (2001) determined that success was due to a number of factors including:
•	 the	 resource	 stakeholders’	 participation	 and	 sense	 of	 ownership	 in	 project	
planning and implementation
•	 clarity	of	objectives	
•	 supportive	leadership
•	 the	partnership	between	fishers	and	government	
•	 specification	and	legitimacy	of	user	rights	enforcement	
•	 capability	building	
•	 tangible	 benefits	 such	 as	 redefined	 resource	 access,	 a	 shift	 to	 non-destructive	
fishing methods, improved enforcement, and observable biological, economic 
and social changes.
Sustainable use of coastal and marine resources in Tanzania
Francis and Bryceson (2001, 76) identified general lessons learned and key factors, 
including: 
•	 dialogue	and	linkage	between	traditional	and	scientific	knowledge	systems
•	 mechanisms	for	interaction	between	scientists,	managers	and	decision-makers
•	 continued	human	and	technical	capacity	building	of	research	institutions
•	 essentiality	of	addressing	land	and	sea	tenure	and	common	property	rights
•	 genuine	 involvement	 and	 empowerment	 of	 local	 communities	 and	 civil	 society	
including community-based organizations (CBOs), and local non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs)
•	 credible	and	equitable	arrangements	for	benefit-sharing	with	communities
•	 open	availability	of	information	for	overall	transparency	and	accountability
•	 integration	of	socio-economic	opportunities	into	conservation	programs
•	 recognition	of	and	respect	for	local	and	traditional	institutions
•	 openness	in	collaboration	between	traditional	and	government	institutions
•	 strengthening	of	relevant	institutions	providing	entry	to	decision-making
•	 management	agreements	between	institutions	for	cross-sectoral	coordination
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•	 long-term	and	broad-based	visions	in	policy	thinking
•	 democratic	process	of	public	involvement	in	policy-making	and	implementation.
Measures which achieved their objectives
Bennett (2005b) collated a number of drivers from a 1997 Organisation of Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) study on measures which achieved their 
fisheries objectives. These were found to be: 
•	 use	rights
•	 co-management	
•	 compliance	and	enforcement
•	 biology	and	luck	
•	 policy	frameworks	
•	 pro-active	industry	
•	 stakeholder	participation	
•	 multi-sectoral	approaches.	
Bennett noted that few if any of these factors are able to contribute to success on their 
own but need to be applied in association with others.  
As can be seen from these examples, the factors which support positive manage-
ment experiences are likely to be numerous, and operating over several scales. For 
example, Wamukota et al. (2012) found that “[t]he full list of contextual conditions 
thought to influence the success of common-pool resource management is large 
(>30).” But having systematically reviewed 38 papers of 49 co-management projects 
related to reefs, they concluded that few studies presented results that covered the 
full range of social-ecological success criteria and that reporting selectivity was likely 
to have been high. 
Success factors appear to operate at different levels and here we have reviewed them 
at three levels: 
•	 factors	affecting	policy	and	planning
•	 factors	affecting	technical	implementation	
•	 factors	affecting	community	engagement.	
However, we have noted that while this helps split the number of factors into opera-
tional levels, some operate at multiple levels – and the linkages between these levels 
are as important as the levels themselves.
6.2 Factors affecting policy and planning
Factors affecting policy and planning are broadly those that act globally, regionally 
and nationally. This includes relating fisheries management to the complexity of the 
management situation and conflicting aims, recognizing the importance of context, 
operating at different scales and levels, ensuring institutional coherence, ensuring 
ecosystem viability and adapting to external change. 
Embracing complexity and integration
Fisheries management is, as mentioned above, a complex process. Efforts to simplify 
that process tend to result in simplistic solutions. Increasingly, there is a focus on 
embracing complexity and integrating management across sectors. 
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Coastal areas are, by their nature, complex. They support a diversity of species, eco-
systems and stakeholders in a dynamic environment where the land-water interface 
generates constant change. The very nature of social and ecological approaches to 
natural resources management means dealing with the complexity of bringing together 
factors that relate to the environment, society, the economy, politics and culture. This 
complexity can often mean that problems have 
no right or wrong answer (see Box 10). But as 
Link (2010) noted, the potential for fisheries 
management to become so complex that it 
becomes unmanageable should be avoided by 
getting the balance right. 
In the past, fisheries management tended 
to represent the issues involved in coastal 
fisheries management in a simplified form. 
The use of single species models from 
temperate waters, for example, has been trans-
ferred to multi-species fisheries operating in 
ecologically diverse ecosystems. While this 
has generated much knowledge of the stocks, 
it also has many limitations (Link, 2010). 
Models based on fisheries with fewer larger 
vessels landing into fewer ports with good 
infrastructure and monitoring facilities do not always transfer well to fisheries with 
many small craft landing into dispersed sites with limited monitoring. 
A key factor of success is bringing these different elements together in ways that 
integrate them as a working whole. Acknowledging and dealing with the holistic 
nature of the coast is an important starting point for understanding how to bring other 
factors into a management approach. As Link (2010, 3335 of Kindle edition) noted, 
“without a place, process, or some such mechanism to sort out the social, economic, 
biological, ecological, and cultural tradeoffs, we will remain mired in the same difficul-
ties we have faced for centuries.”
Pomeroy (1994) noted that the delay in developing community-based management in 
fisheries, compared with other natural resource systems is due, in part, to the com-
plexity of coastal and marine resource systems, the social and cultural structure of 
fishing communities, and the independent nature of fishers.
Addressing the issue of scale in commons management, Berkes (2006) noted that it 
may be more useful to think in terms of managing complexity rather than simply trying 
to “scale up”. This involves thinking of management of the commons as the manage-
ment of complex systems, and recognizing that communities are themselves complex 
systems embedded within a larger complex system of politics and economics. Ostrom 
(2009a, 421) identified a number of variables that need to be considered in analyzing 
socio-ecological systems. Shown in Box 11, these demonstrate how complex it can be 
to understand and to monitor such systems. 
Understanding the processes that lead to improvements in, or deterioration of, 
natural resources is limited because scientific disciplines use different concepts 
BoX 10:  
Wicked problems of fisheries 
management
there is increasing study of the “wicked” nature 
of some of the problems that face fisheries and 
coastal governance. “Wicked” problems are those 
that are difficult to define and delineate from 
bigger problems and tend not to be resolved easily. 
essentially they have no right or wrong answer that 
can be scientifically determined. this can place 
limits to how rational and effective fisheries and 
coastal governance can possibly be.
Source: Jentoft and Chuenpagdee, 2009
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and languages to describe and explain complex social-ecological systems (Ostrom, 
2009a). The current debate on fisheries and marine biodiversity has polarized to an 
extent around three key areas: i) economic rationalization, ii) marine conservation 
and iii) distributional/equity issues. Each of these areas has emerged from specific 
disciplines, each of which operates within a specific discourse, i.e. a shared way of ap-
prehending the world which constructs meaning and relationships, creates and uses 
its own language, validates knowledge in its own way, helps to define common sense 
and legitimate knowledge, and builds assumptions, judgments and contentions that 
provide the basis for analysis and debate (Dryzek, 2005). 
Such discourses tend to separate, confuse and isolate parts of the debate from other 
parts, which then tend towards reductionism in the solutions they provide and to 
heightened disagreement between different discourses. Bromley (2009) noted that 
even within fisheries economics, confused concepts result in incoherent models of 
fisheries management. 
Compartmentalization of the fisheries/biodiversity debate around the three key areas 
mentioned above has often been characterized by oversimplified solutions to fisheries 
problems such as the use of individual transferrable quotas, marine protected areas 
and community-based management (Degnbol et al., 2006). This has been compound-
ed by the evolution of these discourses away from each other (Belsky, 2000). Ostrom 
(2009a) noted that, without a common framework to organize findings, isolated 
knowledge does not cumulate. 
Armitage et al. (2012) found that there are thresholds where existing systems are 
no longer valid, e.g. where coastal fisheries have reached a level of resource decline 
that produces profound effects on the system as a whole. This suggests that systems, 
whatever form they take, should be sufficiently flexible and adaptable to embrace 
change and respond to it. One approach to this calls for utilizing multi-level arrange-
ments where different levels of management or governance have different roles and 
responsibilities, and are linked through coordinating institutions (Ostrom, 2009b). 
The devolution of roles and responsibilities may be the necessary course of action, 
in part to address capacity issues within government, but such transfers also have 
the effect of redistributing power, which may be difficult for government to deal with 
(Mahon et al., 2008).
The multi-species nature of fisheries, especially in high biodiversity areas such as 
coral reefs, can make management particularly difficult. The potential number of in-
teractions of different species and ecosystems in any given fishery can be extremely 
high, which manifests itself in many different fisheries (Link, 2010). For instance, the 
multispecies nature of the fishery along India’s Andhra Pradesh coast constrains man-
agement measures (Salagrama, 2005). Studies of coastal fisheries and other natural 
resource systems suggest that success depends upon matching rules to the local 
resource context and attributes (Ostrom, 2009a).
In research on coastal resource management (CRM) in the Philippines, Fabinyi et al. 
(2010) demonstrated that various aspects of social complexity also have significant 
implications for the outcomes. By highlighting social complexity, they demonstrat-
ed how the planning, implementation and impacts of CRM have different effects for 
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 BoX 11:  
Examples of variables in a framework for analysing social-ecological systems 
Social, economic and political settingss (S)
S1 economic development,. S2 Demogaphic trends. S3 political stability.
S4 government resource polices. S5 Market incentives. S6 Media organization.
Resource systems (RS)
RS1 Sector (e.g., water, forests, pasture, fish)
RS2 Clarity of system boundaries
RS3 Size of resource system*
RS4 Human-constructed facilities
RS5 Productivity of system*
RS6 equilibrium properties
RS7 Predictabaility of system dynamics*
RS8 Storage characteristics
RS9 location
Resource units (RU)
Ru1 Resource unit mobility*
Ru2 Growth or replacement rate
Ru3 interaction among resource units
Ru4 economic value
Ru5 number of units
Ru6 Distincitve markings
Ru7 Spatial and temporal distribution
i1 Harvesting levels of diverse users
i2 information sharing among users
i3 Deliberation processes
i4 Conflicts among users
i5 investment activites
i6 lobbying activites
i7 Self-organizing activities
i8 netowrking activities
Governance systems
G51 Government organizations
GS2 nongovernment organizations
GS3 network structure
GS4 Property-rights systmes
GS5 operational rules*
GS6 Collective-choice rules*
GS7 Constitutional rules
GS8 Monitoring and sanctioning processes
Users (U)
u1 number of users*
u2 Socioeconomic attributes of users
u3 History of use
u4 location
u5 leadership/entrepreneurship*
u6 norms/social capital*
u7 Knowledge of SeS/mental models*
u8 importance of resource *
u9 technology uses
01 Social performance measures (e.g., efficiency, equity, 
accountability, sustainability)
02 ecological performance measures  
(e.g., overharvested, resilience, bio-diversity, 
sustainability)
03 externalities to other SeS
Source: Ostrom, 2009a 
Interactions (1) outcomes (O)
*Subset of variables found to be associated with self-organization.
Related ecosystems (ECO)
eCo1 Climate patterms. eCo2 Pollution patterns. eCo3 flows into and out of focal SeS.
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different groups of people. The complexity of the socio-cultural systems that make 
up the way people and ecosystems interact means moving away from simplistic gen-
eralizations about the coast and embracing complexity (Mahon et al, 2008; Ostrom, 
2009a; Campbell and Townsley, 2013). Understanding and using behavior patterns 
that emerge from complexity might suggest that management measures focus more 
on developing participation, building trust, gaining commitment to change, internaliz-
ing the political economy, enhancing communication and fostering common interdis-
ciplinary discourses rather than focusing on specific technical measures (Campbell 
and Townsley, 2013). 
There is also a growing realization that complex situations, such as those that charac-
terize coastal fisheries, will often generate forms of feedback, learning processes and 
non-linear relationships that are not always predictable. These are becoming more 
difficult to predict due to external factors that affect the fishery – such as climate 
change, natural hazards, global fuel and food prices – becoming more common and in-
fluencing fisheries and coastal livelihoods (Campbell and Townsley, 2013). However, 
attempts to break down these complex relationships at sectoral and sub-sectoral 
levels fail to recognize the interconnectedness of the social, economic and ecological 
systems in which fisheries operate (Campbell and Townsley, 2013). Ferrol-Schulte et 
al. (2013) called for a more holistic approach to understanding coastal livelihoods in 
order to manage coastal and marine social-ecological systems more effectively. 
There is increasing realization that fisheries are, in fact, complex social-ecological 
systems that are capable of adaptation as management systems alter conditions 
(McConney and Charles, 2008). Mahon et al. (2008, 110) proposed “an approach 
that emphasizes enabling self organization and adaptive capacity through empower-
ment, learning, and response systems and promoting positive, equitable, transparent 
interaction among stakeholders” as a foundation for governing fishery systems. In 
reviewing a number of papers concerned with this complexity, Armitage et al. (2009, 
95) determined that “[e]fforts to resolve multi-scale environment-society dilemmas 
require innovative governance approaches.” 
Some of these innovative approaches are starting to emerge, but there is still much 
to be done in this area. In the main, there has been a tendency to implement fisheries 
management processes in isolation from wider coastal activities and from the planning 
and management actions in other sectors (Copes and Charles, 2004). In the future, 
fisheries management will have to take into account a much wider set of social and 
economic variables and address inter-generational issues (Copes and Charles, 2004). 
This has started to emerge as a way forward in some areas. In the Philippines, there 
has been some success in integrating fisheries into a wider process of integrated 
coastal management. In fact, integrated coastal management (ICM) is now replacing 
the narrow focus of fisheries management and narrowly based habitat management 
and moving more towards ecosystem-based management which emphasizes the need 
for integration and collaboration (White et al., 2006). The potential of ICM to address 
coastal complexity through breaking down institutional barriers is gaining support 
and is starting to show positive effects (Christie and White, 2006). But the complexity 
of such approaches requires that they be developed over time through correspond-
ingly complex systems of consultation and institution building. 
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Addressing conflicting aims
Fisheries management tries to address social, economic, environmental and political 
aims, but these often conflict with each other (Cochrane, 2002). Deciding how to 
trade-off between different aims is not an objective process but is ultimately a political 
one of negotiation. This section looks at these conflicting aims and discusses the im-
portance of responding to them. 
A fishery is a complex system that links individual human endeavor, enterprise, risk, 
culture, the physical world, technology, the natural world, the political economy, and 
wider society’s beliefs, aspirations and values. Different people’s perceptions of reality 
and their ideals can influence the aims that are chosen for different interventions. For 
example, wilderness science uses two points on a spectrum when approaching man-
agement: i) the pristine wilderness devoid of humans, and ii) humanized landscapes 
and manipulated ecosystems (Belsky, 2000). Different fisheries ecosystems lie within 
this spectrum but different aims place different fisheries at different points along it. 
Even within a given fishery, the aims of different people engaged in the sector are 
often confusing. These aims may be numerous, often conflicting or requiring trade-
offs, and quite often are being under-achieved. In some situations, the conflicts are 
clearly defined as noted by Salagama (2005), who identified the need to balance man-
agement efforts with providing livelihoods and foreign exchange earnings as one of 
the constraints to effective management in Andhra Pradesh, India. In other cases, the 
conflicts are more complex, as noted by Sugiyama et al. (2004, 49) who determined 
“[a] key factor to turn around the current trends (in fisheries in Asia and the Pacific) 
would be for States to resolve the competing policy imperatives of:
•	 optimal	and	sustainable	use	of	fish	resources	and	their	supporting	ecosystems;
•	 economic	objectives,	especially	in	relation	to	either	small-	or	large-scale	fisheries;
•	 social	objectives,	including	maximizing	employment	and	improving	livelihoods;
•	 objectives	related	to	equity,	including	access	for	only	small-scale	fisheries;	and
•	 any	other	objectives	(for	example	trade	liberalization,	market	access	etc.)	which	
may have impacts on this sub-sector.”
At any one time, the stated aims of fisheries management may be maximization of 
production, conservation of resources and ecosystems, maximization of economic 
benefits to the nation, food and nutrition security, foreign exchange generation, em-
ployment, poverty reduction, sustainable resource use or maximization of ecosystem 
service provision. There may also be many unstated aims, such as rent seeking by 
politicians or for powerful groups that might otherwise threaten political stability, or 
appeasement of some parts of the electorate, or trade-offs with other non-fisheries 
aims in other sectors. 
Historically the main aim of fisheries was to increase production to satisfy growing 
demand from an expanding population. Many saw the sea as full of fish, a resource 
that could never be depleted (Roberts, 2007; Link, 2010). But technology and fishing 
effort have proved that to be incorrect, and many fisheries are now over-exploited, 
biodiversity has changed and ecosystems are damaged. The desire to harvest fish 
must now be balanced by a need to do so sustainably. There is also recognition that 
fisheries can play a significant role in the livelihoods of people, especially the poor, by 
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providing food, nutrition, employment and income. As such, the issue of equity in the 
benefits that flow from fisheries is also important. 
In addition to fisheries management having conflicting aims, there also seems to be a 
significant divide around how those aims might be achieved. Hilborn (2007b) noted 
that ecologists strongly support marine protected areas (MPAs) as a central part of 
the solution whereas fisheries specialists support stopping the “race to fish” through 
a change of incentives to encourage sustainability and stock building. These two ap-
proaches need not be seen as two distinct ways of looking at the world. Claudet (2011) 
noted, for instance, that MPAs can have multiple objectives ranging from sustainable 
use and management of marine resources to socio-economic development. Likewise, 
Pomeroy (2003) recognized how co-management approaches can work well with 
MPAs.
In trying to make sense of the complexities of fisheries management and to break 
them down into their component parts, Hilborn (2007c) cast light on the motives and 
intended outcomes of different groups of stakeholders involved in the management 
process. He concluded that there are broadly four categories of fisheries objectives: 
biological, economic, social and political, each with specific concerns: 
•	 bIologICal objeCtIveS: concerned with maximizing production which translates 
in the traditional maximum sustainable yield (MSY)
•	 eConoMIC objeCtIveS: concerned with resource rent maximization through ef-
ficiency i.e. maximum economic yield (MEY)
•	 SoCIal objeCtIveS: concerned with distributional issues of employment, income, 
maintenance of communities and food security – or maximum job yield (MJY)
•	 polItICal objeCtIveS: concerned primarily with the avoidance of conflict among 
the electorate and opposition from resource-users regarding management 
measures – or what he refers to as “minimum sustainable whinge” (MSW).4
This gives some idea of the complexity of objectives and even of the different ways 
that different groups have of looking at the fishery. It also gives some indication as to 
why there is so little agreement on targets for the achievement of management objec-
tives – if the different groups are talking at cross-purposes about radically different 
priorities, they are unlikely to ever achieve a consensus on what is needed. Hilborn 
(2007c) suggested that the current fisheries crisis can be thought of largely as a 
conflict between these different objectives, and linked these possible policy objectives 
to different stakeholder groups in a way that clearly differentiates the groups from 
each other:
•	 large-scale	 fishers	 may	 want	 a	 greater	 focus	 on	 economic	 optimization	 or	
maximum production (depending on the management regime in place) 
•	 small-scale	fishers	may	prioritize	stable,	reliable	yields
•	 fisheries	managers	operate	within	a	highly	politicized	context
•	 politicians	 often	 react	 to	 policy	 by	 providing	 appeasement	 measures,	 such	 as	
subsidies, to reduce conflict
•	 government	scientists	tend	to	err	on	the	side	of	caution	and	avoid	deciding	where	
they stand in favor of collecting more data
•	 environmental	 NGOs	 tend	 to	 focus	 on	 ecosystem	 and	 species	 health	 and	 the	
negative impacts of fishing, concerns which tend to conflict directly with those of 
production maximization and social inclusiveness.
4 mSW is a term first used by Pope, J.g. in 1983.
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In spite of the diversity of possible aims for fisheries management, Hilborn (2007b) 
found a seemingly broad agreement among the fisheries management community, the 
conservation world and even the resource users themselves that the future of fisheries 
lies with much less fishing, lower exploitation rates, larger fish stocks, reduced 
by-catch, increased concerns for ecosystems, less destructive fishing methods, more 
spatial management of fisheries and more areas protected from fishing. In reviews 
of schools of thought around fisheries management, he identified some areas of 
agreement, pointing out a broad consensus of the need to move towards lower ex-
ploitation rates and to remove subsidies that increase fishing effort. Key elements of 
the consensus included dedicated access, as well as: “quotas and allocation, fishing 
cooperatives that internally allocate, territorial fishing rights for communities, groups 
or individuals, and individual allocation of catch quotas” (Hilborn 2007b, 297). 
The debate around the implementation of MPAs, as one form of fisheries manage-
ment measure, illustrates the increasing recognition of the importance of negotia-
tion in setting management objectives. Christie and White (2007, 1053) noted that 
“[u]nclear goals and inattention to social dynamics are almost certain to result in 
conflict that derails MPA implementation.” Gaining the support of communities in the 
use of MPAs and other management measures is vital if fisheries and conservation 
aims are to be achieved. Integrated coastal management, if planned properly and with 
a sufficiently holistic perspective can provide a useful framework for bringing aims 
together. As Christie and White (2006, 191) noted, the ICM process “tries to break 
down the barriers erected by traditional sectoral management of natural resources as 
well as the divide that exists among local government, national agencies, community 
groups, and NGOs.” 
Diversity in the aims for fisheries management is a fact and needs to be acknowledged 
and reconciled if we are to move forwards successfully. Berkes et al. (2001) discussed 
in some detail how conflicts between objectives can be resolved but ultimately this 
requires agreement on a prioritization process. 
Recognizing the importance of context
The level and form of complexity of fisheries and their management is not constant 
but varies between places. The importance of local context and how it affects fisheries 
management comes out clearly from many references. Recognizing the importance 
of the local context in fisheries management and adjusting management measures to 
accommodate that is very important. 
The specific context in which fisheries management operates will have considerable 
influence on what works and what does not. In the wider context of wilderness manage-
ment, it has been argued that there are no “right solutions” to management problems 
and that these should be examined in the context of particular places, peoples, issues 
and ecosystems (Belsky, 2000). Hilborn (2007b) acknowledged that different situations 
call for different solutions. The local biological, ecological, political economy and socio-
economic aspects of a fishery often determine the success of management initiatives. 
What works in developed countries will not necessarily work in developing countries. 
Guttiérrez et al. (2011) noted that countries with high and very high human devel-
opment indices (HDIs) were more successful at fisheries management than those 
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with low to medium HDIs. Andrade and Rhodes (2012) found that although there is 
a positive correlation between gross domestic product (GDP) at purchasing power 
parity (PPP) per capita and compliance with regulations, this may well be due to other 
factors such as political will, corruption and social inequality. However they also found 
that population density was negatively correlated with compliance. 
Hilborn (2007b, 301) noted that “[i]n countries without strong central management 
structures, decentralization and locally controlled dedicated access appears to be 
the best way to make the transition to biological and economic sustainability.” In 
relation to community-based fisheries management (CBFM), Kuemlangan (2004) 
noted that above all, “the CBFM initiative or programme should be tailored in design 
and delivery to the individual country circumstances.” Bell et al. (2006) determined 
that the success of stock enhancement of scallops in Japan could not be replicated in 
New Zealand, which may have been due to the existence or not of the other factors 
mentioned here. 
While in many parts of the world there is a move towards greater engagement of com-
munities in resource management, this is not always the case. In Costa Rica, when 
Alpízar (2006) compared the current level of government involvement in marine pro-
tection and fisheries management with that of the community, he concluded that, at 
that stage of development, the greater role should remain with government. Francis 
and Bryceson (2001) noted weaknesses in both government and traditional institu-
tions in coastal management in Tanzania that needed support, while Baticados et al. 
(1998) found that even within the Philippines, fisheries cooperatives on the mainland 
had significant differences in their capacities compared with those on the islands. 
This pattern of dependence on specific circumstances also seems to affect specific 
management measures. On the subject of individual transferrable quotas (ITQs), 
Robinson (2010, 53) noted “the first best, ITQs, is barely politically feasible anywhere. 
Even in the best possible circumstances, in rich, well-functioning democracies where 
the stakes are high, ITQs are highly controversial … If ITQs are not politically feasible 
in Norway, what chance have they of being adopted in Ghana or Sierra Leone? Very 
little would be my guess.”
Rudd et al. (2003, 66) reported that complexity of tropical coastal fisheries “makes 
economically efficient policy tools such as individual transferable quotas impossible 
to implement …” This is likely due to a number of factors, such as the quality of 
the institutions in place in terms of their governance arrangements and management 
capacity, the adherence to the rule of law, the political economy, the financial and staff 
resources available, the number of vessels and the number of operating sites. 
Operating at multiple scales
Fisheries management cannot be addressed in isolation from other factors that affect 
the fishery. Fisheries are, by the fluid and interconnected nature of the sea, part of 
a bigger whole which creates the social and ecological context in which fisheries 
management must operate. Attempts to externalize these wider influences from the 
fisheries management equation have tended to lead to rather simplistic and often 
failed management approaches. 
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These factors that influence fisheries also operate at multiple levels. In particular, 
fisheries fit inside a wider set of ecological processes that influence, and are influ-
enced by, the fisheries. There are different scales and levels at which fisheries need 
to be considered (Jentoft and McCay, 1995; Raakjaer Nielsen and Vedsmand, 1995). 
In this case, “levels” refers to where decisions should be made and “scale” refers to 
the fisheries resource system and the management tasks to be undertaken (Sen and 
Raakjaer Nielsen, 1996). It is clear that when the ecological system is large, some 
decisions have to be made at the national or international levels, such as those that 
deal with transboundary issues or are designed to reflect wider national development 
policies. Likewise, the economic conditions that allow fisheries to function at the local 
level are also influenced by the wider national 
and regional economy (see Box 12). Under-
standing the need to work at these different 
scales and to identify the appropriate level for 
particular roles is important to understand-
ing what works in fisheries and how it works. 
Legislation is generally a national role, trade 
may be controlled by an international body 
and the development of specific site regula-
tions may be much more local. In some cases, 
roles are shared – policy and planning may be 
jointly developed, and monitoring and evalua-
tion may be participatory. 
The movements of water, pollution, fish 
and predators across large areas, between 
locations and across adjacent or connected 
ecosystems can affect ecosystem function. 
Likewise, water circulation patterns, climate 
change effects and industrial fisheries can all affect small-scale fisheries over large 
areas and time frames. Where fisheries cover large geographical areas and different 
fish stocks, there may be need for higher level management functions than in the 
case of the management of a small area of reef. Arthur (2005) noted the importance of 
getting management of fisheries at the right scale for the size of the fishery concerned. 
At the larger scales, there would appear to be greater room for generalizing the factors 
that create positive social, ecological and economic benefits. Berkes et al. (2000) start 
to address the generalizability issues in co-management at higher scales. However, 
the most appropriate scale to manage from an ecological perspective does not neces-
sarily correspond to the most appropriate scale from social or economic perspectives 
(Roe et al., 2009). This is likely to be particularly true in coastal fisheries where the 
fluid and interconnected nature of the sea invites a much wider perspective, such 
as a large marine ecosystem, whereas communities of resource users may be more 
isolated and different from each other. 
The value of managing at multiple levels has become increasingly apparent. Armitage 
et al. (2012) noted that devolution of power to lower levels – closer to the level of 
resource users – works best when formal policy and regulatory support from the 
BoX 12:  
Linkages across scales of 
management
in Cambodia, the community management of 
fisheries is embedded in a wider process that 
links fisheries, through the provincial levels, 
into national development objectives through a 
Strategic Planning framework for fisheries 2010-
2019. this framework allows for decision-making 
to be devolved to different levels to incorporate 
local needs and aspirations while also ensuring 
coherence of objectives at national levels.  
Source: fisheries administration, 2010
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state are provided. However, such devolution can generate the risk of elite capture of 
decision-making processes. 
Wilson et al. (2006) also noted that complex scale issues are now resulting in combina-
tions of institutions working at different scales to form cross-scale networks that can 
address greater complexity. While the more traditional view of fisheries management 
has been a more “command and control” approach, these have not tended to create 
the conservation outcomes that are desired because of the complexity and multi-scale 
reality of the management issues (Armitage et al., 2012). In response, multi-level gov-
ernance arrangements involving state and non-state actors are emerging. Multi-levels 
approaches are often needed to confer economies of scale on knowledge generation, 
ensure coherence across policy areas, allocate rights fairly, and link national and local 
priorities. This is particularly so where the effects of management in a fishery will 
affect adjacent fisheries – either along the coast or further out to sea. 
Even in fisheries research, the value of shared functions is being recognized across the 
research cycle (Campbell and Salagrama, 2001), which has shown traditional ecological 
knowledge to be very useful, especially when combined with more formal knowledge. 
The interconnectedness of the marine environment suggests the need for taking a 
broader perspective that links fisheries to the wider ecology and human world. This 
reflects a similar change which is developing in terrestrial systems (Berkström et al., 
2012), such as the “tropical seascape” approach in the marine sphere. This approach 
works with a mosaic of interlinked patches that provides a multitude of ecosystem 
services and represents a level of management intervention which is receiving 
increased interest. However, the knowledge of the inter-linkages and connectivity 
within such systems is limited (Berkström et al., 2012). 
In comparing a number of approaches to large areas for marine management (LAMM), 
Bensted-Smith and Kirkman (2010) addressed marine management at multiple scales 
from the larger scale of multiple nations down, in some cases, to the local scale with 
stated aims that covered both marine conservation and sustainable development. 
These approaches included Large Marine Ecosystems (LMEs), Seascapes, Marine 
Ecoregions, Regional Seas and Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICM).  Large 
Marine Ecosystems that cross national boundaries address marine ecosystems at this 
larger scale – especially in relation to fisheries. The term (LME) is now used to define 
marine management areas by agencies such as the Global Environment Facility 
(GEF), the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) and the World 
Bank. The World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) and The Nature Conservancy (TNC) 
use the term “Marine Ecoregions” and Conservation International (CI) is working 
with “Seascapes” (see Box 13) in the Coral Triangle Initiative (Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste). The United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP) has developed a “Regional Seas Approach” which 
includes action plans for protecting the environment and delivering sustainable de-
velopment. Some form of wider ecosystem approach is an important component of 
many fisheries management programs, and integrated coastal management is used in 
a number of countries but particularly widely in the Philippines. 
Bensted-Smith and Kirkman, (2010, iv) determined that “Large Marine Ecosystems, 
Marine Ecoregions and to some extent Seascapes are all ecosystem-based in their 
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geography and are reasonable starting units, around which to build a programme of 
marine conservation or restoration and sustainable use.” In addition, they suggested 
that for all of these approaches, context is very important. They (2010, iv) noted that 
all three approaches “have attained important results, yet we are concerned that the 
aim of effective governance across sectors and at all levels, from local to regional, is 
poorly articulated and inadequately addressed, especially in the case of the Large 
Marine Ecosystems.” They also noted that “most Regional Seas Programmes are well 
established and have an increasingly significant role in coastal and marine resource 
management and conservation in their respective regions.” In relation to ICM they 
wrote (2010, iv) that “we consider that the other approaches studied here have much 
to learn from the ICM process, as they strive to overcome some of the barriers to 
EBM in developing countries, such as: ineffective governance, sometimes under-
mined by corruption; local stakeholders lacking rights over resources, power in 
decision-making and the means to develop alternative livelihoods; rapid social and 
BoX 13:  
The Conservation International (CI) seascape approach
Seascapes are large, multiple-use marine areas, 
defined scientifically and strategically, in which 
government authorities, private organizations and 
other stakeholders cooperate to conserve the diversity 
and abundance of marine life, with the ultimate goal 
of promoting human well-being. in each seascape, Ci 
is building coalitions with governments, corporations 
and civil society organizations to attain nine essential 
elements.
1. enabling legal framework. Seascapes generate an 
enabling framework of laws, conventions, regulations 
and policies that facilitate marine conservation at 
local, national and regional scales.
2. ecosystem-based management including MPas. 
Seascapes advance large-scale management of 
marine ecosystems and species through the use of 
multidisciplinary scientific information to inform 
effective planning, implementation, monitoring and 
evaluation.
3. adequate institution and capacity. Seascapes 
build adequate institutional frameworks and 
capacity, including personnel, infrastructure, and 
equipment, to make marine governance structures 
(governmental, commercial and civil) work effectively 
and efficiently.
4. Private sector engagement. Seascapes promote 
convergence between conservation and development 
by linking the viability and profitability of major 
economic activities with sustainable management of 
the ecosystem.
5. Social and political support. Seascapes increase the 
social and political viability of marine conservation as 
an integral part of sustainable development, and they 
build broad support at all scales, from stakeholders in 
local marine managed areas to national leaders.
6. Maintenance and restoration of critical habitats and 
ecosystems. Seascapes maintain or restore critical 
habitats and ecosystems so that ecological processes 
and ecosystem services are sustained.
7. threatened species recovery. Seascapes reverse 
declining population trends for threatened marine 
species.
8. Human well-being benefits. Seascapes improve the 
social, economic, and cultural well-being of human 
communities dependent on marine and coastal 
resources and ecosystems.
9. Sustainable financing and market mechanisms. 
Seascapes strive to be financially sustainable with 
funding portfolios that are stable, diverse, and large 
enough to implement all priority marine conservation 
activities.
Source: Conservation International http://www.conservation.org/global/marine/initiatives/seascapes/pages/seascapes.aspx
K
e
y
 f
a
c
t
o
r
s
 s
u
p
p
o
r
t
in
g
 s
m
a
l
l
-s
c
a
l
e
 c
o
a
s
t
a
l
 f
is
h
e
r
ie
s
 m
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t
 - s
y
n
t
h
e
s
is
 r
e
v
ie
w
44
political change preventing sustained commitment to EBM; scarcity of strong civil 
society organisations to champion and support EBM.” Since that review, some of the 
other approaches, such has the Conservation International Seascape (see Box 13) 
and The Nature Conservancy approaches have reportedly placed greater emphasis 
on governance issues and context-specific approaches.
Bensted-Smith and Kirkman (2010, 22) also noted that given the different nature – 
and, in some aspects, complementary roles – of the five LAMM approaches, “it is 
not surprising that their application has in many cases overlapped. In some places 
the outcomes, funding and sustainability achieved may be fruits not of individual 
programs but of two or more complementary, interacting approaches. An additional 
question to ask, then, is whether the application of multiple approaches in the same 
area, or overlapping areas, is synergistic or merely inefficiency caused by institutions 
adhering to their own methodologies instead of building on what is already in place.”
Integrated coastal management is seen by many as an effective, comprehensive and 
holistic way of bringing different sectors and levels together. The Philippines has 
probably had the most extensive ICM experience (White et al., 2006). ICM’s effective-
ness is likely to be, in part, a result of its ability to incorporate other tools at the local 
level, e.g. MPAs. Christie and White (2006, 184) noted that “[t]o be effective on a wide 
scale MPAs should be embedded within larger planning frameworks such as inte-
grated coastal management (ICM) or ecosystem-based management (EBM).” These 
wider frameworks are designed to balance economic development with resource man-
agement processes in cross-sectoral ways. 
Ecosystem approaches to fisheries also place an emphasis on operating at different 
scales. Charles and Saunders (2006) noted that from the perspective of EAF, “it is 
important for fisheries management to take into account the impacts of fishing on the 
ecosystem, and conversely, the impacts of the ecosystem and of other human uses of 
that ecosystem, on fisheries.” The ecological aspects of fisheries need also be consid-
ered in wider development approaches where multiple use economic development is 
occurring. It is important to understand that context and to adjust fisheries manage-
ment accordingly. 
Clearly, there is a need for fisheries managers to look outside of their normal environ-
ment and seek solutions and linkages with other sectors (Mahon et al., 2008). This 
need for integration of social, economic, environmental and political concerns and 
issues is starting to take on a new form as integrated ecosystem-based approaches, 
which have considerable potential to integrate sustainable resource-use management, 
conservation and development into a single paradigm. The value of addressing this at 
higher levels of spatial planning is becoming more generally recognized. The Coordi-
nating Body on the Seas of East Asia (COBSEA) (2011) noted that coastal and marine 
spatial planning (CMSP) “is emerging as a tool of choice around the world, particu-
larly in heavily used marine areas. CMSP offers countries an operational framework 
to maintain the value of their marine biodiversity while at the same time allowing 
sustainable use of the economic potential of their oceans. CMSP is an approach that 
can make key components of ecosystem-based management of coastal and marine 
areas a reality.”
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Ensuring institutional coherence 
As discussed above, many fisheries are faced with multiple aims that are often conflict-
ing, and few mechanisms exist to facilitate trade-offs and choices. This can potentially 
lead to a lack of policy coherence which confuses what fisheries management is trying 
to achieve. Even when there is some clarity of aim, it may not be possible to predict 
how implementation of policies will pan out. Overfishing can be seen as a rational 
response to irrational policies (Dengbol, 2009). 
Policy processes, legislative frameworks and governance structures often reflect 
situations that no longer exist. As noted by Bensted-Smith and Kirkman, (2010, 4) 
“[a]ccess rights, laws and institutional structures in some countries are outdated 
and do not reflect social and political realities, so that governance structures have 
inherent conflicts.” The historic evolution of the fishery and the forces at play within 
the political economy influence the way political decisions are made and the way 
fisheries managers at the national level have interpreted national policy. Much of the 
past emphasis of fisheries has been on productivity increases and many government 
departments are still staffed by people with skills that reflect this focus, in agencies 
structured around productivity using top-down approaches. Salas and Gaertner (2004, 
154) recognized this, noting: “… fishers develop and implement strategies and tactics 
in response to the constraints they encounter and their intended objectives given 
their particular human, social, cultural and economic contexts. Managers in contrast, 
have generally made simplistic assumptions about fishers’ nature and attitudes when 
defining management policies.” 
There is also a need to ensure that institutional structures and processes are 
enshrined in law to avoid failure in political coherence when political parties or indi-
viduals change. Bensted-Smith and Kirkman (2010, 4) noted that frequent changes in 
political leadership can “make it difficult to secure the sustained policy commitment 
over decades that EBM requires; individual and institutional champions of EBM can 
counterbalance this problem but they are few and civil society organisations in many 
countries are weak.” Informal discussions with key informants during the course of 
the current review also emphasized the importance of this aspect in terms of ensuring 
coherence between management efforts at the local level and the prevailing policy 
and legislative framework within which they are nested, and in terms of the need to 
evolve approaches that take account of changing political priorities over the course of 
long-term management initiatives.
Ensuring the viability and sustainability of ecosystem function
Marine ecosystems are important not just for the food and income that they generate 
but also for the many other ecosystem services they provide. These ecosystem 
services generate benefits for local communities and wider society. A key part of 
any fisheries management program must be to ensure the healthy condition of the 
resources and ecosystems being fished. Without this, the harvests are likely to be 
reduced and/or unsustainable. 
As discussed above, greater emphasis is being placed on the larger scales involved 
in fisheries management and beginning to address some of these larger ecological 
issues through approaches such as LMEs, Seascapes, Marine Ecoregions, Regional 
Seas and ICM. 
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Even with smaller areas of sea, there are wider ecological considerations that need to be 
included in fisheries management. According to Bennett (2005b), several studies have 
found that much of the success of the management system put in place is due to the 
biology of the underlying resource species being managed. Some species and ecosys-
tems respond to fishing pressure better than others. Sharks, for instance, often have to 
reach a greater age to breed than many small pelagics (e.g. Peruvian anchovy) and are 
thus more easily affected by overfishing. Coral reefs seem to be very susceptible to sea 
water temperature increases and, where local fisheries are under pressure from over-
exploitation, a decline in habitat can enhance the negative effects of fishing pressure. 
A University of Washington study of some 230 fish stocks emphasized the impact of 
environmental conditions on potential fish harvest (see Box 14). 
Addressing the wider ecosystem needs will often require combining several ap-
proaches to management. The concept of marine protected areas (MPAs), one of 
the main measures discussed in the literature to ensure the viability and sustainabil-
ity of ecosystem function, is used widely across fisheries with mixed results. Many 
consider MPAs a central tool in marine ecosystem-based management of tropical 
inshore fisheries (Rudd et al., 2003) and there is now substantial evidence to indicate 
that, within MPAs, species tend to live longer and grow bigger, and that biomass 
increases, especially among sedentary and benthic species (Roberts et al., 2001; Gell 
and Roberts, 2002; Rudd et al., 2003). These larger, more abundant fish may be benefi-
cial for tourism. Protected areas can also play an important role in stock enhancement 
and restocking programs to allow adequate growth and spawning (Bell et al., 2006). 
Roberts et al. (2005) argue that no-take MPAs can also protect against over-generous 
fishing quotas, which are often set based on poor information about the fisheries 
stocks available or on a political reluctance to upset fishers. MPAs are part of a larger 
group of marine management areas which might include no-take zones, buffer zones 
or limited access zones – all of which have a role to play in fisheries management 
depending on the local context.
Some spill-over effects from MPAs – where 
protected species migrate into the unprotect-
ed area – are also reported. The effect of this 
will depend on a number of factors such as 
the time taken to reach a point where density-
dependent movement is achieved (Rudd et 
al., 2003) – which will vary among species, 
depending upon their behavior and natural 
ranges (Tupper and Rudd, 2003). This time 
needs to be taken into account in order to 
consider the extent to which excluded fishers 
will be affected by lost fishing opportunities 
before beneficial spill-over effects are seen. 
At the time of their study, Rudd et al. (2003) 
recognized that it was generally unknown if 
the benefits of greater catches from spillover 
were sufficient to offset lost catches from 
the MPA. Pitcher et al. (2000) showed that 
boundary porosity had a strong influence 
BoX 14:  
The drivers of fish abundance
it is often assumed that the potential harvest of fish 
is dependent upon their abundance, but a recent 
study suggests that we may have to rethink some 
assumptions. the university of Washington-led 
study suggested that harvestable amount was 
only closely linked to abundance in 18% of 230 
fish stocks assessed. for the other 82% of stocks, 
potential harvest was primarily controlled by 
irregular shifts in environmental conditions or was 
random and not controlled by either abundance or 
shifts in environmental regimes.
Source: University of Washington http://www.washington.
edu/news/2013/01/14/potential-harvest-of-most-fish-
stocks-largely-unrelated-to-abundance/
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on the success of marine reserves. One obstacle to MPAs as an effective fisheries 
management tool is that, while the fish that stay within the MPA are afforded pro-
tection, those outside are subjected to greater harvesting pressure unless effort is 
reduced. While the exploitation of resources inside protected areas on a sustainable 
basis is reported to improve the living conditions of people who depend upon the 
protected resources (Andrade and Rhodes, 2012), there can also be negative effects. 
McConney and Charles (2008) noted that MPAs can lead to conflicts over resources, 
but the extent to which such issues arise tends to be influenced by design and gov-
ernance arrangements. 
MPAs have a role to play in fisheries management systems, particularly when com-
munities are directly involved in their design and management. Community-based 
MPAs are designed to meet both small-scale fisheries management and conservation 
needs. In addition, when run by interested and informed people through collective 
action, they have proved an effective approach (Christie and White, 2006). In recogni-
tion of the role of communities in environmental protection, in 2003, the African Heads 
of State amended the African Convention on Conservation of Nature and Natural 
Resources to promote the establishment of community-based protected areas (Tobey 
and Torell, 2006). MPAs, as part of a wider ICM approach, are having some success in 
some parts of the world (White et al., 2006). For example, the Philippines has estab-
lished more than 1,100 MPAs, of which at least 20 percent are reportedly achieving 
their management targets (Lowry et al., 2009) (See Box 15). 
Adaptating to external pressure and changes
Fisheries are always changing and often in ways that cannot be predicted (see Box 
14). Climate change is having considerable effects on fisheries, and fuel and food 
prices are changing rapidly. Even with the best will in the world, plans will need to be 
adjusted and changed over time. Being able 
to adapt to these external pressures will be 
an important function of future fisheries 
management. 
The coast is in a constant state of flux and 
is subject to major upheavals from time to 
time. Coastal and marine social-ecological 
systems are characterized by their high 
degree of risk and uncertainty (Ferrol-
Schulte et al., 2013). Fishers, fish farmers 
and their communities around the world 
tend to be vulnerable to natural disasters 
because of their locations, the characteris-
tics of their livelihood activities, and their 
overall high levels of exposure to natural 
hazards, livelihood shocks and climate 
change impacts. As exposure and vulner-
ability to these hazards is increasing (FAO, 
2012a), the ability to predict, prepare for, 
cope with and adapt to change will be critical 
to any fisheries management situation. 
BoX 15:  
Community-based coastal resource 
management – success or failure?
there have been a number of assessments of the 
effectiveness of community-based coastal resource 
management (CBCRM) programs in the Philippines 
where MPas play a major role. approximately 
91% of the over 600 MPas in the Philippines are 
managed under the CBCRM framework.  in 1997, 
19% of the 47 completed CBCRM programs survived 
after external funding was withdrawn. 
in 1999, 10% of the 439 MPas in existence were well 
enforced. in 2004, 156 MPas were evaluated and 
44.2% were found to be successful. this suggests 
that success increases over time. 
Worldwide the estimates of successful MPas vary 
from 10–30%. 
Source: maliao et al., 2009 
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Climate change
Climate change is now well recognized as having potential effects on fisheries that are 
widespread and significant (Cochrane et al., 2009). Climate change is already affecting 
the distribution and movement of fish stocks. It is also affecting coral reefs through sea 
temperature rise, and increasing coastal inundation. Extreme weather events, such as 
tidal surges and storms, are also on the increase. These not only affect the social, 
economic and cultural aspects of fishers’ lives directly, they also affect fishing com-
munities located on coastal margins. Loss of life from such events is more common in 
developing countries. From 1970 to 2008, more than 95 percent of deaths from natural 
disasters were in developing countries (IPCC, 2011). The poor are often affected most 
in these situations, as they inhabit the higher risk environments (Blaikie et al., 1994).
Food and fuel prices 
Global food and fuel prices change the costs and benefits of fisheries, as well as the 
tourism trade, which can be a significant market for many small-scale fishers, such 
as those in the Caribbean. In addition, global terrorism and economic decline affect 
markets and especially tourism which, in turn, directly affect fish sales and alternative 
employment opportunities. 
Population and development 
Increasing coastal populations and coastal development have a significant effect on 
coastal habitats and pollution. While coastal tourism brings opportunities to coastal 
communities, it also increases stress on water and land use. Inland infrastructure, 
such as dams and factories, is also beginning to affect water quality and flows into 
coastal areas. 
While it is unlikely that all forecasts will be consistently accurate in the fisheries 
management process, McConney and Charles (2008) noted the importance of 
learning to live with uncertainty, rather than seeking more sophisticated fisheries 
models. Box 16 provides an example of how coastal management is evolving to 
address uncertainty.
Allen and Gunderson (2011) suggested that there are specific circumstances where 
adaptive management can be effective – especially when the situation is controllable 
but uncertain (see Box 17). Adaptive co-management can be defined as an approach 
based on collaboration among agencies, researchers and local stewards where natural 
resource management is seen as a process of controlled experiments that need to be 
monitored and improved upon (Moberg and Galaz, 2005). 
There is growing support for adaptive management processes that foster resilience 
and flexibility (Mahon et al., 2008; Allen and Gunderson, 2011; Evans et al., 2011b). 
Alpízar (2006) noted that co-management and community-based management ap-
proaches have the potential to respond to change and dynamic conditions more quickly 
than central programs because they are closer to where these changes are being ex-
perienced. Berkes et al. (2000) pointed out that traditional management systems have 
certain elements in common with adaptive management strategies, such as: i) man-
agement rules are locally crafted and socially enforced by users, ii) resource use tends 
to be flexible and change with circumstances, iii) accumulated knowledge allows ap-
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propriate responses from ecological feedback, iv) a diversity of resources is used for 
livelihoods thus keeping options open, and v) qualitative approaches are used, rather 
than working towards quantitative yield targets. They also discussed how traditional 
ecological knowledge “can be viewed as a ‘library of information’ on how to cope with 
dynamic change in complex systems” (Berkes et al., 2000, 1259). They also pointed out 
that adaptive management and traditional practices emphasize process and accommo-
date change as part of that process, and that 
by “responding to and managing feedbacks 
from ecosystems, instead of blocking them 
out, adaptive management seeks to avoid eco-
logical thresholds at scales that threaten the 
existence of social and economic activities, as 
do some traditional management systems” 
(Berkes et al., 2000, 1260). In relation specifi-
cally to MPAs, Christie and White (2006, 211) 
said that “[i]t is apparent that a well-managed 
MPA requires an adaptive management 
approach.” 
The external changes not only affect people, 
they also affect the environment. Increas-
ingly climate change is seen to be affecting 
abundance and distribution of coastal species. 
One argument for MPAs in fisheries is that 
the levels of uncertainty associated with 
change require a risk buffer that MPAs can 
provide for the wider marine ecosystem. The 
BoX 16:  
Spatial Planning in the Coastal Zone of the East asian Seas Region 
inteGRatinG eMeRGinG iSSueS anD MoDeRn ManaGeMent aPPRoaCHeS
the  Spatial  Planning  in  the  Coastal Zone  Disaster  
Prevention  and  Sustainable Development  Project 
was developed by the Coordinating Body on the 
Seas of east asia (CoBSea) Secretariat as a post-
tsunami project during 2006. its overall goals are to 
reduce and prevent the impacts of natural disasters, 
climate change and sea level rise, and to promote 
sustainable development of the coastal areas in CoBSea 
member countries through the application of spatial 
planning for integrated coastal zone management 
(iCZM) and ecosystem-based management (eBM). in 
achieving the overall goal, the specific objectives are to:
•	 develop	the	regional	policy,	resource	and	guidance	
document, Spatial Planning in the Coastal Zone of the 
east asian Seas Region: integrating emerging issues 
and Modern Management approaches
•	 strengthen	national	capacities	in	sustainable	coastal	
spatial planning through the application of the 
adaptation of the document into national needs 
and capacities for the CoBSea countries for spatial 
planning and disaster risk reduction
•	 enhance	the	capacity	of	countries	to	integrate	the	
consideration of new concepts such as climate change, 
ecosystem based management, disaster risk reduction 
and integrated land-sea planning into their existing 
national spatial planning procedures and systems.
Source: COBSEa, 2011
BoX 17: 
management approaches for 
different situations
Source: allen and gunderson 2011, adapted from Peterson 
et al., 2003
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fact that MPAs may have a role to play in building ecological resilience (Rudd et al., 
2003) has never been as important as now when, in many parts of the world, climate 
change is an uncertain process. 
When looking at how community-based systems for commons management can be 
used to scale-up approaches, Berke (2006) noted that “it may be more illuminating to 
approach the debate by suggesting that commons management in many cases should 
be understood as the management of complex adaptive systems …”, and that such 
systems are affected by a multitude of outside forces which affect them. 
However, adaptive management approaches are not without problems. Allen and 
Gunderson (2011) identified a number of conditions that can negatively affect the 
success of adaptive management when: 
•	 stakeholders	are	not	fully	engaged	in	the	process	
•	 ecosystems	are	very	complex	
•	 unforeseen	events	occur	–	such	as	natural	disasters	which	are	on	the	increase	in	
many areas where climate change is expected to be significant 
•	 managers	are	too	prescriptive	about	how	they	respond	to	change	
•	 the	desire	to	learn	overtakes	the	desire	to	act	
•	 learning	does	not	feed	back	to	policy	
•	 hard	decisions	are	avoided	
•	 leadership	is	absent,	dogmatic,	non-inclusive	or	biased	in	a	particular	direction	
•	 planning	takes	the	place	of	action.	
There will always be uncertainty in the management of fisheries which are complex 
social-ecological systems, and this will lead to unpredictability. In addition Ferrol-
Schulte et al. (2013) noted that, in poverty stricken areas, the necessary funds and 
know-how to manage resources adaptively is often lacking. A sustainable livelihoods 
approach can be a useful tool to address the complexities of social-ecological systems 
in coastal areas and assist adaptive planning. 
Adaptive management takes learning as a necessary starting point in the struggle to 
confront and respond to this uncertainty, according to Armitage et al. (2009). They 
noted that adaptive management is not a governance panacea and will not be suitable 
in all cases, and that tools are still being developed. They also identified ten key condi-
tions for successful adaptive co-management:
•	 a	well-defined	resource	system
•	 small-scale	resource-use	contexts
•	 clear	and	identifiable	set	of	social	entities	with	shared	interests
•	 reasonably	clear	property	rights	to	resources	of	concern
•	 access	to	an	adaptable	portfolio	of	management	measures
•	 commitment	to	support	a	long-term	institution-building	process
•	 provision	training,	capacity	building	and	resources	for	local-,	regional-	and	nation-
al-level stakeholders
•	 key	leaders	or	individuals	prepared	to	champion	the	process	
•	 openness	of	participants	to	share	and	draw	upon	a	plurality	of	knowledge	systems	
and sources
•	 national	 and	 regional	 policy	 environment	 explicitly	 supportive	 of	 collaborative	
management efforts. 
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However, as Gondo (2008) noted, adaptive co-management systems and tools are still at 
an early stage of development and should be treated with caution. Gondo also pointed 
out that a key part of adaptive co-management is the need for continuous experimenta-
tion and experience in dealing with the associated problems. This is not new for fisheries 
managers, who have experimented with management measures over decades. 
6.3 Factors affecting technical  implementation
While the above factors tend to apply to a larger design scale, there are others that are 
more concerned with technical issues. Although these classifications are not set in 
stone, these technical issues can include the allocations of rights, the need to change 
structures and processes incrementally in order to accommodate the local pace of 
change, ensuring that the right things are done with the right institution and that 
decisions occur at the right level, acknowledging the importance of the local political 
situation and factoring it into management decisions, recognizing the importance of 
balancing costs and benefits of management, and addressing the importance of local 
and global markets. 
Establishing legal group rights and responsibilities
Across the range of fisheries management approaches and themes discussed above, 
rights are playing a more and more central role in what is done. There is a growing 
move towards greater and more sophisticated approaches to rights that combine 
fisheries and human rights. This is a first step towards connecting fisheries to the 
wider well-being of coastal communities (Charles, 2011). While fisheries rights can 
take many forms, there seems to be growing support for community-based rights in 
small-scale fisheries. Recognition of this linkage between community-based systems 
and welfare of communities is gaining momentum (e.g. Copes and Charles, 2004) but 
lacks supporting data, particularly on the multiplier effects across communities. 
The need for controls in fisheries and the recognition of the finite and exhaustible 
nature of fish has encouraged a stronger focus on rights around fishing. This has 
been closely linked to two key problems associated with common property resources, 
namely that: i) exclusion or control of access is difficult and ii) each fisher’s activity 
subtracts from the potential gains of other users (Berke, 2006). There is now wide-
spread acceptance among fisheries academics and managers that some form of rights 
in fisheries is essential to the success of fisheries management. 
According to FAO (2012a), such approaches do have potential to rationalize and 
improve returns in small-scale fisheries and increase resources rents at the national 
level. However, they need to be implemented in ways that provide for rent distribution 
methods that include the poor and vulnerable. 
Huppert (2005, 201) noted that “(t)he controversies over fishing rights take three 
forms: disagreements over the meaning and intent of fishing rights, disputes over 
the distribution of rights and associated economic gain, and concern for disruptions 
imposed on people who are dependent on the ‘old order’.” The initial allocation of 
rights can be particularly difficult and controversial (Pearse, 1992). Anderson and 
Libecap (2010) suggested that, in the allocation of rights, the allocation along the lines 
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of first-possession, or “grandfathering” can make both economic sense (they are more 
knowledgeable about the resource and thus often lower cost) and institutional sense 
(by suggesting that historic engagement is likely to ensure rights of access). They 
said that in community-based fisheries where the participants are often poor but well 
informed about the resources, “grandfathering” is likely to generate local support for 
management measures. 
Overall, the practical experience of using individual transferrable quotas (ITQs), one 
of the most commonly promoted forms of individual fishing right, is seen as encourag-
ing as a rights-based approach. Yet, in 2008, ITQs were found in less than 2 percent 
of the world’s fisheries (Costello et al., 2008). According to Leal (2010), they had 
generated considerable benefits in the form of higher income for fishers, improved 
product quality for consumers, reduced fleet excesses, and largely maintained harvest 
with TACs. But these benefits have largely been associated with developed countries. 
ITQs are also beginning to be used in those developing countries where there is a 
transition to more reliable legal institutions with stronger governance, e.g. in the 
anchovy fishery of Peru and Chile (Leal, 2010). 
While transferable quotas in developed countries have focused mainly on giving 
quotas to vessels or owners, in developing countries there is increasing interest in 
rights to quotas being provided to communities or specific community groups or as-
sociations For example, in the Philippines, collective action and participation would 
be increased if fishers cooperatives were given exclusive rights which restrict access 
and, in turn, provide greater incentives for improved resource management in the 
long-term (Baticados, 2004). The balance between small-scale and industrial fisheries 
needs to be examined with a view to the appropriate allocation of property rights 
(Stobutzki et al., 2006). 
In many developing fisheries, legally-backed exclusive fishing rights granted to 
nearby communities or fishing cooperatives are likely to be a more practical form of 
rights (Leal, 2010) (see Box 18). Associations 
of fishers are more and more taking on the 
role of government in fisheries management, 
which according to Scott (2010) heralds a 
new fishers’ culture. This is supported to an 
extent by the fact that studies over the last 30 
years have documented the capability of com-
munities to self-organize and self-regulate to 
resolve problems of the commons (Berke, 
2006). 
Territorial use rights in fisheries (TURFs), 
in practice in many parts of the world, have 
been a means of traditional fisheries access 
rights and, according to Hilborn (2007a): “the 
most direct incentive to facilitate compliance 
is the granting of territorial fishing rights to 
individuals or communities. This provides a 
BoX 18:  
Local management of lobster 
stocks
the red lobster (Panuliris interuptus) found on the 
west coast of Baja California, Mexico, is harvested 
by fishers’ cooperatives under concessions 
established in the 1930s. nine cooperatives work 
together in a federation to manage the stock. as 
an indication of success, in 2004, after extensive 
scientific review, the Marine Stewardship Council 
(MSC) certified that the fishery satisfied the MSC’s 
criteria for sustainable fishing. 
Source: Leal, 2010 
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strong incentive to exclude non-members … .” In much of the Pacific, small-scale 
fisheries have been based on TURFs from which neighboring communities have been 
largely excluded. 
During expert consultations as part of this review, several respondents referred to the 
success of introducing TURFS in the Chilean loco (abalone) fishery, through which 
rights to fisheries in different areas are allocated to local cooperatives. 
Increasingly fishing rights are being placed in the wider framework of human rights 
(FAO, 2010) (See Box 19). 
Incrementally changing to allow for capacity, reflection and negotiated 
response
Adopting new approaches and tools for fisheries management – including those 
that address wider social, economic, ecological and political concerns and are inte-
grated vertically across scale and horizontally across sectors – requires new skills 
and knowledge, and also new attitudes from those involved, such as managers and 
community members. In addition, getting the speed of change right is very important 
to the successful management of change. In many situations, change has been intro-
duced at a pace that managers and community members find difficult to understand 
and respond to. 
The increased focus on the need to integrate fisheries management into wider 
economic systems is reflected in a move towards more integrated, multi-sector and 
BoX 19:  
Rights in small-scale fisheries 
at its 26th session in March 2009, the fao Committee 
on fisheries (Cofi) reviewed the outcome of the 
Global Conference on Small-Scale fisheries – Securing 
sustainable small-scale fisheries: Bringing together 
responsible fisheries and social development. Held in 
Bangkok, thailand, 13-17 october 2008, the Conference 
was attended by more than 280 participants from 65 
countries. it was preceded by a preparatory workshop 
with more than 100 participants from fishworkers’ 
organizations and CSos. the Conference re-enforced 
the claim that small-scale fisheries have yet to fully 
realize their potential to significantly contribute to 
sustainable development and the attaining of the un 
millennium development goals (MDGs). 
in spite of their economic, social and nutritional benefits 
and societal and cultural values, small-scale fishing 
communities often face precarious and vulnerable living 
and working conditions. various factors contribute to 
these conditions, including insecure rights to land and 
fishery resources, inadequate or absent health and 
educational services and social safety nets, vulnerability 
to natural disasters and climate change, and exclusion 
from wider development processes due to weak 
organizational structures and representation and 
participation in decision-making.
the 2008 Conference identified several critical 
ways forward in securing sustainable small-scale 
fisheries that integrate social, cultural and economic 
development, address resource access and use-rights 
issues guided by human rights principles, and recognize 
the rights of indigenous peoples. the Conference also 
reaffirmed that human rights are critical to achieving 
sustainable development.
Source: Willmann, 2010 
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ecosystem-based management (White et al., 2006). The increased use of integrated 
coastal management (ICM) as an approach to wider ecological management systems 
in coastal areas has necessitated adapting institutional and organizational structure to 
accommodate the different roles and responsibilities. This has meant building skills 
and qualifications across different ministries and departments to ensure a commonal-
ity of purpose, methods and language, a difficult process that should not be underesti-
mated, as shown by ICM experience in the Philippines (see Box 20).
During discussions for this review, experts highlighted the challenge of finding 
the means of communicating ideas about complex management issues that are ac-
cessible to those who are unfamiliar with the terminology and concepts. Several re-
spondents referred to experiences with foreign experts in ecosystem-based manage-
ment approaches who had attempted to explain extremely complex ideas to local or 
national counterparts using language that was largely inaccessible to them, rather 
than breaking the concepts down into more “digestible” elements and building under-
standing incrementally.
Christie and White (2006) recommended the incremental development and the 
adoption of ICM and other comprehensive frameworks such as EBM, building on past 
practice to match human and fiscal capacities. Although calls have been made for larger 
scale interventions to maximize ecological 
function, they were sometimes done without 
sufficiently careful analysis. For example, the 
Large Marine Ecosystem (LME) approach 
moved ahead with little empirically grounded 
understanding of what it entailed (Christie and 
White, 2006). 
Incentives are often needed for local gov-
ernment to move in the direction of change 
in support of ICM. For example, when the 
Philippines adopted a coastal resources man-
agement (CRM) certification process which 
was often provided with external financial 
support, it encouraged national-level agencies 
to start redefining their roles as providing 
technical assistance to local government 
rather than taking the lead on such initiatives 
(White et al., 2006). There is also recognition 
in the Philippines that networks of MPAs in 
a wider ICM process require development of 
network governance (Lowry et al., 2009). In 
some areas of the world, MPA and other man-
agement networks have been established to 
support joint learning and lesson sharing. 
The Philippines has social and information 
networks that assist in improved manage-
ment of MPAs. Christie and White (2006) 
BoX 20:  
Lessons from ICm in the Philippines
a review of experiences in coastal management in 
the Philippines provided the following lessons. 
•	 ICM	provides	the	framework	for	local	
government to implement sustainable coastal 
development.
•	 Participation	at	all	levels	and	allowing	
interagency cooperation and cross-sectoral 
integration is a prerequisite for iCM.
•	 An	integrated	planning	process	is	essential.
•	 Comprehensive	information	systems	that	evolve	
with planning processes are needed.
•	 Institutionalizing	ICM	into	local	government	
is important for integrating into regular 
development plans.
•	 Baseline	information	is	necessary	for	ICM	
planning.
•	 Community-based	management	requires	
on-going support and mentoring from 
government, civil society and the private sector.
•	 Sustainability	of	ICM	cannot	be	determined	
without time and field testing. 
Source: modified from White et al., 2006
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identified five effective processes derived from networking efforts that led to good 
practice and scaling-up of governance: i) consensus building on common issues, ii) 
information sharing and identification of core groups, iii) institutionalizing mecha-
nisms for administration, iv) sustainable financing and v) adaptive management. For 
instance, at the international level, the Local Marine Management Area Network 
(LMMA) is an example of a learning network, in place across Southeast Asia and the 
Pacific where members exchange information and experiences.
Institutional fit and subsidiarity
Ensuring the institutional “fit” of a set of management/governance issues is increas-
ingly recognized as important (Armitage et al., 2012). This might include the suit-
ability of different institutional arrangements to address specific problems. Some 
researchers, such as Folke et al. (1998) have determined that resource boundaries 
rarely fit institutional boundaries. Similarly, Berkes (2006) noted “integrated systems 
of human-in-nature are more likely to work if there is a fit between the level and 
boundary of the ecosystem and the institution designed to manage it.” For example, 
tuna in the Pacific migrate between nations, in and out of EEZs and through inshore 
fishing areas. Even though many communities have successfully addressed many of 
the issues associated with common property fisheries, they are still subject to many 
external pressures that require solutions that respond to scale (Berkes, 2006). 
In many parts of the world, traditional customary marine tenure (CMT) was the 
norm and, in some places, particularly in the Pacific, CMT still plays an important 
role. However, as fisheries capacity has developed and concerns over the resource 
have increased, the management process in many places has become more central-
ized and developed. Some see this move from community-based fisheries manage-
ment systems to centrally controlled government systems as leading to replacement 
of common-property regimes with open-access (Pomeroy, 1994). However, in many 
cases, traditional community-based institutions, in their original form, are no longer 
appropriate for the management of more mechanized fisheries which extend beyond 
traditional grounds, involve many more people and feed into more easily accessible 
and larger markets. 
Kuemlangan (2004), who looked at the institutional fit between community-based 
fisheries management and the legal systems in a number of countries in the Pacific, 
found that recognition of customary marine tenure may provide an opportunity for 
adopting more community-based systems. This raised the important question of the 
legal requirements needed to establish co-management in countries with less history 
of such approaches. In Cambodia, a process of consultation around the by-law on 
fisheries co-management took four years. Although customary marine tenure has 
worked in the past, Kuemlangan (2004) also noted that those past structures and 
processes are not necessarily ideal for the future. Rather, it is better to see customary 
marine tenure as a dynamic process that can inform and influence future processes. 
In noting the importance of the legal and jurisdictional context in which MPAs operate 
to long-term management, Christie and White (2006) also identified the following 
principles for effective legal and jurisdictional norms related to MPA experience. 
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Nested institutional and legal (national to local) systems, if balanced and supportive 
of local initiatives, support MPA implementation. MPA management requires both 
upward (from local to national agency) and downward (from national to local agency) 
coordination and accountability. 
•	 Embedding	MPA	management	within	 larger	management	systems	designed	to	
address larger sectoral and development processes will help address external 
impacts on MPAs. 
•	 Transparency,	 fairness	 and	 broad	 understanding	 of	 the	 law	 and	 enforcement	
support compliance and reduce conflict.
•	 Clear	identification	of	the	role	and	responsibilities	for	formal	and	informal	MPA	
management bodies is necessary.
•	 The	jurisdictional	mandate	should	fit	the	institutional	capacity	of	a	management	
body. If necessary, there should be ongoing attention to the development of insti-
tutional capacity.
A consistent national mandate for MPA implementation with adequate resources for 
implementation can provide a supportive environment (Christie and White, 2006, 197).
This theme, regarding the way in which the legal and institutional context meshes 
with management efforts on the ground, emerged repeatedly during expert inter-
views. It often took the form of constraints encountered by local-level fisheries man-
agement initiatives in situations where existing legislation on fisheries and manage-
ment contradicted rules and regulations being evolved at the local level. Often, the 
fact that legislative functions are entirely held at the national level meant that local 
administrations could not be as responsive as they wished in approving and sanc-
tioning new forms of management being generated at the ground level. The issue of 
subsidiarity and the devolution of decision-making responsibility to the lowest appro-
priate level in order to support adaptive management in the field therefore seemed to 
be particularly important.
Institutional fit also has cost implications (Abdullah et al., 1998). Christie and White 
(2006) noted that MPA planning and monitoring can be expensive, and centralized 
government MPA agencies must compete with other more pressing budget needs 
such as health, economic development and education. But they also pointed out that 
centralized control of management is necessary and effective in some situations, as in 
the case of MPAs in Brunei. 
In some cases, it may be appropriate to consider the private sector as the agency for 
engaging in management as, for example, was shown in Chumbe Island, Tanzania 
(Cristie and White, 2006). In such situations, it is important to balance the incentives 
of society’s goals with those of the private sector. Across a number of environmental 
concerns, there is a growing emergence of hybrid forms of governance that combine 
state, markets and civil society (Armitage et al., 2012). 
Costa Rica has split its resource management function between two government or-
ganizations, one concerned with conservation and the other with resource use. This 
agency interaction is not uncommon, as fisheries departments do not always agree 
with the policies of environment agencies (Alpízar, 2006). 
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Also, in dealing with the effect of climate change on fisheries, the more traditional insti-
tutional arrangements within government no longer fit the problems to be addressed. 
Instead, this calls for incentives to be in place that will encourage different agencies and 
ministries to collaborate and share information and experience, e.g. in cross-sectoral 
functions such as climate change response, disaster risk reduction and ICM.  
Other external considerations, such as fuel and food prices, fisheries-tourism interac-
tions, coastal development and livelihood diversification might require changes in the 
types of institutional arrangements needed to implement change. Likewise, the move 
from a production focus in many fisheries to a poverty reduction or food security focus 
may require skills and experience that fisheries departments do not have and may 
necessitate evolving new partnerships with other agencies such as NGOs. Having the 
right institutional arrangements at the community level and within government is also 
crucial. In some situations, localization of governance might be seen as decentraliza-
tion of function to district-level fisheries offices rather than to community organiza-
tions (Rudd et al., 2003). 
Less traditional forms of rights, such as ITQs, faced implementation issues in develop-
ing countries, in part because of the lack of appropriate legal, institutional and gov-
ernance arrangements required to achieve an appropriate institutional fit. Bennett 
(2005b) noted that property rights have to be equitable in their allocation but also, the 
wider stakeholder group, i.e. society, must see them as fair. 
Another often overlooked aspect of institutional fit is the way that external funding 
can distort fisheries management processes. Project support can provide a hothouse 
effect which ensures a greater chance of a fisheries management initiative succeed-
ing. However, reporting on the success of such projects during implementation may 
generate a more favorable assessment than would be the case several years after 
the project has finished. Likewise, donor willingness to compartmentalize the policy 
process and fund some aspects of fisheries management but not others can distort 
those policies, resulting in long-term adverse effects. Aid effectiveness processes have 
been established to address some of these distortions.5 The situation has shown con-
siderable progress in the fisheries sector in Cambodia, which now has much greater 
policy coherence and has reduced the transaction costs of policy, planning and policy 
implementation (see Box 21). 
The engagement of any external implementer or funder, e.g. NGO, consultancy or 
intergovernmental agency, in the process of fisheries management can distort the 
factors that support sustainability of positive change. The ecoregional approach 
adopted by The Nature Conservancy and World-Wide Forum for Nature, works with 
national and local partners and with NGOs that are committed to the kind of long-term 
(15–20 year) intervention needed. However, the long-term engagement of an external 
NGO can impede the emergence of sustainable governance (Bensted-Smith and 
Kirkman, 2010). Such powerful organizations can influence policy implementation in 
much the same way as that described for donors above, and aid effectiveness proce-
dures need apply equally to them. 
5 for example see OECD: www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness
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Incorporating politics and political choices 
Fisheries management is, in part at least, about the distribution of rights to access 
resources and the distribution of the benefits from those rights. These are largely 
political decisions and can be subject to both the choices of political parties and the 
personal choices of politicians. These two choices manifest themselves either as overt 
policies or covert forces behind the scenes. Political decisions can be some of the most 
important influences on fisheries, and the political economy needs to be included fully 
in the management process for it to stand a chance of being successful. 
The political forces that influence fisheries management effectiveness have been 
touched on a number of times in this synthesis. In management more generally, the 
political aspect of environmental protection has been downplayed (Belsky, 2000) or 
even externalized in the resource management equation. Economic rationalization 
approaches to fisheries management tend to focus on the state capture of resource 
rents for the wider application to national economic development – a political decision 
which prioritizes economic impacts over other impacts. Welfare approaches tend to 
focus more on the distributive aspects of resource rents to fuel local development and 
secure livelihoods. Politics, power and corruption often influence how wealth is redis-
tributed in both cases, e.g. through the political economy of national governments and 
through patronage at a local level. 
A renewed focus on rent capture by the state is sometimes seen as a means of “introduc-
ing some logic into the policy process” (Cunningham et al., 2009). This might suggest 
a level of rational thinking in economics that does not exist in politics. However, policy 
is driven by politics, and political processes may have their own logic which may not 
prioritize purely economic incentives. Wider political issues may concern re-election, 
feeding the population now, short-term foreign exchange generation, trading fisheries 
sustainability for politically more important gains, or enhancing personal wealth and/
or patronage through non-transparent means. These may well represent logical uses 
BoX 21:  
a sector wide approach in Cambodia
the fisheries sector in Cambodia is planned around 
a 10-year Strategic Planning framework (SPf) that 
links to national development policy. the SPf was 
developed through a participatory planning process 
that links all subsectors together and links those to 
provincial plans. 
a “basket funding” mechanism is in place, which 
allows donors to fund the sector according to the SPf, 
rather than their own donor-generated projects. it 
also has a common monitoring and evaluation system, 
which uses participatory approaches to gain fishers’ 
perspectives on policy implementation and feeds 
these back into policy. 
Cross-sectoral and donor harmonization issues are 
addressed through a technical working group process 
and a strategy for harmonization and alignment 
encourages donor procedures to harmonize with each 
other and then align to those of government. there 
also has been a progressive process of decentralization 
of function and resources on the basis of subsidiarity. 
the government-developed Cambodian Code of 
Conduct for Responsible fisheries (CamCode) provides 
a framework for government, development partners, 
civil society and private sector to work to a common 
set of principles and guidance. 
 Source: fia, internal documents
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of fisheries resources if they achieve wider development aims. Externalizing the 
political economy in discussions of policy is likely to lead to unforeseen outcomes. 
Robinson (2010) found that most fisheries reform has occurred in well-functioning 
democracies where competition is for public goods rather than private goods, e.g. 
to achieve larger departmental budgets rather than personal financial gains. The 
extent to which the rule of law and other legal and governance institutions function 
effectively will play a major role in the form of fisheries management and who will 
benefit from it. If, for instance, government officials allow foreign fishing vessels 
or unlicensed domestic fishers to operate, then sustainability can be easily under-
mined (Hilborn, 2007b). There are many documented cases in the Philippines where 
CBCRM initiatives have collapsed because of local politics (Maliao et al., 2009). Roe 
et al. (2009), after reviewing a number of community-based natural resource manage-
ment initiatives across Africa, noted that conflicts between local groups and powerful 
elites remain widespread and are often intensifying. According to Rudd et al. (2003), a 
breakdown in MPA management on Sumilon Island in the Philippines was caused in 
part by local politicians engaging in opportunism. 
Vested interests can also be an incentive for greater or lesser involvement of the state 
– if conflict over resources plays out beyond local levels, then greater involvement by 
government may be needed (Wilson et al., 2006). In some situations, the government 
may be provided with inadequate resources to implement management of fisheries on 
their own, and it may need the involvement of the community to assist (Wilson et al., 
2006). In fisheries management, the generation of knowledge itself is not an apolitical 
process. By its very nature, what scientists say has a political element because some 
of the evidence goes on to inform policy and some does not (Belsky, 2000). 
In discussing the political economy approach to fisheries, Robinson (2010, 54) noted 
that the political economy approach “leads to a very different way of thinking about 
policy than the one current in international institutions. It suggests that too much 
attention is being paid to the first-best solution to this problem and not enough to 
finding politically feasible ways of mitigating the tragedy of the commons.”
The key challenge here, and one widely recognized by respondents during the expert 
interviews, is that these issues relating to politics and power relations in society are 
too often regarded as “externalities” which cannot be influenced or addressed by in-
terventions focused on fisheries management. However, the critical role that these 
factors play in influencing fisheries management outcomes is equally recognized. 
This is in part attributable to the nature of projects working on fisheries manage-
ment, which do not necessarily have the skills, mandate, resources or time required 
to engage at the political level. However, it is also due to a general paucity of appropri-
ate tools for analyzing and addressing the political economy surrounding fisheries 
management and understanding how it can be influenced, or adapted to, during the 
course of interventions.
Sustainably and equitably addressing costs and benefits
According to recent analyses of fisheries management, fisheries in some parts of the 
world cost more than they generate. To generate benefits for society or for fishers, the 
fisheries management and development process needs to generate surpluses. This, in 
turn, means understanding the costs and benefits of the management process. 
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At present, most of the world’s fisheries are heavily subsidized (World Bank-FAO, 
2009). In 1992, FAO estimated the global fiscal deficit of fisheries at US$50 billion 
[FAO, 1993]. Thus, the reference to wealth capture involved in some fisheries man-
agement approaches must seem very attractive to politicians who are faced with 
small budgets, low returns from the sector and ever increasing demands on financial 
resources. According to Cunningham et al. (2009), under free- and open-access condi-
tions, fisheries exploitation levels will reach equilibrium only when all resource rent 
has been dissipated. While the removal of the free and open access could be seen as 
the solution to this problem, such arrangements also incur costs. 
For tropical inshore fisheries, transaction costs may make up a large proportion of 
the total fisheries management cost, but there are limited data to assess this (Rudd 
et al., 2003). Abdullah et al. (1998, 108) separate transaction costs into: 1) informa-
tion costs, 2) collective decision-making costs, 3) collective operational coast, 4) dis-
tributional costs, 5) resource maintenance costs and 6) monitoring, enforcement and 
compliance costs. They suggest that the cost difference between centrally run man-
agement and co-management systems is that cost 1 and 2 are low under a centralized 
systems whereas 3, 4, 5 and 6 are high, while in a co-management system the cost 
structure is reversed. Copes and Charles (2004) recognized that socio-economic data 
are limited for different management systems, but also noted that community-based 
systems can be less expensive to manage than more individually focused approaches 
such as ITQs, because of the self-regulation aspects of community based systems. 
Co-management represents a shift in the financial burden from the central govern-
ment to the community, which the community may not be able or willing to support, 
especially where the benefits of better management may not arrive for many years. 
MPAs, as part of a program of fisheries management, do appear to have some cost ad-
vantages. Cullis-Suzuki and Pauly (2010) roughly estimated the global costs of MPAs 
to be only 3 percent of fishing subsidies. But this needs to be balanced by considering 
the number of MPAs that are actually operating effectively. 
The work done under the DFID-funded Fisheries Management Science Programme 
(FMSP) showed that, while participation in fisheries management by fishers is ben-
eficial, it also comes at a cost. Arthur (2005, 13) noted that, in order for the benefits 
of co-management to outweigh these costs, “it is vital from the outset that efforts are 
to develop trust and mutual respect, including respect for different knowledge types. 
This requires a commitment, throughout the management process, to transparency, 
accountability and empowerment as well as to explanation, developing skills, and 
increasing organisational flexibility.” Analyses of marine management areas across 
Belize, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Panama, Colombia and Brazil found considerable variabil-
ity in costs among locations but all sites had significant expenditure on enforcement 
(Samonte et al., 2010). 
If fishers are not committed to the rules, there is a particular danger that enforce-
ment costs can exceed the benefits to society that the fishery is capable of generat-
ing. There may be strong arguments for increased economic rent capture to cover at 
least some of the costs to society of fisheries management, but given the institutional 
weaknesses in many developing countries, this seems unlikely to be very effective 
(Robinson, 2010). Many see co-management as the implementation of the principle of 
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subsidiarity, and that management is better done, at least in part, at lower levels. This 
perhaps suggests that there is a case for greater resource rent going to local authori-
ties to assist with that management process and to facilitate the wider development 
role of fisheries locally. 
Taxation of fisheries might be one way to do this but, in reality, these taxes are rarely 
applied in developing countries. In part, this is because governments do not have 
the information to set such taxes at appropriate levels, or do not have the political 
power to do so, or both (Anderson and Libecap, 2010). This is not to say that more 
rational economic measures in fisheries would not be beneficial. For instance, fishers 
generally do not pay for the right to fish or for the ecological costs of stock depletion 
(Sutinen, 2010) and, in some situations, revenue generation from the fishery, espe-
cially if locally collected, might be beneficial for wider development. 
In most developed country fisheries, a trend towards the concentration of investment 
and fishing effort into fewer, larger vessels has helped the management process. 
However, a side effect has been the decline of employment opportunities. In the UK 
between 1938 and 2008, employment in capture fisheries fell from 48,000 people to 
12,761, a loss of 73 percent of the workforce (Campbell and Cattermoul, 2009), a trend 
also seen in Norway, which lost 90 percent of its capture fisheries employment in a 
similar period (Béné et al., 2010). While this may be acceptable in developed countries, 
where greater employment opportunities exist, it is less so in developing countries. Fur-
thermore, the transaction costs of governments collecting this rent, enforcing property 
rights and delivering replacement development services to rural communities while 
avoiding political interference are likely to be high, especially where the rule of law is 
poorly adhered to. Legal rules, organizations and processes are central to the success 
of any effort to reform fisheries management (Thompson, 2010) and their existence 
and rigorous application in many developing countries is limited. Anderson and Libecap 
(2010) also noted that rents created by rights-based approaches and transferred to gov-
ernment will be competed for in a potentially rent-dissipating political process. 
The extent to which fisheries are seen to generate economic benefits is in part 
dependent on how costs and benefits are measured. As Béné (2011) noted, “reducing 
the value of fisheries to their rent … misrepresents the real contribution that these 
small-scale fisheries play for the livelihoods and food security of millions of people in 
Africa.” In the case of small-scale fisheries in developing countries, what is perceived 
as the dissipation of rents through a failure to accurately capture and measure them 
can actually represent, at least in part, the distribution of benefits from small-scale 
fisheries within local communities through employment and trade. This contribution 
is often not recorded in GDP figures, and so the economic role of small-scale fisheries 
is often ignored (Hall and Andrew, 2011). In this sense, community-based fisheries 
can play a significant role as a social policy instrument (Campbell et al., 2006). In 
many countries, coastal fishing communities represent growth hubs where income 
from fisheries fuels a large local economy, but these multiplier effects are often 
poorly understood (Allison, 2011) and are all too often externalized from fisheries 
economic calculations. Small-scale coastal fisheries have generated, and continue to 
generate, employment for large numbers of people (Béné, 2011) on a full-time, part-
time, seasonal and safety net basis which often forms a very significant part of their 
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livelihood strategies linked into other sectors (Whittingham et al., 2003, Béné, 2011). 
For many people, having a particular sectoral focus for food, income and employment 
puts too much risk in one area, while a diversified portfolio of livelihood activities is 
safer and may keep them out of poverty (Allison and Ellis, 2001). 
However attractive the capture of resource rent by the state may seem, it is difficult 
to find many examples where fisheries resource rent from small-scale fisheries in 
developing counties has been captured by the government and subsequently applied 
to local community development with the same multiplier effect as the fishery itself. 
This role of generating rural employment and providing a safety net, which fisheries 
often play in developing countries, is very important politically, especially when the 
government does not have the funds to fill the gap that other approaches to fisheries 
management might create. 
Alban et al. (2011) provided some useful insights into addressing cost benefit analysis 
of MPAs but recognized the problems involved in doing so effectively, for example the 
difficulty of measuring non-market values such as marine biodiversity and the lack of 
data on the effects of MPAs on wider fisheries. In addition, transaction costs are likely 
to be high when using MPAs for tropical inshore fisheries (Rudd et al., 2003). After 
reviewing a number of protected areas and associated approaches to management, 
DeFries et al. (2007) determined that identifying “small loss-big gain” opportunities – 
where big gains for management are achieved at low cost to human use – presents a 
key management challenge. 
While the costs and benefits of different management systems will vary greatly, there 
are doubtless ways in which these costs can be rationalized through the application 
of good practice. One facet of costs and benefits noted in both the literature and in-
terviews is that positive change in fisheries management requires adequate financial 
support for a long period of time to be effective. Ultimately this should be self-sustain-
ing. Even in conservation-related management measures where fishers are excluded, 
there may be problems in financing the operations. Andrade and Rhodes (2012) 
noted that the successful establishment and maintenance of protected areas requires 
political and financial commitment in the long-term. Conservation International, in its 
Seascapes approach, recognizes the importance of sustainable financing and market 
mechanisms (Bensted-Smith and Kirkman, 2010).
The expert discussions, held as part of the review, highlighted the need for new and 
innovative sources of financing for fisheries and marine ecosystem management. The 
timeframes involved in establishing effective management processes and mechanisms 
are generally long and tend to stretch beyond the normal period of donor funding and 
project cycles, generally exceeding the mandates of politicians and administrators 
whose support and engagement is so important in bringing about change. Clearly, 
over these long timeframes, the priorities of donors, supporting agencies and politi-
cians will often change, and the destination of available funding will often shift as these 
priorities evolve. For example, donors or government may prioritize setting up MPAs 
as a key management intervention for 2–3 years in response to wider political agendas, 
but this may subsequently be replaced by a desire to focus on climate change issues 
or community resilience for the next funding cycle. 
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This can make it extremely challenging to ensure the flow of resources required to 
support a long-term intervention to develop fisheries management. Those involved in 
implementing and supporting such processes on the ground often speak of the need 
for managers to be “entrepreneurial” in knitting together different sources of short-
term funding in order to create a coherent program on the ground, and in molding 
the way in which they present their work in order to respond to changing priorities.
Alternative and innovative mechanisms for ensuring a more consistent and long-term 
flow of resources into the sector are therefore attracting increasing interest in fisheries 
management, just as they are already playing an increasingly important role in sup-
porting marine conservation efforts in general. A variety of models for generating the 
resources to support transition to more sustainable management approaches have 
been proposed.
•	 The	 Financial	 Institution	 for	 the	 Recovery	 of	 Marine	 Ecosystems	 (FIRME),	
currently being developed as part of the WWF Smart Fishing Initiative, proposes 
establishing a fund that can provide resources for the upfront costs of develop-
ing and implementing management schemes on a loan basis, secured against the 
value of future fish stocks based on credible sustainable fisheries management 
plans. Initial potential financing for this fund has been identified to come from 
the redirection of subsidies currently directed at the fisheries sector (which are 
themselves partly responsible for existing management issues). Funding would 
also come from socially responsible investment from private finance, with a po-
tentially important role for more traditional grant funds from governments and 
philanthropic institutions to leverage more sustainable investment sources and 
support higher risk initiatives (WWF, 2012).
•	 The	development	of	markets	for	seafood	products	produced	with	ecologically	and	
socially responsible methods has attracted much attention in recent years, particu-
larly in developed countries. This provides, at least potentially, a means of generat-
ing revenue for producers and agencies through premium pricing that can be used 
to cover the additional costs of management and to cushion the social and economic 
impacts of changes in management. The costs associated with labeling schemes, 
which are considerable, particularly for small-scale producers, have generally been 
covered to date by grant funds from supporting organizations (MRAG, 2010).
•	 Trust	 funds	 for	 marine	 conservation	 have	 become	 popular	 over	 the	 last	 two	
decades as a means of providing longer-term financing that is not dependent 
on funding for specific projects or programs. These trust funds can take several 
forms, including endowments, which provide a permanent capital fund which 
generates investment from interest and investment earnings; sinking funds, 
which may also invest the capital provided and therefore have a limited life span; 
or revolving funds, where the capital provided is maintained through user fees, 
fines or earmarked taxes, such as the Belize Protected Areas Trust Fund which 
is maintained by a $4.00 fee for park visitors. Trust funds often tend to operate as 
sources of small grants and can provide effective long-term flows of resources into 
either fisheries management or marine conservation more generally, although 
they can suffer from relatively high administrative costs and are dependent on the 
performance of their investments (Spergel and Moye, 2004).
K
e
y
 f
a
c
t
o
r
s
 s
u
p
p
o
r
t
in
g
 s
m
a
l
l
-s
c
a
l
e
 c
o
a
s
t
a
l
 f
is
h
e
r
ie
s
 m
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t
 - s
y
n
t
h
e
s
is
 r
e
v
ie
w
64
•	 Debt-for-nature	 swaps	 have	 also	 attracted	 attention,	 particularly	 from	 bilateral	
donors who agree to cancel part of a country’s debt in return for guarantees on in-
vestment in nature conservation. The Philippines 2002 Debt-for-Nature swap with 
the United States government provided funds for small grants for conservation 
over a 10-year period, some of which was spent on marine conservation activities 
(Spergel and Moye, 2004).
•	 Earmarked	taxes,	fees	and	levies	have	been	widely	used	in	fisheries	to	ensure	a	
sustainable flow of funding into fisheries management. Issues have been raised 
on occasions regarding the specific “earmarking” of funds from these sources, 
as opposed to their inclusion in the overall national budget. However, countries 
such as New Zealand, which has a Fisheries Services Levy and also charges a 
Conservation Services Levy on specific fisheries that have high levels of by-catch 
or ecosystem impacts, and Namibia, which has a Fish Catch Levy, have effective 
systems in place that ensure a flow of funds to fisheries research and fisheries 
management. Worldwide, these levies are found in many different forms, ranging 
from taxes on tourists, hotel guests and airport users, protected area entrance 
fees, excise taxes, lottery revenues and pollution fines (Spergel and Moye, 2004).
•	 Payments	 for	 ecosystem	 services	 (PES)	 also	 provide	 a	 potential	 source	 of	
financing for fisheries and marine ecosystem management. Although better 
developed for terrestrial ecosystems, where initial valuation and monitoring is 
easier, a market for the protection of marine ecosystem services is developing, 
particularly for coastal habitats and coral reefs. The valuation of the ecosystem 
services involved in marine habitats is particularly challenging, and the effective-
ness of these mechanisms is particularly dependent on good governance and 
strong capacity to ensure compliance. The most widespread applications have 
been in more developed nations where the rule of law is strong and monitoring 
mechanisms are better developed (Forest Trends et al., 2008).
To date, the application of such mechanisms to fisheries is less developed, although 
fisheries has also benefitted from existing tools and their application. However, the 
majority of these tools have tended to be applied in more developed countries as they 
almost all depend on the availability of data (for example on the values of ecosys-
tems), high levels of monitoring (for example to ensure compliance in the protection 
of ecosystem services) and the availability of the resources and capacities required to 
set them up and ensure their proper functioning.
Getting market measures right
Market measures to support the sustainable harvesting of fish are becoming more 
popular in developed countries as a means to enhance the management process. 
Thus far, they have had limited effects in developing countries, but there is increasing 
pressure for these measures. 
Markets have had profound effects on fisheries in many countries in recent years. Fish 
is now a significant source of foreign exchange for many countries, which has raised 
its profile among politicians. There is also a growing realization among consumers 
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that fisheries are having profound effects on 
the environment. Sustainable fisheries labels 
are becoming an increasingly important 
marketing device, especially in developed 
country supermarkets. The extent to which 
this has influenced small-scale fisheries in de-
veloping countries is limited, but the number 
of cases is growing (see Box 22). 
An analysis of the Marine Stewardship 
Council (MSC), undertaken by Gulbrand-
sen (2009), found that the MSC has contrib-
uted to more open management processes 
in certified fisheries but that environmental 
benefits from the scheme may take longer 
to be seen. In a report on fish certifica-
tion and eco-labeling, the OECD and FAO 
(2009) highlighted that sustainability is 
difficult to market. It is becoming clear that 
despite consumers’ stated interests in the environmental impacts of their purchasing 
decisions, their actual buying behavior, especially in relation to food, is more likely to 
be determined by other factors. The current global financial crisis has seen consumer 
confidence fall and their behavior increasingly influenced by price. The industry 
therefore cannot, at the moment, rely on consumers being prepared to pay a price 
premium for sustainable fish and seafood. 
Part of the debate at the 2009 OECD and FAO Round Table on Eco-labeling and Certi-
fication in the Fisheries Sector focused on the role that eco-labeling has played in man-
agement and fishers’ behavior. According to the meeting report, at that time, there 
was little concrete evidence of the impact of eco-labeling and certification on improve-
ments in fisheries management and sustainability. It speculated that eco-labeling had 
achieved more as a marketing tool than as a conservation one, although the report 
did go on to say that increasing evidence indicated that eco-labeling and certification 
might lead to better management through the purchasing behavior of the fish retail 
industry rather than through the direct demands of the public.
While market demand can influence the way fisheries are managed, there is a need 
to ensure that the poorer fishing communities are not excluded from these benefits 
through the cost of certification. It is also necessary to ensure that the increased 
revenues that certification may bring do not act as an incentive for increased movement 
into the fishery. 
The need for a better understanding of how market mechanisms such as eco-labeling 
and certification work across international market chains was highlighted during 
expert interviews. The experts noted that the expected premiums to producers from 
such schemes did not always seem to materialize or were insufficient to cover the con-
siderable costs involved in compliance with such mechanisms. UK retailers’ concern 
over the use of trawler by-catch in fish feed for prawns in Thailand was cited as a specific 
BoX 22:  
Certification helps community 
fishery in Vietnam
Ben tre province in vietnam worked with 
government officials to implement management 
measures in its clam fishery through allocating 
fishing rights to local cooperatives. this improved 
management of the clams and attracted the 
attention of WWf which provided partial funding 
toward paying for the full Marine Stewardship 
Council (MSC) assessment of the fishery. in 2009, 
the fishery received full certification that it was 
sustainable and well-managed. in total, the MSC 
certification cost $120,000. 
Source: mRag, 2010
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example of a situation in which realistic alternatives for feed producers were not always 
readily available and, when they were, would be likely to incur costs that they were not 
confident would be recouped through existing certification arrangements. 
6.4 Factors affecting community engagement
A number of factors relate specifically to the community and the individual fishers 
themselves. These relate in part to the extent to which fisheries depend upon the 
coastal fisheries resources for their livelihoods, and what alternatives they have to 
engage in. Bringing about change in behavior requires understanding where fishers 
are coming from – what drives them – and from that understanding, building their 
commitment to change. This requires participation in all levels of decision-making, 
not just for fishers but for all relevant groups in the community. This participation 
includes making use of local knowledge systems and people’s ability to analyze and 
advise on change processes. 
understanding dependency
The extent to which communities or households depend upon fisheries as a key part 
of their livelihood strategies will be a significant driver of impact within any fisheries 
management system. Livelihood dependency on fisheries can take many forms and is 
often a complex mixture of these. 
Coastal ecosystems and their associated fisheries resources provide a wide array of 
ecosystem services (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005), and poor coastal 
people have quite specific and diverse patterns of dependency on these services 
(Campbell and Townsley, 2013). Whittingham et al. (2003) describe the forms that de-
pendency can take. Some people, households and communities are highly dependent 
on fisheries resources for all or most of their needs. These needs may take the form 
of food, income, employment, a resource for reciprocal relations and to demonstrate 
power, cultural values, protection from the sea (e.g. coral reefs for coastal protection), 
building materials (e.g. reefs and mangroves), and areas for recreation and social 
engagement. Some people may depend upon the marine resources at times when 
land-based activities are less productive. Other people may depend upon the fishery 
at certain vital times of the seasonal calendar and, while they only spend a small pro-
portion of their time involved in fisheries, this may be key to their survival. Yet other 
people may use fisheries as a safety net to fall back on when times are very hard. 
This is most prevalent where government social protection programs are not very 
strong (Bennett, 2005b). Cinner et al. (2010) have shown that poorer households have 
a greater reliance on fishing for primary subsistence or for income. 
It is assumed, to an extent, that if other opportunities exist, fishers will leave the 
fishery and take up those opportunities. This was found to be the case in Cambodia 
where many of the fishers did not have a long cultural history of fishing (IMM et 
al., 2003) but not the case in Kenya where fishers have a longer tradition of fishing 
(Cinner et al., 2010). 
More indirect forms of dependency also occur when people depend upon fish for pro-
cessing and trade, and this can be a very significant part of household income. In 
K
e
y
 f
a
c
t
o
r
s
 s
u
p
p
o
r
t
in
g
 s
m
a
l
l
-s
c
a
l
e
 c
o
a
s
t
a
l
 f
is
h
e
r
ie
s
 m
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t
 - s
y
n
t
h
e
s
is
 r
e
v
ie
w
67
many communities, the income generated through fish sales and wages in the fishery 
provides a diverse array of local industries that survive because of the fishery (IMM 
et al., 2005). The management system adopted for fisheries and marine ecosystems 
must be very aware of the dependency of different stakeholders and how manage-
ment arrangements will affect each group. 
balancing exclusion, livelihoods alternatives and the local economy
All too often, fisheries management is seen as separate from the economic activities 
that surround it. But the local economy is one of the main drivers of over-exploitation 
of resources – if fisheries is seen as a business that is more beneficial than other local 
activities, more people will try to enter the fishery. This is particularly important for 
the poor who often have limited means to invest in equipment or land and lack the 
skills to enter other industries. Thus, if people are to be successfully excluded from 
the fishery, they need to have access to alternative options for their labor and capital 
that provide as good, or better, returns than fishing. This is often seen as an area of de-
velopment that stands outside of fisheries management but, in reality, it is crucial to it. 
As coastal populations increase and where fisheries’ entry barriers are porous, more 
people will join the fishery on a full-time, part-time, seasonal or safety-net basis. A key 
part of fisheries management must ultimately be the decision to allow some people 
to fish and others to be excluded. If this is to be done equitably, then the different 
ways in which fishers depend on and use the coastal environment and its ecosystem 
services will need to be accommodated in the management system. In describing the 
underpinning rational for the need for closer links of fisheries in the wider economy, 
Charles and Herrera (1994, 1315) noted “…fisheries of developing regions typically 
face a trio of key problems: over-exploited stocks, an over-extended fleet and a lack of 
alternative employment outside of the fishery. In addressing these, the late economist 
Ian Smith (1981) expressed well a fundamental but oft-neglected reality: to be just, 
feasible and effective, policies cannot be restricted to resolving one of two of these 
problems alone.” Charles and Herrera (1994) also discussed the points that Smith 
made regarding the consequences of not taking all three elements into account, 
namely: i) inhumane impacts on the fishers, ii) political infeasibility due to community 
reaction, or iii) failure due to fishers’ non-compliance. 
Ultimately some people will need to seek alternatives, or at least reduce their depen-
dency through a more diversified livelihood portfolio,  for some or all of the year. This 
requires an understanding of how fisheries and the wider economy interact. Graham 
et al. (2006) noted that “[m]uch has been written about economic development in 
countries, in regions, and in communities, but little about the connection between 
community-based fisheries management and economic development.” This is a sig-
nificant limitation, given how dependent those in the fisheries are on the wider local 
and national economy. This economy generates markets for capital and labour that 
affect investment in fisheries. Community-based fisheries management can be greatly 
influenced by the economic viability of the surrounding community.
Limited diversity of livelihood opportunities are both a factor driving people into 
fisheries and a barrier to their leaving. As a consequence, in coastal communities 
where there are few alternatives, more people will join the fishery or will need to 
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migrate away from their communities. Kuperan and Jahan (2010), for instance, iden-
tified a lack of alternatives as a major obstacle to fisheries management in coastal 
Bangladesh, where population pressure and non-compliance to fisheries regulations 
is accelerating over-fishing, noting that “the resource can be better managed and the 
compliance level can be improved if the fisherfolk have other means of generating 
income to manage their losses for the regulatory measures” (Kuperan and Jahan, 
2010, 112).
In many coastal fisheries where fishing is seen as the occupation of last resort, this 
will be very difficult to achieve. As Tobey and Torell (2006, 853) noted, regarding 
the poor “[w]ithout other income generating options in the near future, the loss of 
nearshore marine fisheries could lead to a downward spiral of food security, income 
and vulnerability of rural coastal households.” 
Providing opportunities for the poor to move out of fisheries permanently, or at least 
reduce their level of dependency, is also fraught with difficulties, given their multiple 
deprivations: low income opportunities, weak market power, poor access to land-based 
resources, weak political access and low inclusion in public services such as health 
and education. Even under rights-based fisheries, Swan and Gréboval (2005) noted 
that regulating access and dealing with displaced fishermen are particularly important 
problems that must be overcome. This emphasized the need to view fisheries within 
the wider local and national economies. 
However, for many people involved in fisheries, the household will already support 
a portfolio of livelihood activities reflecting, e.g. levels of wealth, skill, seasonal op-
portunities and available alternative or additional livelihood options (Allison and 
Ellis, 2001; IMM et al., 2005; Walmsley et al., 2006; Cinner et al., 2010). These will 
often be linked into the wider aspects of the local economy, and fisheries manage-
ment should, ideally, be seen as part of the wider process of community develop-
ment (Jentoft, 2000). Understanding fisheries from a livelihoods perspective can be 
a useful way of understanding dependency and the linkages to the wider community 
(Ferrol-Schulte et al., 2013). Livelihoods approaches encourage a focus on the con-
tribution of fisheries to wider local economic development, with the opportunities in 
the wider economy providing livelihood alternatives for fishers which might lower 
the pressure on stocks and improve the livelihoods of those involved. Closer inte-
gration of the fisheries economy with the wider local economic development should 
also assist in shifting the safety net/buffering role that fisheries provide for rural 
labor (Béné, 2003).
Co-management processes in the Philippines have started to move beyond fisheries 
management issues and started to address wider development, eco-tourism, alterna-
tives to fishing and livelihood enhancement (Wilson et al., 2006). This has also been 
recognized by ICM programs, which cover a much wider part of the economy and 
need to include a diversity of livelihood opportunities (White et al., 2006). In Tanzania, 
there are also efforts to promote livelihood diversity (see Box 23), and in South Asia, 
efforts to develop a systematic approach to sustainable livelihood enhancement and 
diversification (SLED) have proved successful (Cattermoul et al., 2008). 
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From studies in Costa Rica on the diversifica-
tion of livelihood opportunities for fisheries 
households, Charles and Herrera (1994) de-
termined that the role of livelihood opportu-
nities for fisher households may be enhanced 
by taking a more integrated approach to 
management which addresses value addition 
within the sector and by addressing both 
micro-level (community) and macro-level 
(industry) changes to alternative livelihood 
options.
The sequencing of the introduction of liveli-
hood alternatives is very important (Catter-
moul et al., 2008). If restrictions on entry 
to the fisheries are introduced as part of 
a fisheries management process before 
adequate and acceptable alternatives are developed, then fishers are likely to invest 
in means to circumvent management measures. It is important to develop livelihood 
opportunities early in the management process. Ideally, these should not be the sorts 
of opportunities that are only services that rely solely on the income generated by 
fisheries. This is likely to create a localized “resource curse” situation. The “resource 
curse” reflects the poor potential of natural resource dependence to generate the 
economy-wide innovation needed to sustain growth (Collier, 2007; Barbier, 2007). 
This happens because a large amount of human, physical and financial capital often 
gets directed at the development of those resources at the expense of the rest of the 
economy (local or national). The spillover effects of natural resource exploitation tend 
to be less than those of manufacturing and service sectors, which reduces the diversi-
fication effect in the wider economy. This may be particularly pronounced in smaller 
economies where development resources are few anyway. Small-scale fisheries have 
the potential to be a “growth pole” in many coastal communities but, all too often, they 
tend to generate economic activity that perpetuates over-exploitation and dependency 
on the fishery. In reality, small-scale fisheries are a valuable resource that can lead to 
economic diversification if used properly. 
While livelihood diversification is not always a successful approach to shifting pressure 
from fisheries resources (Tobey and Torell, 2006), there are examples where a par-
ticipatory approach which facilitates the selection of livelihood opportunities by the 
communities themselves, rather than imposed from outside, can work (Cattermoul et 
al., 2008). Micro-finance is very important to stimulate or facilitate livelihood alterna-
tives (Tobey and Torell, 2006), as are wider mechanisms of support such as technical 
training, market information and development of entrepreneurship skills (Salagrama 
and Koriya, 2008). 
building capacity 
Fishers and their wider communities have an important role to play in fisheries man-
agement, but first they need the skills to understand the management process and the 
knowledge required of their roles and responsibilities. Good leadership can play an 
BoX 23:  
Livelihood diversification
in tanzania, MPas have used the generation of 
diversified livelihood options as a way of reducing 
pressure on resources. Some 19% of male-headed 
and 16% of female-headed households surveyed 
have been involved in these activities. 
Diversified income-generating activities included: 
agriculture, improved fishing techniques and 
marketing, apiculture, tree nurseries, rabbit fish 
cage culture, oyster farming, seaweed farming, and 
handicrafts such as weaving, .  
Source: Tobey and Torell, 2006
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important part in this but can also distort the outcomes. Building community capacity 
to participate, engage, share and cooperate can be equally as important. 
Good leadership of communities and groups seems to be an important ingredient of 
sound management as does good community cohesion. With an analysis of 130 co-
managed fisheries across 44 countries, Guttiérrez et al. (2011) identified strong lead-
ership as the most important attribute contributing to success, followed by individual 
or community quotas, social cohesion and protected areas. 
However, White et al. (2006) noted the importance of building durable institutions 
that will be self-sustaining after leadership change. Processes such as ICM are seen as 
valuable governance mechanisms that can help this and can enhance the local govern-
ment leadership role. 
In his discussion of co-management on the Mekong River in Laos, Baird (1999) 
mentioned that when solidarity increases through co-management, there may also be 
other spin-offs such as community development. 
A counter to good leadership can be dominant elites who look after themselves 
and their immediate supporters and colleagues. Patronage systems can be seen as 
powerful allies in management where a village chief or local elite is able to ensure 
compliance to management by a particular group. Participation in co-management 
does not always mean community empowerment and, even when the community 
is more empowered, it does not necessarily mean that such empowerment is even. 
Local elites may have a vested interest in moving the co-management process in 
certain directions or in presenting personal choices as those of the wider community. 
Such patronage is likely to exclude some key stakeholder groups, especially the 
poorest and most marginalized. This can be particularly damaging when managers 
or scientists assume a certain degree of homogeneity within communities and that 
the leader represents different groups fairly. This is particularly so where the effects 
and impacts of MPAs are being measured, and the exclusion of fishers is likely to 
have very different effects on different groups of people. Women excluded from 
gleaning local reefs on foot, for instance, are likely to suffer much more from a local 
exclusion zone that men with boats who are able to travel further afield. Women may 
lose not only local access rights but the ability to fish anywhere and the opportunity 
for social engagement with other women in the community where gleaning is a col-
laborative activity. 
But paradoxically, local elites are essential to providing the leadership and legitimacy 
of co-management structures and processes (Wilson et al., 2006). NGOs can have 
a role in reducing the adverse effects of these elites through building rights com-
mittees and other transparency mechanisms.6 Civil society more generally has a par-
ticular role to play in fisheries management where communities are poorly organized 
(Jentoft, 2000). The power of such organization can be seen in Box 24. 
6 The Hunger Safety Net Programme (HSNP) outlines rights committees in pastoralist communities in Kenya 
http://www.hsnp.or.ke/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=142%3arights&catid=34%3aarticle
s&Itemid=1
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Rudd et al. (2003) noted that social capital in 
communities is very important for influenc-
ing decision-makers, for building solidarity 
within communities and for forming bridges 
among communities. This is important for 
developing learning networks and sharing 
ideas. According to Armitage et al. (2009), 
successful adaptive management calls for 
clear and identifiable sets of social entities 
with shared interests. 
The extent of the community’s ability to 
organize itself to work within a co-manage-
ment arrangement is a significant issue 
affecting the potential impact of such ar-
rangements. Abdullah et al. (1998) found that 
it can take 3–5 years to develop effective in-
stitutions.
Wilson et al. (2006) found that many co-management initiatives give the role of 
building capacity to NGOs operating in the areas. They provided examples in Philip-
pines, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Bangladesh where capacity was strengthened 
by NGOs. 
During expert discussions, participants also highlighted leadership issues as being 
important at levels above the community, as initiatives for fisheries management or 
conservation of marine areas have often tended to be highly dependent on specific 
individuals with the commitment and charisma to encourage wider support for such 
initiatives, whether in local government, the NGO sector or at higher policy-making 
levels. They saw this dependence on specific leaders as representing vulnerability, 
because such individual “champions” are subject to generational change or regular 
transfer to other locations or fields of work, especially given the long timeframes often 
involved in fisheries management development. 
Work in Indonesia within the Coral Triangle Initiative is looking at how more systemic 
incentives can be created – within schools, higher education and government depart-
ments – to encourage people to commit to and engage in marine management issues. 
The goal is to generate a wider group of leaders of change across generations and 
institutions who can provide more sustainable leadership for change processes in the 
long-term.
Engaging with fishers’ motives and preferences
A key part of working in partnership with fishers in the management process is un-
derstanding their motives and preferences. Without this, management assumptions 
can be well off mark. 
In addition to understanding dependency of different groups, it is important to un-
derstand what drives fishers to do what they do and how they will react to change. 
BoX 24:  
Post-cyclone cooperation
on india’s orissa coast, many migrant fishers had 
coalesced into communities but lacked cohesion 
and organization. after the orissa cyclone in 2000, 
the nGos providing support insisted that the 
community organize itself and form groups through 
which support could be provided. although it had 
little previous experience of working in groups, 
the community discovered the benefits of mutual 
support and cooperation very quickly. Residents 
reported that this alone had transformed the way 
they function as a community and influenced all 
aspects of their lives. 
Source: Imm, 2001
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Hilborn (1985, cited in Salas and Gaertner, 2004) suggested that the collapse of many 
fisheries is due to misunderstanding fishers’ behavior rather than a lack of knowledge 
of fisheries resources. Understanding what motivates fishers is an important part of 
deciding how to manage a fishery according to Hilborn (2007a), who also noted (2007a, 
286) that “… fishermen respond to regulation in ways that often surprised managers, 
and managers must understand the motivation and incentives for fishermen to under-
stand how they respond.” 
The context in which fishers convert policy measures into actions is subject to a number 
of influencing factors that can change the course of those actions. These include what 
their priorities are, their cultural norms and expectations, their perceptions of risk, 
their relationship with managers and politicians, conflict and cohesion with commu-
nities, and beliefs around the sustainability of the resource. In addition, these may 
differ from those of managers. Salas and Gaertner (2004, 154) recognized this when 
they said: “…fishers develop and implement strategies and tactics in response to the 
constraints they encounter and their intended objectives given their particular human, 
social, cultural and economic contexts. Managers in contrast, have generally made 
simplistic assumptions about fishers’ nature and attitudes when defining management 
policies.” This can be very important in a management context. As Hilborn (2007a, 
290) noted: “[f]isheries management works much better when there is good coopera-
tion between managers, scientists and the fishing fleets …” This cooperation depends 
on people understanding where each is coming from. 
Understanding and responding to the motives of fishers is not straightforward. In 
an attempt to counter the potential effects of a change in community attitudes about 
MPAs, the Philippine government introduced the National Integrated Protected Areas 
Systems (NIPAS) to replace community-based management with national government 
direction. It did so because it feared the community might choose to turn its back on 
conservation objectives and exploit the MPA for economic benefit. This has report-
edly generated much resentment within the communities and reduced effectiveness 
of the MPA (Hind et al., 2010). 
In many fishing communities, there is a tendency for boys and girls to follow in their 
parents’ footsteps and join the sector. In some more traditional communities, fishing 
may be seen as a right or an obligation as a career. This can influence people’s in-
clination to leave the fishery or not join the sector. This is not true in all situations, 
especially where fishers are part-time or seasonal operators. Where viable alterna-
tives offer better benefits, those people will generally take them up. However, many 
fisheries people have few other skills and knowledge, which may make leaving much 
more difficult for them. 
Fishers are apt to view resources in terms of their time preferences or the way they 
discount future benefits in current prices. People who have high discount rates favor 
current gains much more than the same gain in the future. Time preference influences 
the behavior of fishers, as well as those people making policy and those implementing 
it. For politicians the time horizons are generally short – 2 to 6 years (Sutinen, 2010) 
– because of the time between elections. The time preference for donor agencies can 
be even shorter, leading to substantial distortions of policy as their funding priori-
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ties fluctuate in a given sector or policy area. Longer-term considerations are often 
less important to them than short-term gains. This can become a significant problem 
because when major institutional reform is needed for fisheries management change, 
it may take many years. After reviewing the legal requirements for community-
based fisheries management in the Pacific, Kuemlangan (2004, 32) noted that “[a]ny 
external programme for assistance (for CBFM) should be for a longer term duration 
than normal technical assistance or development projects.” This is not only required 
to address community-level institution building but also to build government under-
standing of the benefits of CBFM and to facilitate the necessary policy and legislative 
changes. 
Fishers also often focus on the short-term. In open access fisheries, where fishers 
have no secure claim over future outcomes from the fishery, they are encouraged to 
reap the benefits quickly before others do. There are also uncertainties about future 
fisheries policy, markets and fish stocks. Poor people also sometimes have shorter 
time horizons because they discount benefits at higher rates suggesting a lesser com-
mitment to environmental management (Holden et al., 1998). In Tanzania, Tobey and 
Torell (2006) found that poverty may be a limiting factor to conservation efforts, in 
that poverty often forces people to engage in destructive practices.  
If the time preferences of managers and fishers are very different, then giving fishers 
or local communities the rights to harvest fish resources may not always generate 
the expected results. For example, rights do not necessarily confer a commitment 
to sustainability. As Bromley (2009, 282) noted, “if the ‘time preference’ of a private 
owner is such that income now trumps income in the future, then private owners 
will be quite intent on liquidating (destroying) a renewable natural resource in order 
to spend the proceeds or invest them elsewhere.” Investing current catches in your 
child’s education may seem like a good investment even if it destroys future stocks. 
It is also worth noting that the motivations and preferences of fishers are dynamic 
and constantly changing in response to their surrounding social and economic envi-
ronment. Experience in India indicated how a combination of people’s perceptions of 
the increasing competition for fisheries resources, exposure to outside ideas (in this 
case during the post-tsunami relief efforts after 2004), improved communications and 
access to education had led, over the course of a generation, to a significant change 
in the attitudes of many fishers in South India regarding the future of fisheries and 
their desire for their children to enter the fishery in the future (Townsley et al., 2011).
Understanding these different motives is important for ensuring that fisheries man-
agement systems accommodate them and work with them.
Addressing commitment, compliance, conflict and enforcement
The enforcement of regulations represents a large part of the cost of any management 
process. This can be very high where fishers must be forced to comply with regula-
tions rather than where they have a commitment to those regulations. Moving from 
compliance to commitment can be an important step in increasing management’s ef-
fectiveness and reducing its cost. 
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Rights imply an entitlement which is generally supported in law. With those rights are 
responsibilities which often require the sustainable use of the resources. Enforcement 
involves both protecting those rights and ensuring that rights holders adhere to their 
responsibilities. In traditional fisheries, the enforcement of rights and responsibilities 
were often controlled by traditional authorities. The importance of these institutions 
should not be underestimated. As Jentoft (2000) noted, if the community disintegrates 
socially or morally, it becomes a threat to fish stocks. In many developing countries 
that have introduced more formal and centralized licensing systems, the enforcement 
of regulations has become more difficult with many vessels operating from many 
small landing sites. In many small-scale developing fisheries, the government lacks 
the funds to implement effective enforcement (Arthur, 2005).
Non-compliance to fisheries regulations undermines the effectiveness of manage-
ment measures and is a major problem in most fisheries. In their review of compli-
ance in the coastal fisheries in Bangladesh, Kuperan and Jahan (2010) recommended 
examining the level and causes of non-compliance and exploring policies for encour-
aging or securing compliance because, at that moment, the chances of detection 
and conviction in fisheries rule breaking in coastal Bangladesh were reported to be 
virtually nil. One solution to the compliance issue, suggested by Kuperan and Jahan 
(2010), called for moving towards co-management in fisheries where the additional 
transparency of the approach would support greater compliance. 
Unless there is commitment to the operation of management measures, there are 
likely to be difficulties in getting compliance. For example, Christie and White (2007) 
found that  MPAs were one of the preferred coral reef fisheries management measures 
– covering (at the time) 18.7 percent of the world’s reef. Yet less than 0.01 percent of 
coral reefs were within no-take zones, with no poaching and at low risk. This suggested 
considerable lack of adherence to the rules. Rules not only need the legal framework 
to enforce them and the political will to implement enforcement but also legitimacy in 
the eyes of the fishers. Furthermore, legitimacy should also be in the eyes of wider 
society, but these forms of legitimacy can sometimes conflict (Jentoft, 2000). 
The use of graduated sanctions is seen as important in resource management systems 
(Ostrom, 2009b), particularly in relation to rights, as well as very important to the 
success of fisheries management. However, all too often, this is missing, especially 
in countries where the rule of law is not well established. According to Christie and 
White (2006), lack of clear tenure rules can undermine MPAs, and fair and effective 
law enforcement, knowledge of the law, and consistency between national and local 
laws and institutional goals are important to MPA effectiveness. In-migration and 
conflicts outside of the community often require the government to intervene to 
resolve disputes (Wilson et al., 2006). Where communities are more homogeneous, 
co-management seems to work better. Francis and Bryceson (2001, 94) noted that 
“[c]onflicts of interest can be resolved or avoided by fair processes respecting coastal 
communities’ systems of land/sea tenure and common property rights.”
Andrade and Rhodes (2012) implemented a meta-analysis of 55 published studies to 
understand the key factors that lead to community compliance with protected area 
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(PA) regulations. These included:
•	 establishing	cooperative	relationship	among	all	stakeholders	
•	 building	 relationships	 on	 voluntary	 compliance	 rather	 than	 draconian	 enforce-
ment
•	 promoting	enforcement	through	participatory	decision-making
•	 setting	rules	that	are	clear	and	easy	to	understand
•	 setting	internal	and	external	boundaries	that	are	well	defined	and	recognized	by	
resource used and officials 
•	 ensuring	well	trained,	equipped	and	motivated	personnel	
•	 determining	penalties	and	applying	and	enforcing	them	consistently.	
Fisheries management works best if there is good cooperation among the fishers, 
managers and scientists (Hilborn, 2007a), which enables the beginning of a shift 
from mere compliance with regulation to a sense of commitment to making the 
fishery work. As Bennett (2005b) noted, when fishers believe a stock needs sup-
porting, they will agree to limit effort. A key part of the move towards effective man-
agement must be a move from fishers’ coerced compliance to management regula-
tion towards one where fishers are committed to the success of the management 
measures. Otherwise, there will be need to spend large amounts of funds and effort 
to ensure compliance, which is unlikely to be achieved in developing countries that 
have financial constraints. Understanding what incentivizes fishers is central to that 
process (Hilborn, 2007a).
Ensuring participation and inclusion
A part of generating compliance and commitment is building support for the manage-
ment process, which requires involving fishers and their communities in the decision-
making process. This means bringing in a much wider group than just the fishers 
because, in most communities, the whole local economy is closely linked to fishing 
and decisions are likely to have far reaching effects. The quality of that participation 
is also very important. Extractive participation – meaning the community is mined for 
its knowledge and consent – is likely to be less effective than where participation is 
more collegial (Campbell and Salagrama, 2001). 
Participation of fishers in management decisions and processes that affect their lives 
and livelihoods is important for several reasons. It generates buy-in and support 
for the process, it empowers communities, it incorporates local knowledge and ex-
perience, and it can reduce costs. Recognizing that communities are not made up 
of people who all have the same needs and wants is key to effective participation 
(Bennett, undated). 
Andrade and Rhodes (2012) found that compliance is driven primarily by local in-
volvement in the protected areas’ decision-making processes. This is because those 
decisions are likely to impact upon the livelihoods of people in adjacent communi-
ties. Many protected areas around the world have been developed using exclusion-
ary top-down methods and, as such, failed to consider other important issues such 
as social, cultural and political concerns. Opponents of no-take MPAs consider that 
such measures have failed largely because they have been imposed on fishermen, and 
they argue for the assignation of property rights to fish stocks and co-management 
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through the greater involvement of fishermen in decision-making processes (Jones, 
2007). The effects of exclusion of fishers from MPAs will have effects and impacts that 
are determined in part by the size of the enclosed area relative to the non-enclosed. 
MPAs that force the same number of fishers to catch from a smaller area are in danger 
of increasing over-exploitation in the areas outside the MPA at a much faster rate. 
Respect for participation and inclusion is seen across the literature. Allison (2011, 
11) found that “[o]nly meaningful engagement with and deliberation amongst stake-
holders can yield goals that will be seen as legitimate.” Similarly, Hall and Mainprize 
(2004) said that while it may not be possible to get complete agreement on the aims 
and potential outcomes of fisheries management, it is important that the views of all be 
heard. Aswani and Weiant (2004) noted that when local communities are excluded from 
protected area management systems, and their needs and aspirations are ignored, it 
becomes very difficult to enforce conservation policies. Andrade and Rhodes (2012) 
also noted that while the cost of patrolling big protected areas can be reduced by in-
volvement of local people in patrolling and management, such stewardship will only 
take place if local communities feel included in the decision-making process. While 
biodiversity conservation may be achieved in the short-term, marginalizing participa-
tion in decision-making, not engaging in capacity building, not enhancing governance 
processes or enforcing regulations fairly is likely to lead to biodiversity loss in the 
long-term. In addition there seems to be a growing recognition that stakeholder par-
ticipation needs to be sought throughout the monitoring and adaptive management 
process, not just in initial planning, given the limited knowledge of how ecosystems 
function (Arkema et al., 2006).
In relation to community-based natural resources management (CBNRM) in general, 
Roe et al. (2009) pointed out that, to be successful, it must prioritize local interests, 
agency and capacity. Bell et al. (2006) noted that in China, if the state took over stock 
enhancement programs, they tended to fail because it was difficult to see who should 
pay for the benefits, while those operated by local fishermen worked much better. 
The role of women in decision-making around fisheries management should not be 
forgotten (Bennett, 2005a). While women may play a smaller role than men in fish 
harvesting in most countries, their role in fish processing and trade is vital. Fisheries 
management measures can influence how much fish is landed, what sort of fish is 
landed, where it is landed, when it is landed and the condition in which it is landed. A 
recent study of women fish traders in Cambodia found that changes in the market for 
fish had changed significantly over an eight-year period, demonstrating the dynamic 
nature of the fish trade process (Asian Fisheries Society, 2013). Such changes can 
be driven by the fishery itself or by outside forces, but they can radically change the 
interface between fisheries management and fisheries trade. 
All of these characteristics affect fish processors and traders, but can be dealt with quite 
differently by men and women, the poor and the wealthy, those who are able to travel 
and those who are restricted to the village for religious or family reasons (see Box 25). 
Alpízar (2006) noted that the quality of participation is very important. This begs the 
question: who will be involved, how are they selected and what role will they take? 
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The degrees of participation of small-scale fishers in fisheries research were reviewed 
by Campbell and Salagrama (2001) who noted the important and valuable role that 
fishers can play in research but also the limitation of such practice. Charles et al. (2009, 
178) noted that participatory research and 
community-based management “have consid-
erable, yet often unrealized, potential in coastal 
fisheries of the world. They are, to a great 
extent, two sides of the same coin. In thinking 
about participatory research, we envision the 
building of a co-learning environment that is 
empowering for all participants…” DFID’s 
Fisheries Management Science Programme 
identified the role that fishers can play in stock 
assessment work and how feedback from that 
process improved management decision-mak-
ing (Howard and Arthur, 2005). 
Jentoft (2000) recognized the relationship 
between community and fisheries management 
as fundamental. Fishers are often born in and 
live in communities, and are enmeshed in the 
social and cultural structures and processes. If 
the management systems exclude the community, there is a danger that the fishers 
will act in their own interests only and ignore those of wider society. This role of the 
community will be important both in the design and implementation of fisheries man-
agement plans. However, Van Tuyen et al. (2010) noted that the livelihoods of coastal 
people in Vietnam are often in a state of flux (as they are in most places) adding to 
the complexity of planning and management in fisheries. They suggested that there 
is “growing recognition among authorities of the value of engaging local fishers and 
fish farmers in participatory process to resolve complex livelihood challenges, and 
the development of local management bodies (newly formed Fishing Associations) as 
a basis for emerging co-management of aquatic resources” (Van Tuyen et al., 2010, 
327).
However, as Belsky (2000) noted, we should be careful not to replace a more top-down 
theory of conservation with another where we assume that rural communities are 
“ecological noble communities” or make them central to every conservation effort. 
This is reiterated by Alpízar (2006) who pointed out that communities are heteroge-
neous and multidimensional, so conflicts, divisions and inequalities are likely to exist, 
and decisions are not always going to be environmentally benign. Belsky (2000) also 
found that not all communities have the necessary skills, governance and social struc-
tures to enable management to occur, that a focus on community management takes 
the focus off the role of multi-nationals, international treaties and institutions, and 
that those in control of conservation policy often do not have a strong understanding 
of how communities work. In relation to reef decline, Whittingham et al. (2003, 52) 
noted that “… participation is not a panacea to ensure that interventions succeed in 
preventing reef decline and assuring sustainable reef benefits for poor stakeholders.” 
Other key elements include: i) when participation occurs in the management process, 
BoX 25:  
factors influencing fish processors 
in India
increased capitalization of the india coastal fisheries 
has had a generally positive effect on the fishers 
although future catches are more vulnerable to 
overexploitation. However, increased landings into 
fewer ports has adversely affected many of the 
small-scale processors and traders. Centralization of 
landings has affected access to landed fish processing 
practices (especially the increased use of ice) and 
fish market opportunities. these have had knock-on 
effects on fishers’ household incomes. 
Source: Imm and ICm, 2003
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ii) how it is sustained, iii) the equitability of the participation process, iv) the extent to 
which the poorer and other marginalized groups are included and v) how systems of 
patronage are included. 
People also need to be included in understanding the need for change. In relation 
to ICM in the Philippines, White et al. (2006, 299) noted that “[p]roviding effective 
feedback on biological and socioeconomic information and quantitative indicators on 
fisheries and habitats as a result of effective management contributes to the under-
standing of why ICM is needed.” 
An important element of inclusion often omitted from fisheries management discus-
sions is that of poverty. Where do the poor fit into fisheries management systems? 
Walmsley et al. (2006) expressed that fisheries is often poorly addressed in national 
poverty reduction strategies. In addition, because of their often marginalized positions, 
the poor are often excluded from fisheries management systems. 
Linking different knowledge management systems
A key element of participation and building commitment is recognizing the value 
of local ecological knowledge and the experience-based knowledge of local fishers. 
All too often, fishers are regarded as ignorant and their traditional knowledge as 
inferior to that generated by more formal knowledge systems, which has often proved 
incorrect. There is a growing awareness of the value of these informal knowledge 
systems in fisheries management.
Knowledge management can be thought of as being composed of three components: i) 
generating knowledge, ii) sharing knowledge and iii) using knowledge. Even though 
knowledge is often considered that which is generated through formal science, fisher 
societies have both traditional knowledge that is transferred between generations 
with its roots in history, and experience-based knowledge which comes from working 
in the sector. Many fishers have profoundly detailed knowledge of their environment, 
the species of fish they target, changes in the waters they fish and its navigation, the 
seasons which influence their fishing and the techniques which preserve fish (see, for 
instance, von Brandt, 1972; Johannes, 1981; and Worsley, 1997 cited in Campbell and 
Salagrama, 2001).
Customary marine tenure systems are often underpinned by the existence, value and 
application of traditional ecological knowledge to management (see: Christy, 1982; 
Ruddle and Johannes, 1985; Scudder and Connelly, 1985; Cordell, 1989; and Johannes, 
1981 cited in Campbell and Salagrama, 2001). 
Berkes et al. (2000) discussed the importance of traditional ecological knowledge and 
acknowledged the similarity between such knowledge-based systems and adaptive 
management. Francis and Bryceson (2001, 94) researching the situation in the coast 
of Tanzania noted that “[b]oth traditional and scientific knowledge systems of coastal 
ecology and ecosystem management exist, but there are many gaps and there is a need 
for much improved dialogue and mutual respect between these knowledge systems.”
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In all aspects of knowledge management, a more collaborative approach is emerging 
as a key mechanism for shared understanding and decision-making in governance 
and policy processes more generally. The greater use of indigenous knowledge in 
fisheries management is a case in point. In fisheries research, participatory approach-
es to knowledge generation through all stages of the research cycle are becoming 
more prevalent (Campbell and Salagrama, 2001). Wilson et al. (2006) expressed that 
experience-based knowledge of fishers can be very useful for fisheries management. 
In the UK, the government’s recent (2010–2013) process for the identification of 
marine conservation areas involved a very significant consultation and engagement 
with a wide array of stakeholders including fishers, sports divers, boat operators and 
conservation specialists. This was supported by marine scientists and policy makers. 
The extent and relevance of indigenous knowledge to fisheries is clearly demonstrat-
ed in Johannes’ (1981) work among island communities in the Pacific. 
The expert discussions generally found consensus that local knowledge and experi-
ence offer a crucial contribution to the knowledge base required for effective fisheries 
management. However there was less clarity regarding how this could be married 
with scientific knowledge. Some respondents, for example, were skeptical regarding 
the reliability of purely community-based mechanisms for monitoring and evaluat-
ing the impacts of management, particularly on the ecosystem and its functioning. 
Inputs by trained scientists were seen as indispensable in some fields. Others felt 
strongly that a large proportion of key information-gathering roles could be taken on 
by resource users themselves, and that this could represent an important cost-saving 
mechanism while also contributing to building local commitment and engagement in 
the whole process.
However, even when new knowledge is shared, it often is not used to inform policy 
and policy implementation. The work done through the Global Environment Facility 
(GEF) on its Large Marine Ecosystem projects, for instance, has generated a large 
amount of information about the biophysical, socio-economic, fisheries and gover-
nance aspects of marine management. However GEF is reported to have been less 
enthusiastic about funding improved practice, new management actions and pro-
tection of priority sites, according to Bensted-Smith and Kirkman (2010), who also 
noted that “[o]verall, the LME approach is a powerful generator of information and 
financial resources and promotes transboundary cooperation but we suggest that, in 
a developing country context, GEF and LME proponents should redirect emphasis 
and resources from natural sciences to effective, sustainable governance” (2010, iii).
Mutual respect for, and trust in, different knowledge systems can take several 
decades to develop (Armitage et al., 2012). Without trust, the incentive to commit to 
management regimes based upon shared knowledge can be lost (Campbell and Cat-
termoul, 2009). The incorporation of local knowledge into policy-making processes is 
becoming more common in fisheries management, as is sharing more formal sources 
of knowledge within communities in ways that can be understood and used.
80
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7
7. Discussion, conclusions and    
 ways forward
7.1 Discussion
A large body of literature, both peer reviewed and institutional reports, covers the 
area of small-scale fisheries management. This synthesis reviews a small proportion 
of those to provide an understanding of the existing knowledge field. The emphasis 
of the study has been on “reviewing reviews” of experiences in the field, as much of 
the literature stands one step removed from the field itself. As a consequence, the 
synthesis represents the findings and opinions of thought leaders in the field who 
have assessed the evidence, cross referenced by discussion with some 20 key infor-
mants across the field. 
There was widespread agreement that the fisheries sector is very important to global 
food and nutrition, to livelihoods, to foreign exchange earnings, to local community 
development and as a safety net for the poor. It was also agreed that fisheries are in 
a fairly poor state with most over-capitalized and many over-exploited. But there was 
also a sense of optimism that this could be turned around and that there were already 
signs of hope that this was being achieved. 
A number of major themes in fisheries management that hold center stage in the 
discussions tend to focus on the degree of emphasis placed on different aims. Yield 
maximization, conservation, economic maximization and social policy are all entry 
points into fisheries management that color the focus of the management efforts. In-
creasingly, however, there is recognition of the need to balance these different themes 
and to look at fisheries management much more holistically. 
This holistic approach brings recognition of the complex nature of fisheries manage-
ment that is changing in the face of globalized markets and climate change. It is that 
complexity which needs to be embraced through much more integrated approaches 
to management that work across different scales and levels. This requires horizontal 
integration into the wider economy at local, national and global levels, and vertical 
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integration to link the local fisheries situation to wider concerns of migratory stocks, 
cross-boundary effects, water pollution, IUU fishing and global markets. 
There is also recognition that there is no “silver bullet”, no universal answer for all 
the problems of fisheries. Each situation is ecologically, socially, economically, cul-
turally and politically different. Local context is very important, particularly as more 
holistic approaches are adopted. The aims and objectives of different stakeholders 
and the local context will differ, making the definition of revitalized fisheries different 
in different locations. However, there does appear to be considerable support for the 
idea that a number of factors influence success in a number of locations around the 
globe. There is also a growing consensus of the need to use a combination of these 
factors to set a general trend of improvement in motion. 
An important element in this consensus is that the process by which fisheries man-
agement is developed and implemented is more important than the specific measures 
through which it is implemented. In part, this is dictated by the fact that the timeframes 
involved in bringing about change in the way fisheries and marine ecosystems are 
managed are long, which means that the process by which stakeholders, institutions 
and decision-making mechanisms are engaged over time needs careful attention. Col-
laborative approaches seem to play an important role in such processes, but the exact 
roles played by government, the community, community representatives, NGOs and 
the private sector will tend to vary according to context and the stage of development 
of the process itself. The way the management process develops will also depend very 
much on the broader context of governance, subsidiarity, institutional capacity and fit, 
rights to resources, the legal framework, inclusiveness and scale, and it will be influ-
enced strongly by the prevailing political economy in different locations.
Ensuring the long-term viability of the resource and the wider ecosystem was generally 
accepted as a key element, but one which needs to be balanced by other concerns 
around the ability of stakeholders, particularly the poor, to respond to change and 
around how benefits from protected ecosystem services might be distributed. It was 
also clear that adaptation to change is likely to play a larger part in fisheries man-
agement in the future – climate change is introducing uncertainty that needs to be 
incorporated into the planning process. There was considerable support for the use of 
more adaptive approaches to respond to change and to build greater resilience in com-
munities. Given both the level of change in the management process and the change 
in the fishery itself, it was felt that fisheries management needs to be introduced in-
crementally, as this approach allows adaptation in policy, policy implementation and 
community structures and processes. However, creating the capacity at all levels – 
within policy mechanisms, communities and agencies – to work in an adaptive fashion 
is itself a challenge for which they require support and assistance. 
This suggests that introducing and establishing major shifts in the management 
process will not occur quickly in most situations. A long-term commitment by funders 
to this change process will be necessary, requiring more sustainable funding mecha-
nisms to be identified and put in place without further adding to the subsidies to the 
sector. Improved market chains have a role to play in improving the benefit flows to 
fishers, but will require sequencing.
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There was also widespread recognition that greater inclusion of fishers and their 
communities in the decision-making process is key. This builds on recognition of the 
importance of rights and responsibilities at all levels, and goes beyond the inclusion 
of fisher’s representatives in the form of local elites. It recognizes that fishers are a 
disparate group of people who depend upon fisheries in quite different ways. It also 
recognizes that other members of coastal communities are affected by how fisheries 
management is conducted. Women in their roles as fish processors and traders are 
greatly influenced by management decisions. Children are affected by future em-
ployment opportunities. The wider society is affected by the benefits that flow from 
fisheries into the local economy.
Ultimately, fisheries management decisions will involve some people being included 
in the right to fish and some being excluded. Those excluded may be current fishers 
or future generations who may wish to join the fishery. Those who are excluded will 
need alternative livelihood options, otherwise they are likely to become impoverished 
or will try to circumvent entry regulations. Fisheries are generally closely linked to 
the local economy in which they operate, and ensuring that they become a vital part of 
local economic development is essential. Getting the balance right between exclusion, 
alternative livelihoods and linkages with the local economy will be very important 
to the sustainable and equitable development of small-scale fisheries. Embedding 
fisheries management into the wider context of the local economy is essential if the 
livelihoods of the poor are to be enhanced.
It will also be important to get the sequencing of decisions around controls over 
entry, market chain development and livelihood alternatives right. Introducing im-
provements in market chains before the rights to fish are established will encourage 
movement into the fishery. Restricting entry to the fishery before alternative invest-
ment and labor opportunities are established can push the poor into a state of despera-
tion. 
There was considerable concern about getting the motives of fishers in line with those 
of managers and recognizing the importance of different time frames for management 
decisions. Given differences between people, there would likely be conflicts and viola-
tions of regulation that would need good enforcement, sound leadership, community 
cohesion and a greater sense of commitment to the management process. This again 
requires support for capacity building at the community level and building a sense 
of trust among the different players. A shared recognition of the value of formal and 
informal knowledge systems would provide a basis for starting to build that trust. 
7.2 Conclusions
It is clear from this work that there is no simple universal cure for the problems that 
face small-scale coastal fisheries. These fisheries are complex, confused and difficult 
to deal with, as well as locally specific. However, this does not mean that fisheries 
cannot achieve a much more balanced equitable and sustainable trajectory into the 
future. The 20 factors identified in this synthesis could help achieve this – when 
combined into a process for change. There are doubtless others that would emerge 
from a more comprehensive study. 
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There is much that needs to be done to celebrate the areas of success that have been 
achieved so far but also to recognize that widespread success will take a considerable 
number of years, substantial financial support and a commitment to building capacity 
at all levels. 
Lessons can be learned from outside of small-scale coastal fisheries, such as those 
that have emerged from inland fisheries, such as Bangladesh and Cambodia where 
co-management systems are well developed. There also have been lessons from other 
resource management systems such as forestry, livestock and game which have 
parallels with fisheries. An approach to fisheries management which seeks examples 
and solutions beyond fisheries is likely to generate more useful approaches. 
Efforts to distill these different factors into principles for management began with 
the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries. The specific needs of small-scale 
fisheries that go beyond the Code have been progressively recognized and FAO is 
currently producing a draft International Guidelines for Securing Sustainable Small-
Scale Fisheries to address many of the emerging issues associated with fisheries man-
agement. These Guidelines are intended to enhance the contribution of small-scale 
fisheries to poverty alleviation, food security and economic growth. 
An important development in fisheries management is the greater interest in operating 
at higher scales as well as the community levels. Regional recognition of, and support 
for, good practice creates normative pressure for others to adopt. Learning networks 
around fisheries and marine ecosystem management are important in supporting the 
exchange of positive experience. While the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries 
has not been universally applied, it has become a standard against which practice is 
measured. The proposed Guidelines have the potential to go much further but will 
need time, commitment and financial support to achieve this potential. 
7.3 Ways forward
There is much that can be done to bring the successful experiences of different 
fisheries together into a more coherent and consistent process – a process supported 
by tools and mechanisms and learning materials that will facilitate a more incremen-
tal but more coordinated approach to management change. This would need to be 
done on an iterative basis where experience and learning is shared through networks 
and exchanges, particularly in the face of climate change where so much remains 
unknown. 
The evolving FAO International Guidelines for Securing Sustainable Small-Scale 
Fisheries provides a framework for moving more equitable and sustainable fisheries 
forward. This is still being developed and needs to be piloted to enable the different 
tools and mechanisms for implementation to be developed. 
In addition, as this report has shown, there are knowledge gaps in the process that 
should be given consideration for future work, investment or development in the 
sector, such as: how to combine these success factors into an effective process; to 
what extent will they complement or conflict with one another; how can the appro-
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priateness of different elements in the fisheries management process for different 
locations be assessed and understood; what form would adaptive planning take to 
address fisheries management in a rapidly changing marine environment; how can 
we generate revenues from small-scale coastal fisheries that will fund local man-
agement initiatives, create alternative investment and livelihood opportunities, and 
stimulate the wider local economy; how do we get the sequencing of interventions 
right for different stakeholder groups; and how do we ensure long-term funding for 
the process? 
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Annexes
annex 1: 
A: Electronic database search log
DAtE OF 
SEARCh
SEARCh DAtAbASE SEARCh tERMS SEARCh FIELD NO. OF 
RESuLtS
02/07/13 Web of Knowledge –Web of 
Science
fish* *manage* topic 29,916
02/07/13 Web of Knowledge – Web of 
Science
fish* *manage* coast* topic 5,189
02/07/13 Web of Knowledge – Web of 
Science
fish* community-based topic 550
02/07/13 Web of Knowledge – Web of 
Science
fish* adaptive neaR/3 manage* topic 447
02/07/13 Web of Knowledge – Web of 
Science
ecosystem *manage* topic 32,823
02/07/13 Web of Knowledge – Web of 
Science
ecosystem *manage* coast* topic 4,267
02/07/13 Web of Knowledge – Web of 
Science
ecosystem community-based topic 438
02/07/13 Web of Knowledge – Web of 
Science
ecosystem adaptive neaR/3 manage* topic 1,041
02/07/13 Web of Knowledge – Web of 
Science
natural resource *manage* topic 15,408
02/07/13 Web of Knowledge – Web of 
Science
natural resource *manage* coast* topic 1,288
02/07/13 Web of Knowledge – Web of 
Science
natural resource community-based topic 622
02/07/13 Web of Knowledge – Web of 
Science
natural resource adaptive neaR/3 
manage*
topic 460
03/07/13 Scirus fish* *manage* Complete 
document
Query too 
general
03/07/13 Scirus fish* *manage* coast* Complete 
document
Query too 
general
03/07/13 Scirus fish* *manage* title 18,445
03/07/13 Scirus fish* *manage* coast* title 514
03/07/13 Scirus fish* community-based Complete 
document
2,095,331
03/07/13 Scirus fish* community-based title 342
03/07/13 Scirus ecosystem *manage* Complete 
document
Query too 
general
03/07/13 Scirus ecosystem *manage* coast* Complete 
document
Query too 
general
03/07/13 Scirus ecosystem *manage* title 9,323
03/07/13 Scirus ecosystem *manage* coast* title 72
03/07/13 Scirus ecosystem community-based Completed 
document
772, 268
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DAtE OF 
SEARCh
SEARCh DAtAbASE SEARCh tERMS SEARCh FIELD NO. OF 
RESuLtS
10203/07/13 Scirus ecosystem community-based title 102
03/07/13 Scirus natural resource *manage* Complete 
document
4,725,634
03/07/13 Scirus natural resource *manage* title 8,874
03/07/13 Scirus natural resource *manage* coast* Complete 
document
937, 141
03/07/13 Scirus natural resource *manage* coast* title 105
03/07/13 Scirus natural resource community-based Complete 
document
1,858,356
03/07/13 Scirus natural resource community-based title 360
04/07/13 Directory of open access 
Journals
fish* *manage* all fields no matches
04/07/13 Directory of open access 
Journals
fish* *manage* title no matches
04/07/13 Directory of open access 
Journals
fisheries management all fields 32+
04/07/13 Directory of open access 
Journals
fish* community-based all fields 4+
04/07/13 Directory of open access 
Journals
ecosystem *manage* all fields no matches
04/07/13 Directory of open access 
Journals
ecosystem *manage* title no matches
04/07/13 Directory of open access 
Journals
ecosystem management all fields 3+
04/07/13 Directory of open access 
Journals
ecosystem community-based all fields 3+
04/04/13 Directory of open access 
Journals
natural resource *manage* all fields no matches
04/07/13 Directory of open access 
Journals
natural resource *manage* title no matches 
04/07/13 Directory of open access 
Journals
natural resource management all fields 1+
04/07/13 Directory of open access 
Journals
natural resource community-based all fields 5+
04/07/13 applied Social Sciences index 
and abstracts
fish* *manage* all fields 10+
08/07/13 applied Social Sciences index 
and abstracts
fish* community-based all fields 2+
08/07/13 applied Social Sciences index 
and abstracts
ecosystem *manage* all fields 0
08/07/13 applied Social Sciences index 
and abstracts
ecosystem community-based all fields 0
08/07/13 applied Social Sciences index 
and abstracts
natural resource *manage* all fields 1+
08/07/13 applied Social Sciences index 
and abstracts
natural resource community-based all fields 0
10/07/13 aquatic Sciences and fisheries 
abstracts 
fish* *manage* all fields 94, 247
10/07/13 aquatic Sciences and fisheries 
abstracts
fish* *manage* coast* all fields 21, 127
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DAtE OF 
SEARCh
SEARCh DAtAbASE SEARCh tERMS SEARCh FIELD NO. OF 
RESuLtS
10/07/13 aquatic Sciences and fisheries 
abstracts
fish* *manage* coast* abstract 7, 248
10/07/13 aquatic Sciences and fisheries 
abstracts
fish* *manage* coast* Document title 316
10/07/13 aquatic Sciences and fisheries 
abstracts
fish* community-based all fields 923
10/07/13 aquatic Sciences and fisheries 
abstracts
ecosystem *manage* all fields 49, 666
10/07/13 aquatic Sciences and fisheries 
abstracts 
ecosystem *manage* coast* all fields 13, 184
10/07/13 aquatic Sciences and fisheries 
abstracts
ecosystem *manage* coast* abstract 3,811
10/07/13 aquatic Sciences and fisheries 
abstracts
ecosystem *manage* coast* Document title 111
10/07/13 aquatic Sciences and fisheries 
abstracts
ecosystem community-based all fields 516
10/07/13 aquatic Sciences and fisheries 
abstracts
ecosystem community-based coast* all fields 155
10/07/13 aquatic Sciences and fisheries 
abstracts
natural resource *manage* all fields 38,446
10/07/13 aquatic Sciences and fisheries 
abstracts
natural resource *manage* coast* all fields 9,953
10/07/13 aquatic Sciences and fisheries 
abstracts
natural resource *manage* coast* abstract 1,438
10/07/13 aquatic Sciences and fisheries 
abstracts
natural resource *manage* coast* Document title 9
+ results screened for language and relevance criteria
B: Institutional grey literature search log
DAtE OF 
SEARCh
INStItutION wEbSItE: SEARCh AREA NO. OF 
RESuLtS
14.07.2013 http://www.coopesolidar.org/ Sent by author 2
14.07.2013 http://www.wcs.org/ Sent by co-author 2
15.07.2013 http://fish.washington.edu/ Sent by co-authors 7
15.07.2013 http://www.fao.org/fishery/topic/13261/en fao
fish
ecosystem
7
15.07.2013 http://www.fao.org/fishery/mpas//en fao
fish
ecosystem
Marine protected areas
1
15.07.2013 http://www.fao.org/fishery/topic/2880/en fao
fisheries
ecosystems
1
15.07.2013 http://www.fao.org/fishery/topic/3542/en fao
fisheries
ecosystems
Coastal & marine ecosystems
1
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DAtE OF 
SEARCh
INStItutION wEbSItE: SEARCh AREA NO. OF 
RESuLtS
15.07.2013 http://www.fao.org/fishery/topic/3320/en fao
fisheries
ecosystems
Coastal & marine ecosystems
types of ecosystems
1
15.07.2013 ftp://ftp.fao.org/fi/DoCuMent/eaf/eafguidelines_278364.pdf Sent by co-author 1
18.07.2013 http://toobigtoignore.net/ Books 2
18.07.2013 http://toobigtoignore.net/ articles 1
19.07.2013 http://www.conservation.org/global/marine/Pages/
partnerlanding.aspx 
Marine -
19.07.2013 http://www.conservation.org/global/marine/initiatives/
fisheries/Pages/sustainable_fisheries.aspx 
Sustainable fisheries -
19.07.2013 http://www.conservation.org/global/marine/initiatives/
seascapes/pages/seascapes.aspx 
Seascapes 2
19.07.2013 http://www.science2action.org/ Research and innovation 8
19.07.2013 http://www.science2action.org/files/sciencereports/ Science reports 4
19.07.2013 http://www.conservation.org/global/marine/publications/ Marine, Resources and publications 2
19.07.2013 http://equatorinitiative.org/ -
19.07.2013 http://sfg.msi.ucsb.edu/current-projects/sustainable-ocean-
solutions 
Sustainable oceans Solutions -
19.07.2013 http://sfg.msi.ucsb.edu/current-projects/unassessed_fisheries un-assessed fisheries 1
19.07.2013 http://www.ifad.org/ ‎ Sent by author 1
19.07.2013 http://sfg.msi.ucsb.edu/ Sent by co-author 1
23.07.2013 http://www.mrcmekong.org/ Sent by author 1
23.07.2013 http://www.mrcmekong.org/publications/topic/
fisheries?start=20 
Publications fisheries 1
23.07.2013 http://www.rflp.org/co_management Co-management 7
25.07.2013 http://www.protectplanetocean.org/ tools and resources 1
27.07.2013 https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/
browse?order=aSC&rpp=20&sort_by=-1&etal=-
1&offset=200&type=topic 
fisheries and aquaculture 1
27.07.2013 http://web.worldbank.org/WBSite/eXteRnal/toPiCS/
eXtaRD/0, contentMDK:23070469~pagePK:148956~piPK:216
618~theSitePK:336682,00.html 
World Bank Profish 20
29.07.2013 http://www.iucn.org/about/union/commissions/sustainable_
use_and_livelihoods_specialist_group/
lessons learned 2
30.07.2013 http://www.afma.gov.au/resource-centre/research/reports/ Research reports 5
30.07.2013 http://www.afma.gov.au/search/?query=ecosystem+based+m
anagement
ecosystem-based management 
guidelines
2
30.07.2013 http://www.afma.gov.au/ Sent by author 1
30.07.2013 http://www.cdu.edu.au/ Sent by author 4
01.08.2013 http://www.lmmanetwork.org/resourcecenter Resource center 3
14/08/13 http://www.idrc.ca/en/Resources/Publications/Pages/
default.aspx
Publications - Co-management 2
14/08/13 Publications - fisheries 
management
0
14/08/13 Publications – fish 1
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DAtE OF 
SEARCh
INStItutION wEbSItE: SEARCh AREA NO. OF 
RESuLtS
14/08/13 http://www.idrc.ca/en/Resources/Publications/Pages/
iDRCBookslist.aspx
 
iDRC Books – Co-management 0
14/08/13 iDRC Books – fisheries 
management
0
14/08/13 iDRC Books - fish 2
14/08/13 http://www.smu.ca/webfiles/Dr.tonyCharles.pdf Co-management; community-
based; ecosystem approach to 
fisheries; fishery management and 
governance; international fisheries; 
rights based management; small-
scale fisheries; successful fisheries
26
14/08/13 http://www.southampton.ac.uk/oes/research/publications.
page?
Publications 0
14/08/13 http://www.enaca.org/modules/library/tag.php?label_type=1 Better management practices 0
14/08/13 livelihoods, gender and social 
issues
1
14/08/13 http://www.afdb.org/en/documents/environment/12/ environment 0
14/08/13 http://www.adb.org/publications/search/448?keyword=fish agriculture and natural resource 
– fish
2
15/08/13 http://www.worldfishcenter.org/worldfish-publications fisheries management – open 
access
23
15/08/13 http://r4d.dfid.gov.uk/Search/SearchResults.aspx
?search=advancedsearch&Searchtype=3&Projects=
false&Documents=true&Documentsonly=true&any
word=fisheries+management&anywordCondition=
anD&anyWordPhrase1=1&anyWordChoosefield1=-
1&Keywords=2188&Pageno=7
fisheries management 7
15/08/13 http://www.apfic.org/modules/wfdownloads/ Co-management 2
15/08/13 http://www.apfic.org/modules/wfdownloads/viewcat.
php?cid=59
fishery and aquaculture policy 1
15/08/13 http://www.apfic.org/modules/wfdownloads/viewcat.
php?cid=57
ecosystem approach to fisheries 3
15/08/13 http://www.apfic.org/modules/wfdownloads/viewcat.
php?cid=67
Promoting co-managemenet 2
15/08/13 http://www.apfic.org/modules/wfdownloads/viewcat.
php?cid=76
Gender in fisheries and aquaculture 1
15/08/13 http://www.apfic.org/modules/wfdownloads/singlefile.
php?cid=68&lid=274
Participatory development 
approaches
1
16/08/13 http://caricom-fisheries.com/PublicationsandDocuments/
CRfMResearchPaperCollection/tabid/86/Default.aspx
CRfM Research Paper Collection 2
16/08/13 http://caricom-fisheries.com/PublicationsandDocuments/
CRfMtechnicalandadvisoryDocuments/tabid/87/Default.aspx
CRfM technical and advisory 
Documents
4
20/08/13 http://www.macfound.org/press/publications/conservation-
sustainable-development-white-papers/
Conservation and Sustainable 
development white papers
1
20/08/13 http://www.castlefoundation.org/grants-marine.htm nearshore Marine Resource 
Conservation
0
20/08/13 http://www.waltonfamilyfoundation.org/environment/marine-
conservation
Marine Conservation 0
20/08/13 http://www.oakfnd.org/library environment 0
20/08/13 http://www.packard.org/what-were-learning/program-area/
children-families-and-communities/
Conservation and Science; Children, 
families and Communities
0
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annex 2
Informal knowledge search checklist
NAME(S) ORGANIzAtION(S) POSItION(S) LOCAtION DAtE
the checklist below lays out some broad questions about your knowledge and experience of eco-system based community management 
approaches (left hand column) while the middle column contains some additional more specific issues that you may want to consider 
while writing your responses in the right hand column. Please feel free to treat these questions as freely as you wish and by all means 
make suggestions regarding their relevance. in your responses to some of the questions, you might want to make a distinction between 
your personal opinions and experience, and those of the organization that you work for. 
GENERAL QuEStIONS PROMPtS KEy KNOwLEDGE AREAS/OutPutS
What do you feel are the key characteristics 
or defining features of an ecosystem-based 
community management (eCM) approach?
What experience have you had of these 
approaches?
What eCM initiatives have you been 
involved with / are you familiar with?
Describe the key features of the 
approaches used?
What do you regard as the strengths and 
weaknesses of eCM approaches (based 
on your experience) and what factors 
contribute to them?
How would you define a successful 
eCM approach?
What are/were the strengths of the 
approaches you have experienced 
or used?
What were the weaknesses?
What specific factors contribute/d to their 
success or positive impacts / failure?
ecological / resource 
characteristics?
Social setting?
Governance arrangements?
Characteristics of the organisations 
involved?
Wider institutional context?
Scale?
Markets?
Wider economy?
timing?
Cost-effectiveness?
Can you suggest key initiatives, individuals 
or organisations who work on eCM who 
we should be in contact with as part of this 
review?
What other individuals or 
organisations are you aware of 
working on eCM and/or community-
based management?
What documents would you regard as 
the most useful for understanding eCM 
approaches?
Papers. Reports. Books. Guidelines 
and manuals. articles.
